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ABSTRACT. 
 
This dissertation addresses critically the role that land tenure plays in housing the poor in 
rapidly urbanising medium–sized cities in the Global South and in particular, 
Aguascalientes, Mexico, a city with one of the highest growth rates in the country. Urban 
sprawl, industrial development, and the increasing impoverished population in these sorts 
of cities are key variables that demand the attention of scholars and policy makers who 
have traditionally focused on the largest Mexican cities, i.e., Mexico City, Monterrey, and 
Guadalajara.  
 
The urban poor struggle to achieve consolidated housing by means of creative agency 
strategies operating within restrictive environments, or structures. Thus, this study engages 
with the implications of poverty, informality, and security of tenure as the starting points to 
understand the problems of housing the poor. Their experiences and voice were 
incorporated by following a behavioural approach and contesting the arguments that assert 
the need for a Western–like legal land and housing system as the only path for such cities 
to overcome poverty as promoted by influential international bodies. In order to gain the 
in–depth knowledge required for this research, a qualitative case study methodology was 
employed, interviewing formal and informal poor settlers, policy makers, and experts.  
 
The results showed that more questions are raised by the structure than by the agency 
strategies utilised by the urban poor, as the latter proved to be more part of the solution 
than of the problem. Besides the evident overlapping of formal and informal housing 
mechanisms, institutions must learn from their experiences. Approaching the role played 
by land tenure in home choices from a behavioural approach enriched this research by 
assessing it from the perspectives of the main actors involved in the process. It helped 
understand the problem from a perspective that is rich in experience as settlers provided an 
honest insight into their problems within the sampled areas by incorporating their voice 
into the housing equation. Yet, there was still an evident mismatch between the settlers’ 
and public bodies’ approaches to housing that will probably endure for some time. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION. 
 
1.1. The challenge of housing the urban poor. 
 
This dissertation addresses critically the role that land tenure plays in achieving housing 
for the poor in rapidly urbanising cities in the Global South. In particular, the thesis uses 
case study evidence and detailed residents and key actor interviews to interrogate the 
contention that the regularisation or formalisation of informal housing is an effective and 
desirable way of improving housing conditions and unlocking resources. This region is 
characterised by a challenging socioeconomic environment and the impoverishment of 
much of its population. It accounts for about 90 per cent of the total urban growth in the 
world (World Bank 2009: 1). By 2010, more than 45 per cent of the Global South’s 
population lived in urban areas and this proportion is expected to increase up to 55 per cent 
by 2050 (UN 2011: 3). A major challenge is that most urban residents in this region are 
poor. The World Bank (2011) reported that, by 2005, more than 22.2 per cent of world’s 
population lived in households with an income below the official poverty line, PL, of $1.25 
US a day. Thus, having access to jobs, health services, education, and housing is difficult 
for the urban poor.  
 
Often, achieving consolidated accommodation requires many years of individual and 
family efforts as the urban poor earn low–incomes and often work in non–permanent jobs, 
i.e., bricklayers, gardening, unskilled activities, and street sales. Others are self–employed 
in activities often characterised for not being captured by the legal employment and tax 
systems. All these make the urban poor ineligible to formal housing programmes that 
commonly target formal workers or people with steady incomes. As a result, the poor often 
have no choice but to address their housing needs through informal mechanisms.  
  
As a result, informal settlements and slums have become more affordable options for the 
urban poor to live (UN–HABITAT 2008b: 90). Informality implies a process in which 
housing is subjected to a set of rules outside the legal system, and often depends on rules 
defined by the land seller and the buyer. An informal home construction process often 
starts from building a small room with cast off materials in informally occupied plots 
lacking the basic municipal services such as electricity, running water, and drainage. Often, 
the streets are unpaved without concrete sidewalks and roads or street lighting. Eventually, 
many of these residents will manage to replace their precarious dwellings with more 
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consolidated housing structures whilst many other dwellings will simply remain almost the 
same for years.  
 
As circumstances evolve –i.e., families grow, older children start working or get a partner– 
so do the housing needs that must be accommodated. Thus, residents make decisions 
highly constrained by the perceived security of land tenure and safe investment that their 
efforts represent. Many of these dwellers achieve the legal possession of their plots after 
public agencies implement regularisation, legalisation, and/or land titling programmes. 
This step represents the “official” recognition of both the informal areas and their residents 
and, consequently, it makes residents “visible” and, ultimately, eligible for public 
investment, i.e., infrastructure and services. Yet, many informal areas have basic 
services/infrastructure introduced even before their legal recognition. This sends 
contradictory signals to dwellers about their risk of eviction and the way the authorities 
plan to deal with them.  
 
Some key drivers, such as perceived security of tenure, lead the home consolidation 
process. Often, informal residents shape a sense of “security” based on the interpretation of 
their social, political, legal, and economic circumstances. Over time, the perception of 
being at risk of eviction decreases, leading to a process of home consolidation regardless of 
the legal status of their land. In recent years, many informal residents have learnt that 
forced evictions have in fact become less common strategies among local authorities. 
Ironically, legal/formal land tenure does not necessarily represent the achievement of a 
safe place to stay. The pursuit of security of land tenure seems not to relate directly to legal 
tenure. This de facto interpretation is crucial as the urban poor need to allocate their limited 
resources effectively. Within this context, individual and family efforts become necessary 
to achieve a consolidated home and the process often follows self–help strategies which 
build upon a “safe to stay” perception. 
 
Selecting informal areas to live is not a matter of coincidence. The urban poor find it 
difficult to meet the requirements imposed by formal housing markets and, therefore, they 
direct their investments towards land offered in cheaper places with more flexible 
transaction mechanisms. The initial step towards securing safer transactions is the 
relationship built with the landowners. Often, they meet through references of relatives or 
acquaintances that have had a previous relationship with them. Informal transactions are 
within the grasp of the poor in different ways. First, the land offered is cheaper than formal 
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markets. Second, it is common to achieve “adequate” arrangements with landowners based 
on the individuals’ financial capacity. Third, alternative forms of payment may replace 
often cash payments, i.e., poultry or cattle or even labour exchanged by buyers with the 
seller in the form of small tasks as required by landowners.  
 
Lastly, informal plots are not only cheaper, but also usually larger than the formal ones, 
allowing people to house extended family members, raise chickens or cattle, or plant 
something to eat. This flexibility in transactions arrangements is a key to making housing 
decisions as the majority of urban dwellers face the “inconvenience” of being poor, self–
employed, having a temporary/instable job, a low–income, and/or not being able to show 
convincing proofs of their earnings.  
 
These conditions, however, make the poor unbankable or ineligible for access to services 
in banks or credit institutions that focus on formal workers (often middle–, and high– 
income earners). The outskirts of cities and marginal urban areas have become the 
common locations where the urban poor start large self–produced settlements where home 
conditions progressively consolidate over time (Gilbert 2002: 16). In these areas, the land 
is cheaper for reasons: first, the land is located far from the urban areas, which makes it 
unattractive to housing developers. Second, it is often the case that topographic conditions 
are inadequate for residential projects and the introduction of basic services are 
correspondingly expensive. Finally, informal areas are often located near land uses that 
negatively impact on future residential projects, i.e., dumps or landfills. Formal land 
developers allocate their investment elsewhere to secure their return in more marketable 
areas.  
 
Eventually, urban sprawl absorbs the informal areas that become of interest to local 
authorities and politicians. In time, they turn into “sensitive” urban areas in which legal 
tenure and land regularisation become relevant at a given moment. For instance, De Soto 
(1989: 38) investigated how the informal residents in Lima became attractive potential 
supporters of parties who “compete for sympathies and support of dwellers in the informal 
settlements”. Sometimes, land invaders name informal settlements, streets, and districts 
after prominent political figures, presidents’ names, their wives, local authorities, and 
political leaders in power to “persuade that person to intervene on the settlement’s behalf” 
(Ibid: 22).  
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Residents and politicians build a convenient relationship under the premise of mutual 
benefits in the future. For instance, some public programmes mobilise in these areas 
ranging from construction materials support initiatives to, eventually, regularisation or land 
titling programmes. Yet, the public policies implemented do not necessarily match the 
needs and perceptions of residents regarding their potential benefits. Often, the urban poor 
try to stay away from the legal framework that represents a regularised plot. In an informal 
settlement, the urban poor do not pay any land taxes (although this will eventually change 
after regularisation). Yet, informal settlements experience substantial changes over time: 
for instance, residents progressively replace initial building materials with more solid and 
permanent structures –i.e., brick and concrete– and often manage to have some basic 
services introduced –i.e., sewage, water, and electricity. In fact, informal dwellers often 
find regularisation programmes unattractive.  
 
The idea of living in a formal area to enjoy basic services seems not to be attractive after 
all as the lack of legal land titles or legal tenure did not prevent millions of the urban poor 
from consolidating their homes, obtaining the basic services, or feeling secure about living 
in an informal area. Some authors highlighted the capacity of the urban poor to negotiate 
and achieve legal tenure, basic services, and infrastructure (Gilbert and Ward 1985: 70; 
and Irazabal 2009: 559). The urban poor are able to consolidate home conditions despite 
the absence of legal tenure. Thus, they view regularisation as imposed, tax–driven, and 
unnecessary in practice. Informal residents perceive the progressive introduction of basic 
services as a sign of a tacit recognition from local authorities, making eviction improbable. 
Therefore, residents keep investing small sums of money to improve their home 
conditions. 
 
Certainly, formal housing markets only serve formal workers through housing funds and 
agencies but, in the Global South, the number of people working informally is enormous. 
Burgess (1982: 62) claims that public housing
1
 “is badly matched with the needs of its 
users” and, actually, it mismatched the social and economic profile of millions of ineligible 
urban residents who do not qualify for credit or mortgages. The inability of the housing 
sector to match the needs of the urban poor accompanies the growth of informal 
settlements. The role of public bodies is often reactive and seen as an attempt to regain 
control of the urban sprawl. Once informal areas attain certain levels of consolidation, 
                                                 
 
1 This refers to housing promoted by public bodies at local, regional, and national levels.  
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policymakers try to gain control over these areas by promoting large regularisation 
programmes. This reinforces the perception that no matter what, the informal areas will 
eventually be regularised and that eviction will not be an option or a policy for the 
authority to follow. Thus, the urban poor make their decisions based on what they perceive 
and interpret far beyond the simple argument of the formal or informal status of assets.  
 
As argued by Golledge and Stimson (1987: 11), the decision–making process relates more 
to the attitudes, perceptions, and the learning processes of people within specific structural 
environments. The environment and the person establish a perceptual relationship as 
decisions follow people’s own interpretations. In other words, one understands how she/he 
interpreted the environment by understanding a response to individual circumstances. The 
legal framework, for instance, is only one element within this environment that an 
individual interprets. This may be different among members of the same group. This 
relationship –or interface– is central for “enhancing behavioural human–spatial settings” 
concerning social, political, and institutional agents (Ibid: 11). Understanding human 
behaviour is central in trying to explain the drivers for home improvements in deprived 
urban areas. Golledge and Stimson named this relationship as the man–environment 
behavioural interface (Ibid), whilst Giddens assesses this relationship as the structure–
agency approach (Giddens 1984).    
 
As a result, this dissertation seeks to assess the process of housing the urban poor from 
both the views of suppliers and the urban poor themselves, aimed to assess the process of 
achieving consolidated housing. In this endeavour, this dissertation takes into consideration 
the role played by land tenure perception as a driver of home consolidation among the 
urban poor within a context of rapid urbanisations in the Global South where poverty and 
housing conditions continues to be a major challenge for scholars and policymakers. This 
research scrutinises the existing disassociation between the mechanisms followed by the 
urban poor in practice as opposed to what we find often as current housing policies and 
programmes (and advanced in their academic and policy polemic antecedents). The 
evidence for the benefits of land titling policies remains scarcely assessed in places such as 
Mexico and in particular, in its typical, medium–sized cities. Thus, this research embarked 
on the scrutiny of the home consolidation process in a city of this type in Mexico as a 
theoretical opportunity to learn some key lessons. As long as granting legal titles remains 
considered as the ultimate solution for policymakers’ intervention, its effectiveness 
remains uncontested. The inability and incapacity of the housing sector to accommodate 
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the needs of the urban poor for shelter, raises the necessity to continue the analysis on the 
benefits of alternative policies that do expedite home improvements among the urban poor. 
 
1.2. Rationale of the study. 
 
This research sought to narrow the existing literature gap about the impact of land tenure 
on home consolidation and its role as a driver for expediting improved housing conditions 
in rapidly urbanising settings in the Global South, particularly in the selected case study. 
This dissertation aimed to provide a wider understanding of the role played by land tenure 
in both formal and informal settlements. To pursue such contributions, this dissertation 
critically analyses key literature about poverty, urbanisation, informality, housing the 
urban poor, and land tenure. Additionally, it assesses approaches aimed to explain how the 
urban poor perceive and interpret their environment within restrictive conditions. In 
particular, it adopts the structure and agency approach (Giddens 1984) and the man–
environment interface as a way to understand such an interaction (Golledge and Stimson 
1987: 11; and Rossi 1955: 174). 
 
The fieldwork conducted allowed this dissertation to obtain new, original data to aid 
understanding of this process within a specific setting. In particular, the fieldwork focuses 
on scrutinising the process of home access and consolidation, starting from the moment 
when an individual decides to leave his/her parental home and continuing through different 
stages such as the search and selection of the new place to live, the actual move into the 
plot/house and the long process of improving their homes. This helps understand the role 
played by land tenure throughout all this process. Thus, the analysis of the benefits of land 
titling policies also includes their impact on helping to achieve a consolidated home among 
the urban poor.  
 
Mexico is a country of great contrast. By 2010, for instance, 77.8 per cent of Mexicans 
lived in a city and the Gini Index was 0.52 (UN–HABITAT 2011: 209). Unemployment 
has doubled since 2000, reaching 5.43 per cent in 2010 (INEGI 2011c). Half of Mexicans 
are officially poor, and 10 per cent live in extreme poverty (CONEVAL 2011). The 
National Housing Commission (CONAVI 2006: 218) reported that more than 24 million 
people lived in inadequate housing. The housing deficit was 7.3 millions of homes – of 
which 4.4 million were new homes needed and 2.9 million of homes were homes in need 
of significant improvements. The current housing stock of 24.7 million homes is expected 
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to double by 2030 but the provision of housing for low–income earners will remain as a 
major challenge for the sector (CONAVI 2006: 221–2).  
 
Researchers typically focus on analysing the three largest Mexican cities: Mexico City, 
Guadalajara, and Monterrey. More than 32 per cent of Mexicans –or 36 million people– 
live in these three cities only (INEGI 2010). The rest concentrates in medium–sized cities 
where industrialisation is ramping up along with population growth. Yet, whilst medium–
sized cities have experienced rapid urbanisation, the largest cities have reached a certain 
level of “saturation”. Thus, this dissertation selected the city of Aguascalientes,2 Mexico, 
as a case study. The city presents increasing population growth rates and rapid 
industrialisation accompanied by an increasing urban sprawl and growing poverty levels in 
the last three decades. Since the 1970s, the population grew 3.94 times –from 181,277 
inhabitants to 722,218; and the number of housing units increased by 6.47 times –i.e., from 
28,596 to 185,120. Nevertheless, 45 per cent of its residents did not have enough income to 
buy a house in a fraccionamiento
3
 in the formal sector, and 24.5 per cent of hidrocálidos –
i.e., the name given to the inhabitants and residents of Aguascalientes–lived in extreme 
poverty (INEGI 2010).
4
 
 
                                                 
 
2Aguascalientes means “Hot Waters” and it is the name of the City, the Municipality, and the State. Yet, 
“Aguascalientes” will refer to the city unless otherwise stated all throughout this dissertation.  
3 In Mexico, fraccionamiento is a local word commonly used to designate formal residential areas as 
developers sell a “fraction” of land –e.g, a plot- or build houses in each fraction of the area. 
Fraccionamiento refers also to formal areas developed by following local regulations, whilst colonias refers 
to older residential areas built before the implementations of building codes, zoning regulations, and urban 
master plans.   
4 See INEGI (2011c) “Encuesta Nacional de Empleo” in 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/sistemas/enoe/infoenoe/default.aspx?s=est&c=14042. 
Page last accessed in January 2011. 
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Figure No. 1. Location of Aguascalientes City in Mexico. 
Source: Google Maps (2013). 
 
The pressure on the urban areas of the city–region to accommodate a growing and 
impoverished population led to the creation of informal housing areas. There, thousands of 
poor residents have found accommodation as the city is the main source of employment in 
the region. The majority of the state’s population –or 67 per cent– is concentrated in the 
city alone (INEGI 2010). Aguascalientes is a city of migrants; one out of five people living 
in Aguascalientes was born elsewhere (INEGI 2010), particularly from the surrounding 
states of Zacatecas, Jalisco, and Guanajuato, and from Mexico City. The federal, state, and 
local authorities invest the majority of public funds in the city of Aguascalientes.  
 
One may assume that the city is a buoyant area. Yet, there is a contrast between the official 
picture of the social and economic development of the city (Gobierno del Estado de 
Aguascalientes 2010) –promoting an “orderly” urban development, higher levels of school 
attendance, employment, and industrialisation– and the reality faced by many people living 
in poverty. By 2010, more than 22 per cent of the Economically Active Population, EAP
5
, 
actually worked in the informal sector (INEGI 2011b). 
                                                 
 
5 The Economically Active Population, EAP, in Mexico is “Persons 12 and older who had links with the 
economy or which they sought in the reference week, so they were employed or unemployed”. In INEGI 
(2010b). “Glosario”. In 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/glosario/Default.aspx?ClvGlo=CPV2010&s=est&c=27432. Page last 
accessed in January 2011.  
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1.3. Aim and objectives of the research. 
 
The difficulties of defining the extent to which home improvements are an attribute of a 
particular intervention of a public policy (Payne et al 2009: 446) are evident. However, it is 
possible to trace the path through which the poor attempt to achieve adequate housing. 
Hence, the aim of this dissertation is to assess the motivations and barriers for the urban 
poor to invest and achieve fully consolidated and serviced housing. It seeks to scrutinise 
the environment within which the poor attempt to consolidate housing and its influence on 
the incentives and barriers in the process. To pursue this aim, the dissertation established 
three objectives as follows:  
 
First objective: The first objective is to assess the living conditions of the urban 
poor by contesting the utility of the dichotomy of informal and formal in 
categorising the poor. In pursuing this objective, this research engages in seeking 
better understanding of the environment in which millions of people struggle to 
achieve fully consolidated and serviced housing within their grasp, given the 
limitations and barriers they face.  
 
Second objective: This objective examines critically the circumstances under which 
the urban poor make choices regarding their efforts to achieve permanent housing. 
By achieving this objective, this research scrutinises the existing mechanisms by 
which the urban poor attempt to access owned housing in developing countries.  
 
Third objective: this objective scrutinises the contribution of security to informal 
house construction and the role played by land titling as a driver for home 
improvements among the urban poor. This objective engages with the controversies 
that the legal tenure plays in land choices and home improvements for both formal 
and informal settlers.  
 
1.4. Thesis structure. 
 
Thus, the thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 1 (present) introduces the context and 
rationale behind the structure of this dissertation, its aim, and goals. It introduces the reader 
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into the dissertation structure aimed to capitalise the enormous amount of data that helped 
delve into the dynamics of land tenure and housing the urban poor.   
 
Chapter 2 engages with the debate on the benefits of land tenure and its implications in 
housing the urban poor. It critically engages with interrelated issues, such as urbanisation, 
poverty, housing processes, formal/informal dichotomies, transactions costs, credit and 
savings, taxation and mobility, and the understanding of poverty by officialdom, among 
others. These are key aspects influencing the possibilities of achieving owned and 
consolidated housing over time and play a major role in practical terms of millions of 
people.   
 
Chapter 3 assesses the land and housing environment in Mexico, especially the role of 
ejido land –or communal land– in the equation of housing the urban poor. It helps 
scrutinise the efforts to make such land tenure type operational in a conflicting context of 
urban sprawl and informality in urban areas. It also recreates the influence of ejido land in 
the poor’s housing choices.  
 
Chapter 4 engages with the methodological framework designed to attain the aim and 
objectives of this dissertation. By adopting a behavioural approach to analyse  the role 
played by land tenure in attaining consolidated housing, this dissertation seeks to contest 
the different theories aimed to promote or deter both formal and informal land tenure as a 
process to improve the housing conditions of the urban poor.  
 
Chapter 5 scrutinises the process followed by the urban poor towards achieving 
consolidated housing. It recognises a non –linear path, yet, it implies the understanding of 
each stage in the process when it occurs. It assesses the challenge that this process 
represents in a specific setting –the selected case study area– under particular 
circumstances. This chapter discusses the data obtained in the fieldwork.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the contribution of security to informal house construction. This key 
section helps assess the process by which the poor deal with the institutional framework, 
which tests their agency capacity. This reviews the data obtained during the fieldwork to 
identify existing milestones in the process towards consolidated housing in the challenging 
process of self–production followed by thousands of people in the sampled areas.  
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Chapter 7 starts by ascertaining the views of those poor who chose the formal path and its 
role in house consolidation. In addition, it reviews critically the voice of relevant actors 
who play a major role in urban, housing, and financial mechanisms intended to promote 
housing for the urban poor. This shows how they approach the problem of those with 
limited capacity to access housing through formal mechanisms and how they deal with 
residents in Aguascalientes, the city selected as a case study.  
 
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of this dissertation intended to contribute to fill the gap 
of a quite limited literature on the implications of the role that land tenure plays in the 
process of achieving consolidated housing in medium–sized cities with high 
industrialisation and urban growth rates in Mexico.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE DEBATE ON LAND TENURE AND ITS BENEFITS. 
 
2.1. Introduction. 
 
A number of key factors helped shape the theoretical framework of this dissertation: the 
urbanisation of poverty; the formal/informal land and housing market; and land titling as a 
policy to expedite poverty alleviation. Although these aspects are not necessarily 
connected in a linear way, they influence land and housing choices at different paces and 
forms among the poor who cannot meet the cost of formal housing (Gilbert and Ward 
1985: 5). This section complements the discussion with the inclusion of taxation, credit, 
savings, and mobility aspects into the analysis.  
 
In an impoverished South, security of tenure and land titling play an important role in the 
housing equation. On one hand, land titling reveals “complementary measures” (Gilbert 
2002: 8) not only to encourage investment but also to help the poor improve their living 
conditions. Gilbert (Ibid: 16) claims, the uncomfortable truth is that, in practice, the 
granting of legal titles has made very little difference. On the other hand, the question 
remains on whether titling must be seen as the ultimate policy to help people improve their 
housing conditions or not. The challenge is important, as most informal areas are, as 
AlSayyad (1993: 34) puts “high–density, widespread, residential communities which have 
been established and consolidated often outside of the formal legal and economic 
structures”.  
 
The literature disagrees over the supposed benefits resulting from the insertion of informal 
property into formal markets. Payne (2001: 427) claims that, “caution is advisable in 
effecting major changes to tenure systems”. He considers that further unwanted outcomes 
could be produced after granting titles to informal settlements and offers alternatives to 
legal titling as intermediate options for preventing negative effects after legalisation based 
on both rights and customary approaches and, at the same time, incentivise home 
improvements in informal settlements. These alternatives are to increase the rights of 
residents without changing formal tenure systems and to extend existing customary 
arrangements with further benefits if displacement occurs.  
 
Varley (2002: 458) is cautious in dealing with titling programmes as she refers to aspects 
to be considered in terms of the private life of “beneficiaries” –i.e., gender issues, family 
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networks, and emotional connections. She states various options where the granting of 
titles may cause problems to families with land disputes, i.e., among members and second 
wives’ claims. Her argument focuses on the dichotomy of the public and the private and 
pointed to the representation that this implies within a family. Doebele (1987: 16) also 
calls for a review of alternatives to cope with the problem of housing the poor, highlighting 
the problem on the supply side. He presents some recommendations to cope with the 
problems, such as changing in official policies in the property system, the promotion of 
participatory schemes with the poor, large–scale interventions, community land ownership, 
financial intervention, new policies for tenants, and horizontal property.  
 
Mooya and Cloete (2007: 162) claim that informal markets would work better as long as 
“…they are to be a tool for poverty alleviation”; they stressed the need for better roles of 
institutions in reducing inefficiencies of markets. Gilbert (2002: 7) asserts that the evidence 
shows that settlers improve their homes regardless the possession of a legal title. The 
argument is based on the idea that security of tenure, as Razzaz (1993: 349) claims, 
“depends less on the exact legal status and more on occupants’ perceptions of the 
probability of eviction and demolition”. Thus, the understanding of the impact of land 
tenure on housing the urban poor is of a major relevance for this dissertation, as it must be 
seen within the context of an evolving urbanisation process in poorer countries where 
many studies show that the poor are able to achieve consolidated housing despite the lack 
of a legal title.   
    
2.2. A rapid urbanisation process in the South. 
 
Poverty in cities has increased largely during the last decades. The United Nations, UN, 
(UN–HABITAT 1996: v) claims that the exodus of people to cities has worsened urban 
poverty with a number of problems attached to this process, such as “scarcity of housing 
and basic services; unemployment and underemployment; ethnic tensions and violence; 
substance abuse, crime and social disintegration”. By 2009, more than 50 per cent of the 
world’s population lived in cities for the first time ever, over 90 per cent of urban growth 
occurred in the South, and about 70 million new residents settled in urban areas every year 
(World Bank 2009: 1). This phenomenon is accompanied by the increase in the number of 
people living in poverty and, hence, in need for a house.   
 
 
 25 
Figure No. 2. Selected demographic indicators. 
World and 
Regional Data
6
 
Total 
population 
(millions) 2009 
Projected 
population 
(millions) 2050 
Population 
growth rate 
(%) 
2005–2010 
% Urban 
2009 
Urban 
growth 
rate 
World total 6,829.40 9,150.00 1.20 50.00 2.00 
More developed 
regions  
1,233.30 1,275.20 0.30 75.00 0.60 
Less–developed 
regions
7
 
5,596.10 7,875.00 1.40 45.00 2.60 
Least–
developed 
regions 
835.50 1,672.40 2.30 29.00 4.10 
Source: UNFPA 2009: 90.   
 
The North and the South have faced urbanisation differently. In Africa, almost 400 million 
people will become urban in the next 25 years (Kuiper and van der Ree 2006: 2), whilst 
China and Indonesia doubled their urban population in 25 years (Saich and Yusuf 2008: 3). 
Whilst poorer countries are still in the process of becoming mainly urban, richer nations 
are already urban. Wealthy countries are 3.5 times more urban than poorer countries; 75 
per cent of residents live in urban areas in developed economies, whereas 29 per cent in 
poorer regions. Thus, some scholars consider urban growth
8
 as a major challenge for cities 
and their governments (Fekade 2000: 128; and Ravallion 2001: 2), in the implementation 
of the strategies to provide the conditions for all to experience the urban life, as in the 
South, poverty is still more acute in rural areas. Ravallion (2001: 2) explains that the 
incidence of poverty is higher in rural areas than in cities and calculates that the world’s 
population is urbanising rapidly and poverty is “becoming more urban”. As the number of 
people in poverty grows along with the size of the urban area they occupy, this process is 
                                                 
 
6 According to the UNFPA (2009: 92), more–developed regions comprises of North America, Japan, Europe, 
and Australia–New Zealand. Less–developed regions comprises of Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Asia (excluding Japan), and Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia. The least–developed 
countries are Afghanistan, Malawi, Angola, Maldives, Bangladesh, Mali, Benin, Mauritania, Bhutan, 
Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Myanmar, Burundi, Nepal, Cambodia, Niger, Cape Verde, Rwanda, Central 
African Republic, Samoa, Chad, Sao Tome and Principe Comoros, Senegal, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Solomon Islands, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Timor–Leste, Gambia, Togo, Guinea Tuvalu, Guinea–Bissau, Uganda, Haiti, Tanzania, Kiribati, Vanuatu, 
Lao, Yemen, Lesotho, Zambia, Liberia, and Madagascar. 
7 Mexico is part of the less–developed countries category.  
8 Yet, urban growth can be a matter of definitions. Fay and Opal (2000: 6) argue that the natural growth rate 
of population, the re–classification of rural areas as cities and towns, and rural–urban migration explain 
urban growth. As in the case of the re–classification of communities, this responds to the change in the 
categorisation of areas promoted by regulatory public bodies based on socio–technical drivers or political 
decisions. In Mexico, a community is “urban” when reaching more than 2,500 inhabitants (INEGI 2010), 
whilst in Sweden and Denmark 200, Spain and Turkey it was 10,000 inhabitants, and Japan 30,000 
(Hartshorn 1992). 
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now known as the “urbanisation of poverty” (Chen and Ravallion 2007; Fay and Ruggeri 
2005; Kuiper and van der Ree 2006; Malhotra: 2003; Ravallion 2001; Ravallion et al 2007; 
and UN–HABITAT: 2003, 2009). It reflects on the increase in the informal housing stock 
in the South where slums shelter one third of the world urban population (UN–HABITAT 
2008b: 90). Regardless of what Roy (2011: 231) identifies as the periphery, urban 
informality, zones of exception, and gray spaces, the fact is that the urbanisation of poverty 
creates a vicious circle; many migrate attracted by the chances of accessing to 
employment, education, and housing. Ravallion et al (2007: 27) claim that it would take 
some decades before most of the poor live in urban areas in the South.  
 
Although, poverty rates are higher in cities than in rural areas (UN–HABITAT 2003: xxi), 
it does not necessarily mean that the direct reason for the increase in urban poverty is the 
growth of cities, as migrants are already poor and move to the cities as an attempt to 
overcome poverty. Much of urban poverty is displaced rural poverty, underlining the idea 
that urban poverty is partly provoked by rural migrants, implying some difficulties in 
adapting to an impoverished urban environment, struggling not only to access 
employment, but also to achieve shelter (Blanes 1989: 139; and Bradshaw 2006: 13).  
 
According to the Millennium Development Goals Report (UN 2009: 6), in 2009, the 
number of people living in extreme poverty was between 55 to 90 million higher “than 
anticipated”. It spots the overall fall in poverty rates at different speed across regions 
(Figure No. 3) and that poverty reduction by half in 2015 will fall far short in some regions 
with an estimated of about 1 billion people remaining in extreme poverty (UN 2009: 7). 
The goal seems to be insufficient; the alert remains in place to promote effective actions to 
tackling poverty, and improving the living conditions.  
 
Figure No. 3. People living on less than $1.25 US a day (percentage). 
Region 1990 1999 2005 
2015 
target 
Eastern Asia (including China) 60 36 (16) 30 
South–Eastern Asia 39 35 (19) 19.5 
Northern Africa 5 4 3 2.5 
Transition Countries of South–Eastern Europe 0.1 2 1 .05 
Latin America and the Caribbean 11 11 8 5.5 
Commonwealth of Independent States 3 8 5 1.5 
Western Asia 2 4 6 1 
Southern Asia 49 42 39 24.5 
Sub–Saharan Africa 57 58 51 28.5 
Source: The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009 (UN 2009: 6).  
Note: Regions in brackets reached the goal by 2005.  
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Millions of people gather in areas lacking services, slums, or marginal land and housing in 
their attempt to improve their living conditions. One tangible representation of poverty is 
actually housing. Choguill (2007: 146) argues that slums are “the shelter dimension of 
urban poverty” which is the “visible” evidence of the conditions in which many people 
live. In fact, Roy (2011: 225) argues that the slum “has become the most common itinerary 
through which the Third World city is recognised”.  
 
2.3.  The implications of defining poverty. 
 
Within this scenario of an increasing poverty in cities, poverty itself becomes a key 
concept for this dissertation. There were found a wide variety of ways of defining and 
approaching it, yet the challenge is making it operational (Bradshaw 2006: 3; and Lister 
2004: 3), avoiding the temptation to implement concepts that might be regarded as 
successful elsewhere, yet, within different contexts. This is especially critical in designing 
housing and land policies for the urban poor. Thus, understanding poverty is a major 
challenge. On one hand, some authors claim that poverty is the most important social 
challenge for humanity (Hughes et al 2009: 1; and UN–HABITAT 2002: 3). Lister (2004: 
36) claims that poverty has to be “understood as a painful reality and as a construction of 
competing concepts, definitions, and measures” which actually makes it complex to reach 
consensus (Maxwell 1999: 3; and Ruggeri et al 2003: 34).
9
 On the other, as Spicker (2007: 
3) claims, defining poverty is not the best way to start its debate since it means something 
different to people. Lister (2004: 3) considers poverty as one of those words that could 
have a particular construction for each individual within societies and evolves over time. 
Øyen (1996: 4) concludes that poverty is “culturally–bound” and universal at the same 
time with a variety of possibilities not only to define it, but also to tackle it in accordance 
to location and culture. If poverty is such a difficult issue to understand, it is evident the 
presence of potential problems to make pro-poor programmes consequently.  
 
Briefly, for the purpose of this research, poverty definitions were divided into two 
approaches: the monetary and the relative. The monetary defines poverty as a “shortfall in 
                                                 
 
9 To illustrate such a challenge, Bradshaw (2006: 6-22) categorises poverty into five groups based on poverty 
causes: a) individual deficiencies; b) cultural belief systems, also called the “culture of poverty”;  c) 
economic, political, and social distortions or discrimination; d) geographical disparities; and e) cumulative 
or cyclical interdependencies. 
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consumption (or income) from some poverty line” (Stewart et al 2007: 7). The poverty 
line, PL, refers to a virtual division based on economic parameters to categorise people as 
poor or non–poor, which the WB defined in the early 1990s. This was originally fixed at 
$1 US and then updated to $1.25 and $2 US a day as the minimum income required by an 
individual for not being considered as poor and arguably sufficient to provide a minimum 
level of “well–being” (Ravallion and Lokshin 2006: 16; Ravallion et al 2008: 3; and World 
Bank 1990: 23).
10
 A major critique of PLs is that they were established independently of 
any reference group, the society in which they were conceived, and nor did it vary over 
time (Noble et al 2004: 5).  
 
To make PLs operational, the World Bank defined two parameters: the calculation of a 
minimum income level and the minimal standards for living under “adequate” conditions. 
In theory, the original $1 US per day PL should have been sufficient to cope with basic 
needs of an individual (see Desai 1990; Doyal and Gough 1991; and Sahit 2007). The 
monetary approach is relevant as many housing programmes deal with “minimal” 
standards and match people’s income capacity to pay for the unit offered. 
 
In contrast to the monetary approach, a growing interest in relative approaches has caught 
the attention of academics and policymakers. For instance, Lewis (1967: 54) argued that 
poverty is a sort of culture and a life system produced following the previous conditions 
among a vast number of poor, making poverty a way of living. Lewis claimed also that 
eradicating poverty does not necessarily eradicate the culture of poverty (Ibid: 64). In the 
late 1970s, Townsend (1979: [31]) argued that poverty could be explained only in terms of 
the concept of relative deprivation and required a local reference to what was argued to be 
“customary” in the social context. Townsend defined poverty as a condition in which 
people “lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities, and have 
the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged 
or approved, in the societies to which they belong” (Ibid: [31]). Satterthwaite (2002: 7) 
adds that reducing urban poverty is not attained only by increasing people’s incomes, but 
the skills, abilities, and capacities must be taken into account. 
 
                                                 
 
10 Many international bodies rely on the monetary approach, as data is available for cross–country 
comparisons regardless of location, economic development, and political system (Baharaoglu and Kessides: 
2002; and UN–HABITAT 2003: xxvi). 
 29 
The capabilities approach, defined first by Amartya Sen in the 1980s, rejected the 
monetary approach to measure well–being by proposing “a life lived under a value–
oriented focus” (Stewart el at 2007: 15; and Sahit 2007: 55). Sen (1983: 165) claims that in 
conceptualising poverty, it has to be considered “more than just fixing a poverty line”, 
arguing that the right focus on poverty was “neither commodities, nor characteristics, nor 
utility, but something that may be called a person’s capability” (Ibid: 160). The idea of 
“freedom to live the life one values” (Stewart et al 2007: 3) is the main approach’s focus. It 
must be more pertinent to account for what people value rather than the resources available 
to do things or obtain goods. Sen did not offer a list of capabilities. Instead, he outlined 
what a capability needs to attain, such as that of what people need to meet nutritional 
requirements; to escape avoidable disease; be sheltered and clothed; to be able to travel; or 
be educated to have the capacity to live a life according to their own choices (Sen 1983: 
162–3). This approach highlights the feelings from achieving results rather than possessing 
the things themselves. Other authors contributed to enrich the discussion on the capabilities 
approach as Figure No. 4 illustrates:  
 
Figure No. 4. The basic capabilities lists. 
Author(s) / 
Source 
Capabilities 
Basic needs /a Health, education, food, water supply, and sanitation. 
Doyal and 
Gough /b 
Physical health, autonomy, food and water, housing, work, physical 
environment, health care, childhood needs, support groups, economic 
security, physical security, education, birth control and child–
bearing, and societal preconditions. 
Qizilbash /c 
Health, basic physical capacity, nutrition, shelter, sanitation, 
education, basic mental capacity, basic level of aspiration and self–
respect, rest, security. 
Desai /d 
Stay alive/enjoy prolonged life; ensure (biological) reproduction; 
healthy living; social interaction; knowledge and freedom of 
expression and thought. 
Nussbaum /c 
Life, bodily health, bodily health (nourishment and shelter), bodily 
integrity (free movement, security against assault), senses, 
imagination, thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other 
species, play , control over environment (political and material). 
Sources: /a. Basic needs defined by the World Bank (Streeten et al 1981: 93). /b. Doyal 
and Gough: 1991. /c. Sahit 2007: [62]. /d. Desai 1990: 16 
 
Within this concept, housing is considered not as the evidence of poverty, but that of the 
capacity of an individual or a family to reach accommodation regardless of its economic 
condition. Under this approach, public policies must focus on enabling people’s 
capabilities –i.e., self–help– rather than incentivising income generation only. Stewart et al 
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(2007: 28) propose that social policies have to invest in public services to secure an 
adequate environment for people’s development, including housing. Policies centred on the 
improvement or delivery of services that stimulate potential residents’ capabilities can 
arguably benefit the poor. The approach considers income generation as an enabler of 
people’s lives though not to rely on income to reduce poverty. By enabling capabilities –
i.e., mental capacity, aspiration, self–respect and security– housing becomes a part of a 
much larger process that motivates the urban poor to achieve shelter.  
 
The social exclusion
11
 perspective is another relative approach that Sahit (2007: 75) 
defines as “a state of exclusion from the normal activities of society, and is often of a 
multidimensional nature, including access to the welfare state, lack of employment, of 
housing, and poor social relationships”.12 Here, poverty is not seen as the lack of resources 
per se, as people are poor because they are not protected by solidarity and they are not fully 
part of society (Spicker 2007: 68). Becker (1997: 159) states that the “consequences of 
social barriers… which label the poor as “different”, and marginalise and punish them…” 
are poverty and social exclusion. This is the case, not only for those who are poor in 
monetary terms, but also for certain groups in society who are –in Becker’s terms– deemed 
as “different”, i.e., migrants and lone parents. Burchardt et al (2002: 31) claim that an 
individual is excluded when he or she “does not participate in key activities” within the 
society –i.e., health, education, and housing.  
 
Finally, the participatory approach is a poverty stance that intends to identify a mutual 
learning experience “in which the knowledge, views, and experiences of policy actors 
involved in the process becomes as much the object of reflection and analysis as that of 
poor people” (Cornwall 2000: 64). The inclusion of the poor in the equation is central to 
the approach in which they actively take part in designing, implementing, and assessing 
programmes and outcomes (Chambers 1994: 953). In some places, the housing 
programmes intended to assist self–help in the South is the translation of this perspective. 
Yet, the approach leaves space for interpretations that challenge standard practice due to 
social diversity. External agents often conduct the assessment and interpretation of such 
exercises, beneficiaries’ participation in shaping plans, their impact on the strategy itself, 
                                                 
 
11 The social exclusion term was first used by Lenoir in the 1970s by referring to les exclus, or the excluded, 
as those left out of social insurance schemes in France. 
12 The European Union adopted this approach in its treaties as “not only the material deprivation of the poor, 
but also to their inability to fully exercise their social, cultural, and political rights as citizens” (European 
Foundation 1998: 19; and Spicker 2007: 65). 
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and the evaluation process is less intensive than expected. As seen, the different ways to 
approach poverty represents an important challenge for policymakers in implementing 
effective pro-poor programmes that successfully provide solutions to millions of the urban 
poor, in particular, in terms of housing.  
 
2.4.  Alternative paths to housing the poor. 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the alternative paths and mechanisms to housing the 
poor are divided in a) State investment programmes: b) formal financial sector 
programmes; c) direct investment by low–income residents or self–help; and d) 
microfinance institutions, MFIs, programmes.
13
 Often, the four mechanisms are connected 
to each other and coexist at some point. On one hand, a formal resident may build an 
additional room throughout an informal process, i.e., without permits and with self–help. 
An informal resident can be also eligible for public programmes to upgrade the home 
based on sanitary concerns or for electoral support. On the other, the State develops often 
the land and private developers build and sell the homes; the State itself, private banks, or 
even MFIs can provide credit.  
 
It is, however, the particularities of each mechanism, which make them (un)attractive 
depending on their benefits or constraints as perceived by the potential beneficiaries or 
clients. A person will make their choices based on the way they assess the barriers –their 
eligibility too– and their  capacity to cope with the commitments that each path to housing 
represents, i.e., flexibility of payments, trust in the seller, and proximity to places of 
interest, such as jobs and schools, to mention a few. This has often proved to be difficult. 
Areas nearest to employment are more expensive than more remote areas (Payne 2005: 
136). The beneficiaries assess what determines their path towards a place to live according 
to their wants, needs, and possibilities. 
  
2.4.1. State investment programmes. 
 
In the South, public housing programmes have presented uneven results in coping with the 
demand of the urban poor. Ferguson and Navarrete (2003: 315) argue that the provision of 
                                                 
 
13 The UN–HABITAT (2002: 79) also follows these categories in analysing the housing mechanisms for the 
urban poor. 
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a housing unit with a mortgage was still a popular approach among housing bodies. A 
contract has to be set in order to assure repayments and even initial sites and services 
programmes required a marginal or nominal payment from the beneficiaries involved. 
Choguill (2007: 145) claims that public housing was unsuccessful due to the high cost of 
the units that prevented them reaching the poor. Housing standards are usually set too high 
and are rarely affordable for the poor. Besides, international funding agencies often impose 
these standards regardless of the local characteristics of each place, leading many 
programmes to fail (Ibid: 146). Okpala et al (2006: 12) survey the recent evolution of 
housing policies over the last years. On one hand, supposedly, the transfer of housing 
stocks to dwellers or local associations reduced the bureaucratic cost of running them. 
States shift their participation. Starting with the implementation of sites and services 
programmes, they then implemented other approaches to housing, such as upgrading 
schemes and basic unit programmes, to more recently, taking an active role as a financial 
institution, and administering housing funds.  
 
For instance, during the 1970s the sites and services approach was a frequent housing 
policy, although, results were uneven. For Gilbert (2004: 14), sites and services were 
“deemed unsuccessful” after the WB and the Inter American Bank tagged them as not 
“replicable” or not “working very well”. Corruption was also a major issue leading to their 
failure. Fekade (2000: 138) argues that in the case of African countries, programmes failed 
because they depended on the operation and funding from international agencies, which, at 
the same time, did not succeed in providing “sustainable” funding. In addition, public 
resources were insufficient and the burden of bureaucracy meant delays in their 
implementation, which increased the costs. This shift intended to create an enabling 
environment for the housing sector with emphasis on the economic, financial, legal, and 
institutional framework. Yet, this shift has not always been as effective as desired.  
 
Fekade (2000: 136) identifies some misconceptions that led public housing to fail. For 
instance, African countries saw housing the poor more as a welfare responsibility after 
independence than as a key sector in the development of the national economy. The result 
was that funds were insufficient and the approach was unsustainable. Choguill (2007: 146) 
claims that even the “best practice housing policy is deficient, and seriously so”. As part of 
policies’ evolution, subsidies, for instance, have become central in public housing either 
via direct subsidy to mortgages or, in the case of home improvements, by reducing the cost 
of building materials through vouchers (Betancur 2007: 11). In the 1990s, many 
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governments left the housing provider role and started participating in the promotion of 
private investment and regulating long term credit conditions of savings and housing 
(Rueda–Garcia 2003: 19–20). This helped reduce a burden to the bureaucratic body, 
making it more efficient. In some parts of the South, housing policies focused more on 
enhancing urban governance, creating policies oriented towards the urban poor, 
simplifying procedures for government services, eliminating corruption, and securing 
tenure (Fallavier 2003: 16). These efforts concentrated on a better group of officials and 
the reduction of indirect housing–related costs, i.e., the cost of bribing them. In fact, 
corruption in public bodies not only deprived the poor unwilling to deal with a public 
programme. It also represented an increase in the cost for private developers who add 
corruption fees to the final cost of housing. Governments in the South have dealt with 
housing for the poor in different ways, as shown in Figure No. 5.   
 
Figure No. 5. Selected public housing programmes. 
City, Country Public Housing Approach 
Singapore /a 
Housing was a strategy to promote economic growth and 
employment About 85 per cent of residents lived in public housing; 
850 thousand housing units have been built and 23 new towns 
constructed. 
Seoul, S. Korea  
/b 
To reach the target to build 2 million housing units, an agenda was 
outlined based on the following factors: pro–growth agenda, urban 
growth management, housing rights, and community involvement. 
Chile /c 
Housing was part of the economic-financial reform; more than 2 
million people accessed housing (total population of 15 million).  
Quito, Ecuador 
/d 
Policies focused on public investment in infrastructure and services, 
the promotion of tenure to slums and public–private partnership for 
land and housing to regulate prices and avoid speculation. In one 
year, 13 thousand families in 40 urban slums received property titles; 
the investment was more than $200 million USD on roads, sewage, 
and drinking water systems. 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina /e 
Some social movements resulted in the implementation of housing 
policies –the key was the promotion of people’s participation for 
“restoring social consensus and institutional legitimacy” shifting from 
street protests to housing provision. More than 500 units built and 
1,300 near to completion from 2007 to day. 
India /f 
Promotion of reforms centred on pushing the role of governments as 
“facilitator” and encouraging development of mortgage markets, 
changing developers’ role of providers to promoters. 
Ghana /g 
Focused on encouraging “an enabling environment” to improve 
housing delivery through the private sector participation. Yet, houses 
are still of low quality. 
Sources: a/ Arku 2006: 385 and Yuen 2007: 1; b/ Ha 2004: 148–153; c/ Gilbert 2004: 15 
and Rodríguez and Sugranyes: 2004: 54; d/ Carrion and Vasconez 2003: 8; e/ Scheinsohn 
and Cabrera 2009: 110; f/ UN–HABITAT 2009: 12; g/ Fiadzo 2004: 7, 10. 
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Mukhija (Ibid: 2249) argues that there was not sufficient evidence to consider the 
“enabling approach” as successful but that the risk of its replication was high, requiring a 
more cautious position. Leaving aside the wider political and economic circumstances, the 
diversity of official approaches to housing was evident and its evolution from the role of 
the state as a builder, to the promotion of investment towards the construction of a better 
environment for the sector, was clear. Nevertheless, this approach has also showed uneven 
results. Dowall and Ellis (2009: 2294) propose that governments should facilitate a major 
enabling environment via housing policies that promotes individuals and the private sector 
“to take care of their own needs”. Sometimes, they claim, policies focus on the provision 
of services and housing schemes rather than actually enabling the housing sector as 
desired. “Too much government” in various aspects such as zoning, planning, and local 
regulations still prevailed, whilst “not too much government” regarding property rights, 
provision of infrastructure, and the promotion of private sector participation was still 
required (Ibid: 2294).  
 
They consider that the attempts to enable the housing sector have failed. In some parts, 
what actually happens in the cities rarely reflects urban planning processes. These are often 
only developed inside public agencies. The focus on good planning and theory has led to 
weak practices in the field. Frequently, public housing is contested in terms of the extent of 
the participation of public bodies in housing markets. The intervention of governments has 
often resulted in a distorted market due to intensive subsidy–led programmes, unrealistic 
repayment rates in public housing schemes, and / or unrecovered investments in the sector. 
The top–down approach to housing has proved to be ineffective. Nevertheless, there are a 
few examples intended to promote urban governance by incorporating the voice of the 
urban poor, reducing costs, and diminishing the pressure for housing. These programmes 
are innovative in the sense of the extent of people’s participation all through the housing 
process. More evidence in the future will allow the measurement of the impact of having 
the people’s voice incorporated into public matters. A housing approach needs to find a 
balance between social and economic conditions but this is still a major challenge for 
public bodies in the South.  
 
2.4.2. The formal financial sector. 
 
The most common representation of the formal housing is in the form of a credit or 
mortgage from a bank or a housing credit institution. Daphnis and Ferguson (2004: 12) 
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define traditional mortgages as “mortgage loans over a fifteen to thirty years period for the 
acquisition of new housing for families from the formal sector”. The attachment to an 
instrument of this sort represents a long–term commitment backed up by an enforcement 
environment to secure repayment from the beneficiary. Although, this is a major aspiration 
for millions, it is also one of the most challenging decisions and processes for an 
individual. For the poor, having access to formal housing finance is often out of the 
equation. Formal institutions do not consider informal residents or informal workers as 
eligible for credit or mortgages. Eligible clients are those who appear able to guarantee 
repayments over the length of the mortgage. It is assumed that a formal worker with 
permanent employment and a steady income is more reliable. Thus, working in the 
informal sector prevents millions from accessing the formal credit system.  
 
The poor do not have valuable assets to use as collateral, and they have occupations which 
are neither stable nor paid well (McCarthy 2003: 12). Unable to cope with banks 
requirements, the poor search for financial assistance elsewhere within a restrictive 
environment that has limited housing market development in recent decades (Okpala et al 
2006: 10). With the majority of inhabitants being poor, the number of clients in formal 
banking institutions is too low to encourage housing markets to develop. Providing access 
to short–or long–term funds has been difficult (Daphnis and Ferguson 2004: 9). From 
inflationary scenarios in the 1980s, to global economic shocks and the instability of the 
financial sector, housing markets have made efforts to adapt their finance systems 
(Buckley and Klarickal 2005: 247). With the recent global financial crises of 2008, 
markets have struggled to recover as the downfall affected poorer countries. The poor 
explore alternative options far from the formal housing sector. Banks perceived risks and 
remain cautious in providing mortgages and credit on larger scales. Lea (2009: 34) argues 
that: 
 
“Despite the attractiveness of mortgage lending for banks, there are many 
lower–income countries where banks still refuse to enter the market”.  
 
Beck et al (2009: 119) claim that financial markets and their institutions perform better if 
they “provide opportunities for all markets participants to take advantage of the best 
investments by channelling funds to their most productive uses, hence boosting growth, 
improving income distribution, and reducing poverty”. Lack of access to financial markets, 
hence, means that institutional performance is limited. The uneven access to markets also 
exacerbates inequality among potential participants, as the benefit of having access to 
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credit becomes selective of a few, which jeopardises economic growth. Exclusionary 
practices prevent the poor from participating due to their lack of collateral, credit history, 
and connections. However, the poor have proved able to rely on their own resources. Beck 
et al (Ibid: 133) identifies that a major problem was that financial institutions did not offer 
adequate products and services to the poor, preventing them from participating. They 
mentioned that, for instance, what they called “social distance” prevent the banks from 
servicing poorer clients who do not receive any information on services and, at the same 
time, cannot count on someone who can explain their existence. Physical distance also 
represents a restriction. Banks’ branches are usually located far from deprived areas, close 
to, or in, commercial or richer areas. It is uncommon to find a bank or even an auto teller 
machine, ATM, in the poorer areas. The urban poor are still unattractive to traditional 
banks, as operation costs seem to be still high as the amount of transactions is low in 
comparison to other client segments.  
 
Erbas and Nothaft (2005: 213) argue that promoting access to financial services can help 
“both the redistributive and growth–enhancement objectives”, i.e., affordable housing 
credit. They claim that affordable housing loans help improve living standards at both 
urban and household levels and alleviate poverty in the long term, given the benefits of 
better social and economic environments for low–income earners. By promoting the 
housing sector, dwellers’ investments increase and small amounts of money can be 
allocated to satisfy other needs. To improve housing markets and encourage the private 
sector participation, local regulations are essential. For instance, bankers need to satisfy 
some requirements before delivering housing products to clients. Warnock and Warnock 
(2007: 9–11) refer to these requirements as a number of conditions needed to allocate 
funds better to finance housing. These conditions are the capacity to obtain information on 
the borrower, the ability to value the property, the ability to secure collateral, and the 
impact of macroeconomic conditions on finance institutions. These conditions help the 
lender make decisions in granting loans, especially for the uncertain portfolios represented 
by the poor. Besides, the burden of institutional incapability increases the products’ costs 
to the detriment of borrowers for whom the need for collateral prevails to secure 
repayments that cope with those operational costs.  
 
In trying to improve housing markets, some governments have changed banking policies. 
As long as a more user–friendly approach to attend the millions of the urban poor is not 
available, they will remain excluded from a financial system that tags them as a risky 
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portfolio and does not see any possibility of doing business with them. Whilst other paths 
to secure loans have been explored by microfinance institutions and non–for profit 
organisations, the banks continued to rely on physical assets to secure their loans and 
collaterals. This stripped the majority of urban residents of resources to finance not only 
housing but also income–generating activities. Besides, due to the risks, credit rates were 
so high that credit was often inaccessible even for formal low–income workers. In 
summary, banks are not an option for the poor, informal workers, and those low earners in 
formal markets. Whilst banks offer only traditional mortgage schemes to borrowers, the 
benefits will remain exclusive to those with middle– and higher– incomes in the formal 
sector and the poor will search elsewhere and rely upon their own means.  
 
2.4.3. Self–help housing. 
 
Self–help housing is probably the most common path towards housing among the poor as 
they often access land informally and build their homes room by room; sometimes, they 
rent a room from where they start a lengthily path to have his own place to live. Literally, 
they build the rooms with their own hands or need to be able to hire others to build it for 
them very cheaply, i.e., acquaintances or relatives with construction expertise. They build 
room by room practically with no building permits. Over time, many manage to achieve a 
consolidated house according to their needs in a fully serviced plot. The formation of large 
unauthorised housing areas is problematical from the authorities’ viewpoint due to 
concerns related to sanitation, health, education, the fragmentation of the city, the creation 
of poverty belts, the increase of servicing a growing urban area, and the inability of 
efficient police that gives rise to the perception of dissatisfaction and deterioration in crime 
rates. The poor rather embark into informal housing before considering a house/land in the 
formal sector, as they often know that they would be rejected there. The barriers imposed 
by the formal sector push millions to choose informal housing through an incremental 
building strategy.  
 
Green and Rojas (2008: 92–3) claim that the proliferation of informal housing represents a 
failure of formal housing production and of financing mechanisms. The process of home 
production in informal areas usually starts with the assembly of a shack made with 
discarded pieces of wood and boards of different sorts found in the surroundings. Residents 
rebuild the shack progressively in brick, or concrete, and/or other more solid/permanent 
materials. When the process starts with a formal basic shelter unit, the construction path is 
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uneven and depends on household’s ability to buy materials, time, expertise, and access to 
supplementary cheap labour. This process is long and takes many years before a finished 
well–built house stands (Hardoy 1985: [62]–66). Without establishing fixed periods, 
Baross (1998: 71) reports that this period might last from eight to fifteen years as some 
events may slow the process since these represent associated costs, such as health problems 
and the birth of children.  
 
The poor invest as much as they can in home improvements but it is difficult for a family 
alone to extend investment towards basic services or infrastructure, which is more a 
community affair; they take care of their plot inwards. AlSayyad (1993: 34) distinguishes 
four basic phases towards housing consolidation: a) land invasion, social formation, 
physical consolidation, and urban maturity. Residents negotiate services with politicians 
and local authorities who may gradually introduce them over the years in perceived 
successful settlements. Others will simply never achieve services or improvements at 
housing or neighbourhood levels. Often, a major obstacle to access help from local 
authorities is the residents’ incapacity to negotiate. Their circumstances may be judged as 
irrelevant or technically/legally too complicated to proceed to invest in neighbourhood 
upgrading schemes. Sometimes, the communities have been unable to organise to improve 
their neighbourhoods. This delays housing and community consolidation for years. Yet, 
consolidation is often a subjective matter. For instance, Baross (1998: 73) considers that a 
settlement has reached a consolidated stage when their houses are built with solid 
materials, the land occupied, provided with basic services, schools, and shops. This is not 
necessarily a rule for every settlement as it depends more on the perception of people 
based on their experience. More important may be the way people lived during the process 
of home consolidation. It is important to understand how the poor achieve housing and 
how this differs from the formal mechanisms as Figure No. 6 shows:  
 
Figure No. 6. Phases in formal and informal housing processes. 
Process Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
Informal 
housing 
Occupation 
(invasion or 
illegal sales) 
Construction 
(many years) 
Consolidation 
(long period of 
time) 
Legalisation 
(after many 
years) 
Formal housing 
Land 
Acquisition 
(legal) 
Planning          
(short period 
of time) 
Construction 
(short period 
of time) 
Occupation 
(legal sales) 
Source: After Fay (2005: 96). 
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The major differences between the formal and informal housing processes are first, in the 
occupation phase and, second, in the issue of legal titles phases. These two occur at 
different stages within the housing process. Fekade (2000: 142) identifies an initial stage of 
occupation of land as one by which informal residents convert peripheral land into 
residential use and newcomers start building “primitive” houses made of temporary 
materials and where commercial and retail activities start taking place. The provision of 
initial basic services increases the appeal of invaded settlements, which, often, experience 
an important growth in the following years. In Mexico, self–help housing is defined as 
follows: 
 
“Self–building is a slow process, since families first settle on lots and then 
build a temporary home. They buy building materials, hire a mason, or get 
help from some relative to build the home gradually. After an indefinite 
period that may span several years, municipal services reach these homes and 
they become part of the city’s dynamics.” (CIDOC 2005: 20). 
 
Yet, any increase in the cost of living and, especially, the cost of building materials, 
jeopardises the continuity of the self–help process. Dwellers buy materials little by little 
every week whenever possible. Inflation is common in poorer countries affecting the 
capacity of the poor to make investments on their homes and may delay consolidation for 
many years more. Due to inflationary environments, the families of the poor have no 
option but to use second–hand materials, which impacts on the durability of the house. The 
way policymakers have seen informal settlements have changed over time. The army or the 
police often demolished them. The promise of a new place to live for the evicted was one 
that, at best, the authority partially fulfilled. During the post–war period and up to the early 
1970s the common reaction of governments to informal settlements was the demolition of 
houses and the offer of public housing, via units for sale or rent (Abbot 2002: 306). Now, 
governments deal with informal residents in different ways not only because of the need to 
avoid human rights’ violations but also as a way to recognise that self–housing alleviates 
their incapability to provide housing for the poor. Anyway, residents learnt that evictions 
are no longer practiced by the authorities in the last decades. They embark on a lengthy 
regularisation process.  
 
However, access to official programmes that support self–help or construction materials 
vouchers is dissimilar. While this is a common strategy to upgrade informal settlements in 
the majority of the poorer economies, in Mexico, for instance, national regulations prohibit 
these types of official support and informal settlers are –at least in law– ineligible for 
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participating (Aguascalientes 2009). Ironically, many of these informal residents actually 
receive support despite of the legal limitations, as they are potential supporters for 
politicians. Despite the changes in housing policies, the poor continue managing housing 
themselves with no– or limited assistance (see Harris 2003: 261; Hurskainen 2004: 13; 
Magigi and Majani 2006: 18; and Saich and Yusuf 2008: 58). The debate now centres on 
the effectiveness of resource allocation, i.e., technical, social, or financial. Some scholars 
argue that the final goal must be the insertion of the informal residents into the formal 
market and the promotion of home ownership to improve their conditions. Choguill (2007: 
143) concludes that: 
 
“…if the poor actually built their own houses, even with appropriate external 
assistance, the cost could be reduced sufficiently to allow them to enter the 
home ownership market”. 
 
Nevertheless, the poor do not perceive land tenure security in the way intended by public 
bodies. For instance, legal tenure is not necessarily the main driver to buy a piece of land 
in informal areas or to make home improvements. The perception of legal land tenure is 
different from place to place often attached to the levels of law enforcement at the local 
level. In contrast, in some public housing programmes, the beneficiaries focus their 
investment on mortgage payments, making home improvements difficult, as resources are 
limited. For many, legal land tenure does not actually make sense during the consolidation 
process in informal settlements. Rather, the poor perceive this as a “natural” step 
eventually taken by local authorities once settlements reach certain levels of consolidation 
or residents become relevant to politicians and governments. Over time, informal residents 
have learnt that legal tenure or the restitution of invaded land is not actually enforced. They 
will spend some years with the local authorities insisting them to legalise their status or to 
fulfil building regulations. The regularisation of informal areas seems to be easier to 
accomplish and less expensive for local authorities than dealing with the creation of new 
formal housing settlements for the poor at the standards regarded as adequate in local 
regulations.  
 
2.4.4. Microfinance institutions. 
 
A recent trend in housing the urban poor is an increase in the participation of MFIs and 
non–governmental organisations, NGOs. MFIs have normally focused their participation 
on microcredit to promote income–generating activities to overcome poverty (UN–
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HABITAT 2001: 81). Microfinance is defined as the provision of financial services to 
low–income clients, i.e., the self–employed and those with no access to traditional banking 
(Ledgerwood 1999: 1), whilst a MFI is defined as “an organization that provides 
microfinance services – loans, savings, maybe even insurance –to the world’s poor” 
(MixMarket 2009). The services intended to reach the unbanked, mainly composed by the 
urban poor. Its success is considered as one of the most interesting developments in recent 
years in all regions mainly in the field of credit for microenterprises (Daphnis 2004:1; and 
UN–HABITAT 2002: 11). MFIs typically offer savings schemes of small amounts and 
provide small loans, both usually not offered by traditional banks.  
 
By 2009, MixMarket (2009) reported more than 79 million of clients in more than 1,400 
MFIs worldwide, following a steady expansion in three decades. MixMarket (2009) 
includes “small–scale financial services, such as loans, savings, insurance, remittances, and 
other services”. The services intend to reach the unbanked, mainly composed by the urban 
poor. The creation of microfinance and microcredit is attributed to Muhammad Yunus who 
founded the Grameen Bank in the late 1970s. This is a model replicated in many countries, 
such as Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, South 
Africa, US, and Venezuela (ACCION 2009; Conde 2000: 46; FUPROVI 2009; Habitat for 
Humanity 2009; SDINET 2003; Stauffenberg 2002: 20; UN–HABITAT 2001: 81; and 
Yunus: 1999: 18).  
 
A shift in MF has occurred recently. NGOs initially participated in these schemes, but 
other formal institutions took over the leadership by the late 1990s. The original approach 
was extended by MFIs and NGOS to cover other needs among the poor, such as land 
tenure arrangements, sanitation provision, and credit for shelter (UN–HABITAT 2001: 
84). HABITAT (Ibid: 81) defines two major types of MF in housing the urban poor by 
extending traditional microcredit schemes into housing, and by addressing urban poverty 
based on the promotion of savings and loans. The first attempt to ease the lack of access to 
formal financial institutions, and the second enhances financial flows into housing. 
Housing microfinance, HMF,
 14
 a recent tendency, assists the poor to improve access 
through lending small loans payable over shorter terms. It suits the incremental 
                                                 
 
14 In this dissertation, housing microfinance refers to small loans with short terms for repayments designed to 
low–/moderate–income people and used for self–help housing, improvements of existing shelters, the 
addition of new rooms, and for the construction of new homes.  
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construction process and does not rely on the mortgage or property–based collateral to 
guarantee payments, as in the traditional banking system. HMF is offered to clients once 
they proved reliable in previous microcredit cycles initially borrowed for income–
generating activities (UN–HABITAT 2001: 81).  
 
Yet, Gilbert (2002: 13) claims, “this approach [microfinance] presents difficulties in the 
housing field, which requires much greater sums of money”, as the amount of money 
required for home consolidation is higher than the sums operated by MFIs. Yet, following 
MF schemes based on extending loans to housing once income–generating microloans 
have been paid, assumes that the beneficiary is able to direct some sums of money to 
housing purposes, and to repay the microcredit. The translation of strategies into practice is 
not easy, the availability of funds in small organisations for financial assistance via 
microloans is limited, and the impact on a large scale contested. Although, many MFIs do 
not provide credit for a wide range of housing needs of the poor yet, some offer some 
options for home improvements. Ferguson (1999: 192) claims that: 
 
“…the effective demand for micro–housing finance at the rates necessary to 
make this activity commercially viable has yet to be widely tested. The longer 
term of housing micro–finance creates greater term risk.” 
 
Microcredit will play an increasing role in housing finance in the future by considering 
dwellings not only as a house but also as a place for income–generating activities. In many 
cases, the legal status of the house is irrelevant as a condition for granting a micro loan.    
 
2.5.  The formal/informal dichotomy. 
 
Defining “adequate” housing has been a matter for public and private agencies for a long 
time along with the definition of minimum housing standards. Many of the urban poor are 
unable to afford public housing based on those criteria, leading them to search for 
alternative options. Often, the standards are subject to the will of policymakers. For 
instance, in South Africa, the law defines adequate housing as “permanent residential 
structures with security of tenure, ensuring internal and external privacy and providing 
adequate protection against the elements with access to potable water, adequate sanitary 
facilities and domestic energy supply” (Marx and Charlton 2003: 6). This house provides 
physical and legal protection along with a full set of services. Yet, the cost of the house is 
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high and consequently the number of beneficiaries is low due to institutions incapacity to 
deliver.  
 
In contrast, millions of people live in informal settlements with lower housing standards, a 
few municipal services,
15
 or none, and with no legal land title. Informality becomes the 
option towards housing for many. Thus, defining what is informal and, more importantly, 
what its implications are, become critical. Maloney (2004: 1159) claims that numerous 
efforts to reach a consensus have been ineffective, as an overlapping of definitions exist.  
 
Tokman (2001: 50) put this in perspective by claiming that “total illegality is non–existent, 
but limited legality is significant”, as it is more a matter of informality rather than 
illegality. The question is whether a legal title is a precondition to have access to services, 
infrastructure, and other aspects that legal human settlements offer or even more, whether 
this is a precondition for chances of having a better life in the cities. Durand–Lasserve 
(2006: 2) defines security of land tenure as the result of the “fact that the right of access to 
and use of the land and property is underwritten by a known set of rules, and that this right 
is justifiable”. This right allows exercising other rights inherently attached to urban 
citizenship, i.e., access to financial services, the right to an address that facilitates voting, 
and the proof of address for different administrative procedures –i.e., applying for basic 
services.  
 
Malhotra (2002: 1) claims that insecurity of land tenure and uneven incomes determine the 
length of the construction process of a house among the poor. Buckley and Kalarickal 
(2004: 9) argue that low–income beneficiaries from titling programmes receive an increase 
in property value and these can be sold at better prices than before (see also Nkurunziz 
2008: 115). Land occupied by the urban poor is often located in low–valued zones, in 
hazardous areas –at risk of flooding for instance–, polluted zones, plots with unclear 
ownership, or unattractive areas for developers, lacking basic services and infrastructure. 
Flooding and environmental–related health diseases are common in deprived areas 
                                                 
 
15 One aspect that is common to informal residents is the struggle for water and improved sanitation (CIDOC 
and SHF: 2009: 25; and Hardoy and Schusterman 2000: 63). Often, water trucks service informal residents 
as houses lack sanitation and running water. Besides, residents generally steal electricity from nearby 
public lighting posts if any. In fact, more than 8 per cent of the world’s population lack water and more 
than 30 per cent adequate sanitation in their plots (CIDOC and SHF: 2009: 25). Yet, the lack of provision 
of services and infrastructure is due to the lack of a legal title but more often, to the incapacity of local 
authorities to deliver them in both technical and financial terms. 
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(Johnson 2007: 36; Rueda–Garcia 2003: 18; UN–HABITAT 2009: 129; and Yonder 2006). 
Nwaka (2005: 2) claims that the problem is the activities of residents affect the rest of the 
city; yet, local authorities rarely apply the regulations in practice (World Bank 2004: 45) 
and the urban poor choose these areas as these are unattractive to land markets (Carrion 
and Vasconez 2003: 16).  
 
Besides, people face some barriers for not participating in public and private programmes, 
such as health problems (Painter et al 1999: 26), corruption, residential segregation, and an 
escalating violence affecting disproportionately women and the poor themselves (Amis and 
Rakodi 1995: 405; and Connolly 2003: 4). Kuchta–Helbling (2000: 13) explains that the 
predominance of informal institutions in business transactions among the poor is another 
reason of inequality. Yet, people’s capacity to deal with the institutional framework makes 
them able to cope with their needs. Thus, agency plays a major role in dealing with the 
social structure, as Giddens (1984) suggests. This is an unfinished circle. Informal 
residents and informal institutions coexist to compensate for the limitations of formal 
institutions. Satterthwaite and Tacoli (2002: 57–8) identify some elements of inequality, 
i.e., access to public transport, education, housing, access to water, food, and healthcare 
and childcare. International agencies have promoted some ideas to reduce such inequalities 
through people’s participation, providing an insider viewpoint and programmes leading to 
improved living conditions (Majale 2008: 271).  
 
Nevertheless, there is a problem of trust with the authorities as the poor rarely trust 
governments and generally do not participate in decision–making processes (Fallavier 
2003: 18; UN–HABITAT 1996: 255; and UN–HABITAT 2003: 12). Thus, politicians and 
policymakers make decisions in detriment of more inclusive processes of public 
consultation. A one–way planning system leaves the majority of people out of the process. 
People’s participation is central to the definition of more sustainable and satisfactory 
results in community issues (OSCE 2003: 4; and Satterthwaite 2002: 11). Yet, in areas 
where extreme poverty is common, people’s participation has helped improve the level of 
community organisation and of the income of some families. Perception is seen as the 
basis of trust in promoting people’s participation in community matters (Delwar Akbar et 
al 2007: 32; Murray and Rosenberg 2006: 1; and Titus 1997:232) as it relates to the way 
local authorities and residents are able to reach consensus in different matters.  
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There is inequality also within the poorer areas between residents, i.e., between women, 
children, and youth in terms of access to education, health services, jobs, and housing 
(Bresciani 2006: 16; and Nwaka: 2005: 1). In fact, land and housing are often sold to men 
only even within informal settlements and squatter areas (Farfan 2005: 225–6). Frequently, 
deals between landowners and buyers are issues exclusive for men; gender and 
discrimination are still major concerns. Some property registration offices only register 
properties under the men’s name when, for instance, formal banking institutions need to 
register a credit they granted (Benschop 2003: 13).The reaction to these disparities and 
segmentation are public programmes and products offered in a segmented way to specific 
groups (Rahman 2002: 439). For instance, the Grameen Bank established banking products 
for women, ranging from credit for productive activities to housing credit. By 2008, 97 per 
cent of members were women (Grameen Bank 2009).  
 
Gilbert (1994: 29–30–[190]) argues that conditions are similar in Latin American cities 
since they have comparable circumstances and trends. Countries have followed parallel 
paths towards development and therefore the image of deprivation is the same. In contrast 
to what occurs in African and Asian countries, where the majority of the population and 
poverty remain in rural areas (UN–HABITAT 2001: 39), migration and poverty belts are 
common in urban areas in Latin America (UN–HABITAT 2001: 40). The urban poor 
follow survival strategies to compensate for the lack of access to the formal fabric and 
institutions, especially in terms of finance, access to land or shelter, basic services, credit, 
health, and education. These strategies are critical in financing housing: i.e., borrowing 
money from moneylenders or relatives; saving small sums of money over time; buying 
small quantities of building materials every time income is present; participating in a tanda 
like system
16
 to finance their needs; and building a room through self–help with the 
support of relatives. Sometimes, the poor rent a small room and start a process of achieving 
adequate housing elsewhere or share accommodation with others in similar circumstances. 
These mechanisms often take place in an informal way, as these are unregulated and self–
managed. They are the counterpart of existing formal mechanisms.  
 
                                                 
 
16 Tandas are rotative–credit/savings mechanisms where a small group of people contributed fixed sums of 
money usually every week, and one member of the group uses it. Once all group members have had their 
turn, the tanda starts again for as long as they decide. Including new members depends on the trust or 
recommendations of a member. Tandas is a Mexican word though this mechanism exists worldwide under 
different names such as roscas, tutu, and tontin.   
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The informal housing sector is not a minor issue; the largest investors in low–income 
housing worldwide are the poor themselves (UN–HABITAT 2001: [79]). In the informal 
sector, the poor generate their own income and find their way to house themselves. Being 
informal is a choice for many. Maloney (2001: 1165) argues that informal workers often 
prefer to remain informal, as this is flexible, profitable, and convenient. He shows evidence 
from some Latin American countries that prove that informal workers are able to manage 
risk through informal strategies as well (Ibid: 1168). For many, he says, formal or informal 
employment will not necessarily make a difference to their path to exit poverty. Formal 
employment for the unskilled worker pays little as training and benefits are not free, whilst 
“the informal option may actually offer a measure of dignity and autonomy that the formal 
job does not” (Ibid: 1173). Castells and Portes (1989: 11) openly accept that defining 
informality is not an easy task for anyone. Tokman (2001: 45) accepts that the lack of a 
shared approach towards informality “related to the absence of a common definition”. De 
Soto (1989: 12) claims that there is a distinction between the activities tagged as informal 
and the people involved. This translates it into a particular urban system for subsistence 
that is neither perfect nor desirable (Ibid: 56). Although informality is not exclusive to 
poorer countries, there is where it is more acute. Tokman (2001: 50) claims, yet, “the 
informal sector is not a “black market” operation and the “formal” sector was not as law 
abiding as could be expected. Grey areas prevail”.  
  
Informality is not a static phenomenon either (Gilbert 1994: 80). The concerns about its 
impact on different aspects of urban life are an important topic for scholars. This interest 
has diminished some of the existing prejudices linking informality, poverty, and survival 
mechanisms to poorer countries almost exclusively. As Skolka (1987: 35) suggests, the 
term informality is rich and it must relate to the context of its definition to identify specific 
drivers of informality in specific settings.
17
 Many people work informally, ignoring local 
regulations. Roy (2011: 233) defines urban informality as an idiom of urbanisation, a logic 
through which differential spatial value is produced and managed. In addition, Smith 
(1992: 2) defines the informal economy as every activity not taking place in the formal 
                                                 
 
17 Many studies have sought to explain informality in different countries. For instance, a study such as 
Thomas’s (1992: 1) establishes that informality refers to activities not reflected or recorded in the national 
income accounts of the majority of countries. Other studies have been developed in the USA (Smith 1982; 
Tanzi 1982); Germany and Britain (Smith and Wied–Nebbeling 1986); Norway (Isachsen 1982); Italy 
(Capecchi 1989; Contini 1982); Canada (Smith 1982); Australia (Tucker 1982); Israel (Ben–Shahar 1982); 
the former Soviet Union (Grossman 1982 and 1989); and Eastern Europe (Rose 1992; Dallago 1987). 
These researchers agree that informality is part of the countries’ economies and represents the 
“environment” where informality works as this is a concept highly tied to economic matters. 
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economy, making it difficult to know its size in any country. Some argue that reasons and 
aims of informality differ depending on the context in each country. In the North, Skolka 
(1987: 36) claims that the informal economy aims at evading taxes and other charges such 
as social security costs or medical contributions (Smith and Wied–Nebbeling 1986: 45). 
Often, the poor are informal for survival reasons in trying to avoid hunger and poverty. 
Whether intended to avoid taxes or hunger, informality is a major issue. These two aims of 
informality are considered for some authors as the major difference between informal 
economies across countries, reflecting the importance of attending those groups engaged in 
informal activities, not only for regulatory purposes, but also, to reduce hunger and 
poverty. Skolka (1987: 37) distinguishes some important aspects of informality as follows:   
 
“[Informality is] subsistence activities transferred from rural areas to large 
cities. The poor people living in slums are engaged in productive work for 
their own support, in barter exchange among themselves and in occasional 
work for the market. The aim of activities in the informal sector is not to 
avoid taxes (income taxation is anyhow low in developing countries), but to 
avoid hunger and poverty.” 
 
Although informality and poverty are linked elements, many informal residents manage to 
attain certain levels of wealth or even exit poverty over time. Roy (2011: 227) recognises 
that informal areas or, what he calls, subaltern urbanism, are places for economies of 
entrepreneurialism and political agency. She adds that these areas host a “contemporary 
capitalism, the greenfield sites where new forms of accumulation are forged and 
expanded” (Ibid: 229). What may compel the poor to participate in informal activities is 
the need for finding their own opportunities (Castells and Portes 1989: 11–12) as a 
response to restricted markets. This participation can even be voluntarily and a matter of 
choice. Such activities aim to generate income and wealth for a person or families (Ibid: 
15, 298) and their benefits encompasses other aspects of life in cities, i.e., access to 
services, health, and education. Sethuraman (1981: 17) defines the labour representation of 
informality as follows: 
 
“It consists of small–scale units engaged in the production and distribution of 
goods and services with the primary objective of generating employment and 
incomes to their participants notwithstanding the constraints on capital, both 
physical and human, and knowhow.” 
 
Yet, informality is not a separate world. Both informal and formal activities occur in the 
same place at the same time and overlap. Sometimes, the legal status of certain activities is 
indistinguishable and mix inevitably. For instance, AlSayyad (1993: 34) claims that during 
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the process of physical settlement and consolidation, squatter inhabitants normally 
establish a complex network of relations with the so–called formal sector”. He establishes 
that the formal and informal sectors are a coupling phenomenon (Ibid: 4). Yet, informal 
residents neither fulfil their obligations with regulatory bodies nor exercise their rights. 
This is a major distinction between the two. In contrast, the authority does not have the 
capacity to inspect and supervise every activity that takes place in the cities. In other cases, 
informal residents partially meet legal obligations but local authorities still consider them 
as informal. Many do not fully participate in civic matters and struggle to organise 
themselves to obtain recognition from local authorities (De Soto 1989: 26–9). They are 
sometimes invisible to local authorities due to the argument of lacking a legal address to 
apply for some formal procedures but they are visible enough for demands for taxes 
compliance and electoral support.  
 
The rich and formal also evade taxes. The government is far from taking this under control 
and making them pay or controlling informal activities. The income generated by informal 
activities is not reflected in the gross national product, making it difficult to estimate its 
size. The regulatory frame exists neither to regulate nor to protect people or activities in 
this sector (Borsdorf 1999: 215), making people establish their own rules. Informality has 
its own reasons to exist. Lack of opportunities push people to choose it, whilst on the other 
hand, a flexible market that sometimes provides for living expenses, though at minimum, 
keep informal workers unregulated. Entering into the formal sector is a challenge due to 
the regulations faced by entrepreneurs trying to start a business. For instance, as De Soto 
(1989: 134) explains, registering a factory may take up to 289 days in Peru. That is not 
very different from what occurs in other parts of the Global South (Elizondo 1992: 69).  
 
Unregulated small entrepreneurs, housing and land markets, and street sellers remain 
unregistered since no matter how cheap sometimes registering a business or activity can 
be, registering into the formal system makes no sense to the urban poor at all (Ibid: 35–83). 
The fight against informality, though, has evolved over the years. From an initially 
consistently negative attitude to a more relaxed position presently, this change has been 
slow and difficult. During the 1960s and 1970s, the official discourse was aggressive and 
negative. In housing, for instance, Gilbert (1997: 97) reports that the policy was to 
eliminate any dwelling or squatters in order to keep order in urban areas, which resulted in 
violent evictions sometimes even with casualties. Yet, the increasing number of informal 
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residents started to represent potential advantages for governments and political candidates 
(Warnock 1995: 31).  
 
2.6.   Official attitudes towards informality. 
 
Self–provision of land for shelter purposes for the urban poor reduces the pressure on 
governments to provide housing, a task arguably left aside due to the lack of resources. If 
the cost of provision is higher than the cost of tolerating informality, dwellers will be 
allowed to stay, and eventually, negotiations will result in the progressive introduction of 
municipal services and lastly, regularisation would eventually take place. This pattern is 
often common in many informal settlements despite of their informal creation. Yet, if 
property rights are a key issue in economic development and markets functioning, the 
institutional order plays a major role in enforcing these rights. This order helps establish 
exclusive rights of property to people over private goods (Webster and Lai 2003: 77). 
Hardoy and Satterthwaite (1985: 89, 96) comment that political reasons are major factors 
to change government attitudes towards informality.  
 
The urban poor become the supporters of weak governments who are unable to satisfy and 
fulfil social demands of their own supporters once politicians retain or gain power. A 
concession for the poor is a silent acceptance of unregulated activities. Besides, the 
creation of large informal housing areas provides governments a relief of the increasing 
pressure on housing provision as informality somehow alleviated it (Hardoy 1985: 103–
105). It prevails in a relaxed context lacking regulations to prevent a clash between the 
informal residents –yet, supporters– and the government. This is most successful in 
uncontested areas, preferably away from elite neighbourhoods. Governmental bodies may 
impose certain level of institutional order. Yet, though, this is often costly and ineffective 
(Ibid: 77). For that reason, it is argued that security of tenure does not necessarily depend 
on legal titles. Customary rights over land are often more effective in providing shelter for 
poorer populations. The official apparatus respond slowly to the spontaneity of transactions 
that occur in informal markets and react to market functioning rather than regulating it. 
Legalisation is a legal procedure, but also, a political event by which authorities try to 
manipulate residents sometimes “to suit their particular ends at a particular time” (Varley 
1987: 478). Indeed, Payne (2001: 418) claims that land tenure and potential legal titling is 
“ultimately a political issue” depending more on the willingness of central governments to 
proceed than of the nature of the problem. This undermines formal markets.  
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Gilbert (2002: 5) refers to the fact that the government played a major role in preventing 
illegal occupations, further legalisation, and upgrading programmes according to their 
attitudes towards the political environment.
18
 This is evident at initial stages of land 
occupation and home production. However, it is also relevant in the legalisation process, 
which often takes place at governments’ convenience for reasons ranging from seeking 
electoral support to the incorporation of informal areas to new urban plans after speculative 
interests. Many people find political participation and engagement as an effective strategy 
in attaining individual benefits, especially towards housing consolidation (AlSayyad 1993: 
41). Political parties and sometimes authorities encourage and stimulate informal 
settlements, especially in electoral periods (De Soto 1989: 52–3; and Gilbert 2002: 6).  
 
If the informal is supported by political patrons or even officials, security of tenure is 
considered to be in place and, as Irazabal (2009: 559) defines, if de facto tenure has been 
achieved, legal “land tenure is not necessarily very attractive”. This may represent a barrier 
to governments and politicians when arguing legalisation is a way to generate support 
among informal residents since evidence shows that potential evictions are not as frequent 
as in the 1960s and 1970s. Often, given the “passivity” of governments towards illegal 
occupations, these take place on public land rather than private to reduce the possibilities 
of eviction (Gilbert 2002: 6). Since the 1990s, evictions are now seen as “politically” 
incorrect and human rights groups’ opposition have made this practice to be less frequent. 
If land is public, the vulnerability of informal residents is less than if the land occupied 
were private. Vulnerability is reduced in line with the proximity of the next election (De 
Soto 1989: 38; Gilbert 2002: 7).  
 
The attitudes of governments towards informal housing have gradually evolved over time. 
Ranging from initial evictions of squatters, the provision of ready–built core units, the 
promotion of sites and services projects, to land titling programmes, the literature includes 
numerous approaches over time in their treatment of informal settlements, i.e., shifts from 
development for, to by the poor. These changes are evident in the call for “harnessing” and 
“mobilising” forces and resources from the settlements themselves as Turner widely 
promoted (Turner 1968 and 1982). Turner (1983: 209) recognised that: 
                                                 
 
18 Gilbert presented the Mexican policy known as the Solidarity National Programme in the late 1980s by 
which benefits were given to supporters of opposition parties as a way to co–opt and gain support for the 
government and as a way to secure power in further elections (Gilbert 1998: 152).   
 51 
 
“…the ways and means of scaling–up service programmes and of replicating 
them on a sufficient scale have eluded the national and international agencies 
seeking them.” 
 
Though, self–help and sites and services schemes are largely accepted in tackling housing 
deficits, the need for implementing them at large scale prevent many programmes from 
extending sufficiently (Doebele1987: 16). The benefits of this approach are then limited 
and depend on the organisational capacity of participants and of the willingness of the local 
authorities. The WB eventually dropped the appealing sites and services approach widely 
promoted in the 1970s. Fekade (2000: 137) claims that the failure of sites and services 
programmes was more an issue of implementation and funds rather than of the approach 
itself. Although, initially attractive, these programmes required copious funds for financing 
and subsidising the programmes at a time when economic problems made countries 
incapable to sustain the path of investment.  
 
International agencies also reduced their flows of money towards these programmes, 
leaving the poorer countries with the burden of large investments. Defective administrative 
organisation led to delays in implementation with the consequent increase of associated 
costs. Fekade (Ibid: 137) claims that construction standards are still too high to be 
affordable by the intended beneficiaries, even in a sites and services approach. These often 
ended up benefiting other groups not originally targeted by the approach due to 
inefficiencies and corruption.    
 
The support of international agencies for housing issues, especially those from the WB, has 
evolved over the years. The Bank’s support has moved from sites and services projects, to 
the upgrading of existing slums, non–shelter loans approach, policy–based loans, and 
financing–related projects (Buckley and Kalarickal 2004: 4–6). In the South, national 
governments have experienced the impact of such changes in housing policies and the 
impact on the markets in a direct way. Gilbert (2002: 5) claims that the attitudes of 
governments towards informality explain better the incidence of the creation of informal 
settlements. These changes have responded more to the “recommendations” coming from 
abroad, i.e., those from the WB, rather than implementing creative strategies particularly 
focused on local problems. Stein and Vance (2008: 21) find uneven results in terms of the 
assistance provided to improve housing and neighbourhood conditions.  
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Often, legal tenure is a pre–condition to receive financial, technical, and legal assistance in 
urban areas. However, they report the presence of an “accompanying” policy, which takes 
legalisation as part of the process of official assistance to the urban poor. In assisting urban 
areas, legal titles usually deprive many from actually participating in public programmes. 
They often loose eligibility after regularisation takes place as they have supposedly 
overcome a certain level of inequality with respect to others. Yet, legalisation often 
becomes relevant to authorities for reasons other than those related to improve the living 
conditions of residents. Market forces often drive public intervention in informal 
settlements.  
 
The evolution of the approach in informal settlements recognises the initial attention that 
Turner’s ideas represented for the academia and policymakers (Turner 1968: 354–63), as 
he called for a better understanding of the self–produced cities by the poor and in the way 
in which this process takes place to be more effective through intervention. Turner argues 
that informal settlements are not the problem, but a vast part of the solution to the 
provision of accommodation for the urban poor (Harris 2003: 257).  
 
2.7.  The debate on the benefits of land titling 
 
“…it is not title, but the feeling of security that is important” (Gilbert 2012: 
ix). 
 
The debate on the benefits of land titling has increased in the Latin American cities 
context, especially after the launch of extensive programmes supported by international 
bodies. One of the most influential voices promoting land titling policies was De Soto 
(2001: 47) who argued that by granting titles, an empowering market would allow the poor 
to accumulate capital and overcome poverty. De Soto makes a proposal based on the 
benefits of the implementation of a sound legal property system in poorer countries 
following a Western–type model. This model, he claims, becomes effective by organising 
“information and rules governing the accumulated wealth of their citizens into one 
knowledge base” (Ibid: 51) and it is intended to provide valuable information and facilitate 
property transactions “without having to see the asset itself” (Ibid: 53). Available 
information generates a comprehensive environment where transactions take place and De 
Soto is convinced that this type of mechanism could be transferred to the South to make, 
he adds, people accountable, and properties marketable safely.  
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Central to his argument is the call for the property titling of informal/illegal premises as a 
way to expedite poverty reduction by inserting the poor into the formal market where their 
“dead” capital can then be fungible and it can be used in the same way that the legal 
market works (Ibid: 48). The main benefit of transforming the informal into formal is that, 
he continues, assets can participate in the market, be transferred, or used as collateral for 
credit. This transformation protects assets and transactions, arguing that formal property is 
more viable to be protected by the “system”, whilst informal assets cannot be even traced 
for granting protection to de facto owners (Ibid: 60). The Western formal property system 
is, he says, a warrantor of the assets of people in a given society, securing a healthy market 
for transactions, security, and consequently, to provide tangible opportunities for the poor 
to accumulate capital. 
 
What is relevant for this research was that he also argues that the legal system is the 
ultimate option for promoting and enabling land choices and home improvements. He 
claims that due to the protection provided by the legal system, “people are at least nine 
times more prepared to invest” in housing improvements, which a mere “perceived land 
security” –i.e.,  de facto– does not (De Soto 1989: 24–5). The World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund promoted De Soto’s arguments in the South by encouraging 
structural adjustments, based on the potential of markets as they operate in the West 
(Gilbert 2002: [1]–2). De Soto (1989: 47–62) outlines six benefits of formal property 
systems that, according to him, have been successful in the West as follows: a) fixing the 
economic potential of assets; b) integrating dispersed information into one system; c) 
making people accountable; d) making assets fungible; e) networking people; and f) 
protecting transactions. Yet, these benefits do not apply everywhere.  
 
The informal housing system has survived for years precisely by protecting de facto 
mechanisms from part or all of the benefits listed by De Soto. The informal sector works in 
parallel to the formal trend and many times overlaps. The list proposed by De Soto can be 
also part of informal markets benefits, especially for the poor (Almansi 2009: 390). 
Fieldwork remains essential in this dissertation to ascertain whether the benefits actually 
follow such assumptions. The debate increases on the potential benefits of “revealing” the 
value of informal assets and their transformation into capital (De Soto 1989: 47) by 
promoting legal ownership, regularising informal settlements, and enforcing contracts, 
which are supposed to  result in economic development and the reduction of poverty 
(Gilbert 2002; Jimenez 1983; Mooya and Cloete 2007; Payne 2001; and Varley 1987, 
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2002). De Soto does not consider associated transaction costs of moving from one informal 
basis to a more formal one.  
 
The focus on home ownership as the centre of housing policies encounters some 
difficulties, such as the inability of public bodies to cope with demand, the pace of cities’ 
growth, the costs of transactions, and the debate on the necessity of a legal system to 
enforce contracts and register properties. Chiquier and Lea (2009: xxxvi) claim that formal 
housing is “only available to middle and upper echelons of the salaried income–
distribution structure of households”. Doebele (1987: 7) follows De Soto’s arguments by 
claiming that, “the granting of tenure to private individuals is extremely efficient in 
releasing enormous energies for urban development”. Thus, the legal tenure is beneficial 
not only to an individual but also at a greater extent, the city. Doebele adds that legal 
tenure provides “a balance between need for social control and fairness in access to land” 
(Ibid: 8) and permits a “whole new set of economic forces to begin to operate” (Ibid: 12). 
Yet, he recognises that the evidence is “scarce and mixed” in the areas analysed by the WB 
where safe forms of tenure have not stimulated significant changes as expected (Ibid: 12).  
 
De Soto presents a utopic position from which he assumes that the Western–type system is 
the model to follow and compares the South with the USA of a few centuries ago which, 
by the way, he claims was also a developing country at the time (Ibid: 10–11, 16). He 
assumes that, following the lessons taught by the US history, the rest of the world would be 
able to succeed in establishing a solid economic structure within which people will be able 
to find their way out of poverty. People will learn –he adds– how to “unlock” a capital 
already there but, in a form that makes it difficult to scale up or enjoy its benefits.  
 
De Soto’s arguments on land titling have been contested by many scholars (see Broegaard 
2009; Buckley and Kalarickal 2005; Chiquier and Lea 2009; Cousins et al 2005; Gilbert 
2002, 2012; Handzic 2010; Mooya and Cloete 2010; Payne et al 2009; Reerink van Gelder 
2010; and Varley 2002). For instance, Varley (1987: 464–5) recognises that residents of a 
given settlement make periodical evaluations of their security of tenure –though informal 
by all means– based on surrounding events in the community, such as the introduction of 
municipal services little by little following political promises or after residents lobbying 
the local authorities. This fact provides residents with a sense of an “official acceptance” 
and the perception that eviction is improbable.  
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By this way, people improve their living conditions without the need of legal titling or 
evidence of any other legal procedure, which enriches the counter argument to De Soto. 
Some scholars find that legal titling does not guarantee an increase in income levels or the 
insertion of residents into formal and better–paid jobs. Titling does not ease access to 
credit from formal institutions or increase property value. The poor remain poor and banks 
hardly rely on property, though, legal, to grant credit or mortgages. Bankers evaluate other 
aspects in order to grant credit. The counter argument on land titling as a driver for land 
choices and home investments among the urban poor is central to this research (see Gilbert 
2002, and 2012; Mooya and Cloete 2007; Payne 2001; and Varley 1987).  
 
Evidence shows that wider factors impact on decisions to invest in housing that could not 
be attributed to the legal tenure of land. For instance, Payne (2001: 421) claims that legal 
tenure neither necessarily drives home improvements nor guarantees a complete sense of 
land security in poorer urban areas. Legal land tenure as a driver for home consolidation 
only plays a relative role. At the extreme, it has been proven that legal titles do not 
guarantee that residents will not be evicted from their legal properties (Gilbert 2012: vii; 
and Werlin 1999: 1535). Gilbert (2002: 8) reports an increase in home improvements in 
different cities despite the lack of services, but recognises that their installation plays an 
important role to reassure occupants’ security, though it is not definitive and observes that 
“complementary measures” are necessary to increase investment beyond the achievement 
of a legal title.  
 
Varley (1987: 463) argues that the justification for legalisation is that “it will lead to 
housing improvements” but results have been uneven because of the incapacity of 
authorities to cope with the housing demands (Turner 1983: 209). AlSayyad (1993: 33) 
claims that informal areas are “the direct expression of the development of dependent 
capitalism in their respective societies”. Even the UN–HABITAT (2005: 70) claims that a 
healthy housing market might exist without titling. The dichotomy of the formal/informal 
housing is well expressed by Pamuk (2000: [381]) as follows: 
 
“The persistence and expansion of informal housing settlements in the 
developing world, despite the adoption of various regulatory reform measures 
and targeted programs to curb them (i.e., formalisation of informal 
settlements by granting title and lowering standards), continue to be a puzzle 
in the land and housing policy literature”. 
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Varley (1987: 468) accounts for three types of factors other than land regularisation that 
may affect housing. First, there are factors related to government intervention that 
reinforce the sense of security of tenure of informal residents, such as the granting of 
trading licenses of different types –i.e., for street vendors established in informal 
settlements that most of the times are the residents themselves– and tax collection. Second, 
there are factors related to what Varley calls the “absence” of government intervention in 
informal settlements that may be interpreted as a message of security to carry out 
improvements without being troubled by officials. Third, if neighbouring settlements 
and/or other parts within the same area were, or have been, regularised or upgraded, home 
investment and improvements may be encouraged “in anticipation” of further legal tenure 
granting (Ibid: 468). Varley recognises both the limitations in the scope of the study cited 
above and the existence of other elements that impact on legalisation or the granting of 
land titles, i.e., the satisfaction evinced by the “new” owners and the cost that this 
procedure represents for the “beneficiaries” (Ibid: 476–7).  
 
Payne (2001: 421) also distinguishes between the effects of both the security of tenure and 
legal tenure on home improvements. He analysed some consequences that legal tenure 
delivered to the urban poor, which contrasted with De Soto’s claims. He argues that legal 
tenure was not a precondition for encouraging housing investment, as that was from the 
perceived security by de facto ownership. Residents may decline participating in 
legalisation procedures only after being recognised as an area for further legalisation. This 
recognition was often sufficient for residents to assure permanency and therefore, 
continuing with home improvements. The costs of the procedure may also prevent dwellers 
from participating not only in the process per se but also for the associated further costs 
embodied in the collection of land taxes. Frequently, a person did not want to be captured 
by the taxation system. Many informal areas have managed to reach certain levels of 
consolidation progressively throughout the effort of their occupiers despite lacking titles.  
 
Over time, an informal settlement may equal a formal housing area in both the levels of 
consolidation of the dwellings and the services introduced. Payne (Ibid: 418) argues that 
the perceived security of tenure there “may be indistinguishable in practice from 
households living in legal housing”. Therefore, the legal status of the areas occupied by the 
poor did not seem to be the main driver for home improvements. Yet, some governments 
have attempted to promote formal markets where properties are identifiable, registered, 
and contracts enforced, as a way to provide security of tenure, following De Soto’s ideas. 
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The polarisation promoted by De Soto when tagging the South as a place with no laws, 
disregarded the efforts of many years of implementing adequate frameworks to deal with 
the countries’ economies if their paths do not follow the established rules that he proposed. 
De Soto claims that a legal system provides the opportunity to have a legal title of a 
property that can eventually be used as collateral (De Soto 2000: 7).  
 
Yet, the evidence shows that moneylenders do not necessarily find peoples’ properties 
attractive to secure repayments due to the location, age, geographical conditions of their 
sites, and more importantly, because owning a house does not mean that the loanee will be 
able to repay a credit or mortgage or that he/she has improved their income for that matter. 
Gilbert also analyses other impacts of land titling programmes such as indirect 
displacement –or gentrification–, corruption in granting titles, and the increase of rented 
accommodation. Although Gilbert (2002: 8) recognises some pro–De Soto evidence, he 
considers it as weak, insufficient, and methodologically inadequate as to assert legal titling 
as the panacea for poverty reduction. This revisit by Gilbert (2002) to De Soto’s 
“mysteries” provides support for those advocating a more comprehensive intervention in 
housing the poor driven by the idea of benefiting the occupiers.  
 
Figure No. 7. Arguments and counter arguments to De Soto’s ideas. 
De Soto (1989: 
47–62) 
Cousins et.al. (2005: 1–6) Gilbert (2012: vi–xvii) 
Fixing the 
economic 
potential of 
assets 
De Soto over–simplified the informal 
economy and associated property 
relations 
There is no evidence to 
back the claim that US$40 
trillion is locked up in dead 
capital among the informal 
housing market 
For property to function as capital 
there must be a market for it, allowing 
it to be used as collateral for credit by 
banks and other lenders 
Security of tenure does not 
strictly depend on land 
titling. Most self–help 
settlements survive without 
legal titles. 
The “extra–legal” sector includes 
businesses that make fortunes from 
the exploitation of workers because 
they operate outside the law 
Houses, even without titles, 
are places for income 
generation for owners and 
tenants 
Protecting 
transactions 
Only the capital–formation function of 
property is acknowledged and other 
functions such as securing livelihoods 
or underpinning social identity are 
ignored 
Legal title is not a 
requirement for settlements 
to obtain services 
Making assets 
fungible 
The focus is largely on urban realities 
and the complexity of rural property 
regimes is not acknowledged 
Transactions take place 
widely in informal areas 
despite the lack of titles  
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De Soto (1989: 
47–62) 
Cousins et.al. (2005: 1–6) Gilbert (2012: vi–xvii) 
Networking 
people 
The poor and the “extra–legal” sector 
are portrayed as homogeneous, 
whereas in reality they are highly 
differentiated –some of the poor are 
entrepreneurs, but others are landless 
rural workers who own virtually no 
assets at all 
Integrating dispersed information into 
one system 
Property titles seem to have 
little effect in convincing 
private banks to lend to the 
poor 
Making people 
accountable 
Large areas of land occupied by the 
poor are already owned (for example, 
by private landlords or the state)– the 
question of redistribution of this land 
is not discussed 
Legal title does not imply 
better income or less 
working hours for owners  
 
A call to consider other aspects supporting poverty alleviation policies is essential rather 
than simply following a one–direct action to land titling policies as the panacea. The cost 
of titling is often too high for the poor for a piece of paper, which might not represent any 
change in their lives. The turmoil in the global economy from 2008 onwards proved that 
even the arguably sound economies were vulnerable despite of the debatably strengths of 
their legal and economic systems (Gilbert 2012: xii). There are bad banking practices even 
in those countries undoubtedly defended by De Soto. His assumptions do not necessarily 
apply in a straightforward way in the South. The risk of implementing De Soto’s solutions 
is that it prevents opportunities to explore local conditions and attitudes towards legal 
frameworks imposed as a rule for everyone.  
 
2.8.  Transaction costs and property rights. 
 
It seems that legal tenure is not the central factor for land choices and home improvements 
in poorer countries as other aspects play major roles in security perception, such as price, 
location, and enforcement of rights. As Webster and Lai (2003: 19) assert, existing markets 
restrictions are gaps filled by creative forces to cope with the inadequacy of both the 
assumed municipal functions and the formal markets. When institutions do not deliver the 
expected outcomes, alternative options –i.e., the informal markets– take place to amend 
these deficiencies. Beall and Fox (2009: 98) argue that “informal markets operate where 
formal markets or the state are absent”. Institutions tolerate the reproduction of informal 
markets because they have been unable, on one hand, to address people’s housing needs 
and, on the other, prevent them from satisfying their needs by implementing self–provision 
mechanisms. In theory, the market delivers housing, which either enables or discourages 
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the environment where transactions take place. When these are unable to provide housing 
following the legal framework, transactions take place in spontaneous and unregulated 
segments of the same markets (Chiquier and Lea 2009: xxxvi). The poor must be creative 
in gaining access to the market. The fact is that formal and informal markets coexist and 
operate within the same settings, though under different values, conditions, and risks. 
Users make their choices in connection to potentially positive and negative outcomes 
perceived within formal or informal arrangements. This differentiation is a key in both the 
way these transactions take place and the implications on tenure and rights issues.  
 
As Gilbert and Ward (1985: 6) claim, the distinction between formal and informal markets 
represent some barriers in understanding and tackling the issue, identifying elements that 
link one to the other, explaining the changes that land and housing experience over time, 
and omitting to distinguish between users –i.e., owners, tenants, and people in shared 
accommodation. The evolution, mix, and changes experienced by land and housing 
provided a diversity of themes requiring special awareness in understanding the impact on 
the urban poor. Gilbert and Ward conclude that the most important aspect was related to 
the process by which land is designated –or appropriated– for different uses and by 
different users (1985: 6). As Sawyer (1993: 33) defines, the ultimate key role of markets is 
exchange and allocation of assets, products, and services. They exist to facilitate their 
transactions, incorporating their associated costs in both legal and economic aspects and 
maximizing the perceived benefits for their participants. Assets are available at a value 
defined by the markets. Some specific segments of the population can cover this value 
according to their economic capacity –i.e., high– and middle–income people– whilst others 
cannot.  
 
In theory, the formal housing market usually allocates the types of assets where legal 
contracts backed by the existing legal framework property and economic rights are 
enforced. However, when formal markets fail to provide for some segments of the 
population, these create a number of alternatives to cope with the needs of those left out 
and for transactions to occur within the same markets’ dynamics. These informal 
alternatives establish their own nature of transactions and contracts in which property 
values and economic rights are defined, established, and enforced. Often, the legal 
framework neither recognises nor enforces transactions but this fact does not prevent users 
from making transactions and enforcing security of tenure in such circumstances. For 
transactions to take place, the users –or potential buyers– have to make some decisions to 
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assess the facts around them. Herein, the costs of transactions, the role of institutions, the 
property rights
19
 acquired, and the way they are enforced were relevant issues before, 
during, and after transactions have taken place in both formal and informal markets.  
 
Transaction costs take into account different aspects of the asset that becomes available in 
the market for negotiation. These characteristics consider not only the physical attributes of 
assets, but also the rationality and the behaviour of the buyer (Williamson 1996: 18). An 
asset represents both the tangible nature inherent to the goods and the intangible 
conception given by existing and potential users at the time of transactions. An asset with 
similar characteristics may have different costs in different locations and under different 
circumstances –i.e., legal status. Dietrich (1993: 168) considers at least three costs in 
transactions: “the search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and policing 
and enforcement costs”. Yet, costs are different in informal markets regards policing and 
enforcement, as these involve the cost of absent elements rather than present ones. It is 
different, for instance, in a transaction between an informal resident and a landowner as 
contracts are often verbal or written on any piece of paper. Coase (1988: 115) proposes that 
to know the costs involved in a transaction: 
 
“…it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform 
people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations 
leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection 
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so 
on.” 
 
Coase’s (1988: 33) definition of transaction costs deals with the organisation of firms and 
the associated costs of products in which the market bases its operations. The transaction 
costs approach explains the way an economic activity is organised and, as a result, impacts 
on when people make decisions during the transactions. Transaction costs rule the 
economic environment and decisions made following the associated tangible and 
intangible costs. In the case of land and housing, their costs depend on the physical 
qualities and other associated costs. As land is found in both formal and informal markets, 
it is enmeshed in a set of rules that define its costs of transactions, which becomes 
important in deciding its acquisition. When land is the product of an unauthorised 
                                                 
 
19 As to property rights, this paper follows the definition of Libecap as follows: “Property rights are the social 
institutions that define or delimit the range of privileges granted to individuals to specific assets, such as 
parcels of land or water” (Libecap 1989: 1).    
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subdivision, the risk perceived in the transaction may be high, yet, the price is low. This 
reflects the potential problems associated with the transaction for the buyer in the future or 
during the sale of the plot.  
 
Based on identified attributes of the assets –legal status, perceived risk of eviction, access 
to services, amenities, location, and topography–the buyer makes the decision to pay for 
that piece of land or find accommodation elsewhere. It is the buyer who regards whether 
the cost of present and future conditions are worth paying for or not. Yet, contracts have to 
be agreed and enforced in both formal and informal transactions. Without formal titling 
and legal transactions, there must be mutually enforceable and acceptable informal 
enforcement systems that both parties feel is economically worthwhile. Although, in 
theory, the presence of a legal framework means that it will be enforced, the role of 
institutions and the concept of property rights are also relevant. The first refers to the 
capacity of institutions to establish an enabling environment within which goods become 
available to the majority. The second refers to the attributes of assets assigned or perceived 
by users.  
 
Since institutions are responsible for delivering an adequate framework to enforce property 
rights “the degree to which ownership is established over a commodity’s separate attributes 
depends on the cost of creating and policing contracts that establish that ownership–
transaction cost” (Webster and Lai 2003: 7). Markets respond to the costs associated with 
transactions in both economic and legal aspects. Libecap (1989: 3) asserts that institutions 
were “the most efficient responses to particular social and economic problems”. Their role 
was a key issue in the functioning of markets. In theory, institutions are to protect property 
rights, yet, the arrangements can be both formal and informal. If formal, they rely on rules 
and judicial provisions to enforce it. If informal, these are based on customary conventions, 
rules, and values regarding the transactions and the properties concerned. In the market, 
both arrangements take place constantly and evolve according to the economic 
circumstances of societies over time (Libecap 1989: 2). Moreover, these arrangements 
often overlap. Yet, despite of its nature, the economic, legal, and social aspects of the 
transactions prevail.  
 
In terms of economic rights, these have been associated with the capacity to obtain income 
from properties derived from their attributes, while legal rights are those, which the legal 
or de facto means enforce. This means that a property could have economic attributes that 
 62 
are derived from its legal features. Yet, though, this is not necessarily a rule for every case. 
For instance, informal settlements do not have the benefit of legal rights but a de facto 
tenure of land does not necessarily deny them economic benefits, such as the sale of the 
plot/house. A property’s value depends on the valuation of the commodity made by buyers 
and of the enforcement of rights, which affects the increase, or decrease of its price. When 
the perceived risk in the transaction is high, the value is kept low and the market for that 
asset is restricted to those willing to pay for the associated costs. Yet, the poor are often 
willing to take over places with high risks due to the marginal value of land. This logic 
responds to the “necessary creativity” evoked by Webster and Lai (2003: 19) to provide all 
markets’ participants with the goods required for life.  
 
Land available to house those left out of legal markets is usually situated in low–valued 
areas disregarded by formal markets, because of its location beyond municipal grids and 
the cities’ facilities, or close to unattractive areas –i.e., landfills and dumps–, and the cost 
of development may be high for topographical or flooding risks. Land is low– valued for 
reasons that exclude the interest of formal markets, but it the price is what makes land 
attractive. If land is invaded and consolidated over time, it means that market forces were 
not present there and therefore, the institutional framework was not active in pursuing 
property rights of the third parties potentially affected. If governments attempt to impose 
their rules, Webster and Lai (Ibid: 77) argue that, this is “prone to failure”. Transactions in 
informal markets follow customary and, often, spontaneous rules with a different logic 
from that of the formal sector. Both security of properties and transactions in informal 
markets are de facto organised and recognised by their participants. Often, this fact 
prevents informal residents from participating in formal transactions and regularisation 
programmes as participation represented additional costs, taxes, or jeopardised security –
i.e., if relocation is involved. If markets worked as based on De Soto’s assumptions, 
poverty, customary and spontaneous rules would eventually be replaced by formal 
economic forces. Yet, this may not necessarily work efficiently among the poor who rely 
on customary conventions, and shared values to keep the informal markets working. If 
informal transactions existed, this was explained by the presence of a market ready to 
participate, as traders perceived a value in it. In contrast to De Soto’s arguments, Webster 
and Lai (Ibid: 61) argue that these elements –i.e., institutions not necessarily formal– kept 
“markets working”. These premises apply to a wide range of social and economic activities 
taking place informally, i.e., business, trade, and housing. 
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The intervention of public institutions has had important effects on the functioning of 
markets, not only in regulating them but also, due to inefficiency, leading them to fail. As 
Webster and Lai (Ibid: 65) define, these interventions may “exacerbate” their failures, 
create market distortions, increase taxes, and an “over participation” of official bodies in 
public issues. These inefficiencies were common in markets, critical, and cyclical in the 
South. They argued that the order was successful if it “delivers efficient order in exclusive 
property rights” (Ibid: 70). A society is successful if institutions –formal or informal–, 
governments, and market forces are able to guarantee property rights (legal or de facto) 
and a better functioning of markets. Yet, De Soto claims that legal frameworks and legal 
property rights make markets function better. This cannot necessarily be the rule, as 
markets function differently under various circumstances. Informality, although not 
desirable as De Soto says, is an imperfect setting for markets to work and deliver what 
formal markets have denied to millions in cities.  
 
Although De Soto (2000: 48) defines property as not only the asset itself, but also its 
representation, his claim that the legal must be the exclusive framework that protects it is 
contested. Its representation, he asserted, is separate from its materialisation, though assets 
acquired in the informal sector do not lack any of them. This representation is linked to the 
attributes that assets symbolize for people and to the value that markets assign to land, 
which in turn relieves the informal of external pressures. If formal markets do not capture 
the value of property by transactions ruled by the legal framework, the value remains low 
until inherent factors affecting the property change due to internal or external 
interventions, such as the installation of municipal services or the inclusion of land in 
urban development plans. However, if land becomes attractive to public or private bodies, 
the informal count on customary rights, political pressure, and tenure to defend property 
against market forces and the legal system. In the end, as Webster and Lai (2003: 6) 
establish “the boundaries between market–delivered order and planned order evolve over 
time in a spontaneous fashion”, thus markets evolve and accommodate commodities 
accordingly.  
 
2.9.   Credit and savings. 
 
Often, credit is assumed as an alternative source for land and/or housing acquisition. Yet, 
the informal character of the poor’s assets prevents the banks from offering credit based on 
it not only because of their own policies, but also due to the low profitability perceived in 
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the process (Gilbert 2002: 12). Moreover, a newly formalised dwelling does not transform 
into a better–built structure and better–located assets immediately after titling. Certainly, 
informality is a major reason for lack of credit among the poor but even more so poverty 
itself and the income levels of potential clients are causes for banks and other formal 
bodies declining to grant credit. De Soto (2001: 37) claims that once legal tenure is 
granted, residents might be able to access credit from formal institutions. However, this is 
not always true, as applicants have to satisfy other requirements, such as work in formal 
and stable jobs and time in employment.  
 
The house is often insufficient to guarantee credit as physical collateral as the financial 
institutions do not consider it attractive for commercial purposes. Farfan (2004: 230) 
argues that achieving land and housing through credit with commercial institutions is 
virtually impossible for the urban poor. The mobilisation of loans is directed towards those 
segments of population with higher possibilities to repay, stable incomes, and credit 
history. Gilbert (Ibid: 32) adds that banks do not offer loans to the poor since they are 
considered “both an unprofitable and a problematic exercise”. McCarthy (2003: 12) 
indicates that the absence of secured assets, uneven jobs, and low paid make the poor an 
uninteresting target for banks, resulting in their exclusion from financial services.  
 
Lack of constant income makes the poor being perceived as an uncertain portfolio for 
commercial lenders. The poor resort to informal lending mechanisms available in their 
own communities or to relatives. In general, lending procedures of banks, as Durand–
Lasserve (2006: 11) asserts, are simply not adapted to the needs of the poor. The lending 
process includes some requirements designed in such a way that the poor are unable to 
satisfy, creating a permanent cycle of banks refusing to lend money and the poor refusing 
to approach banks. Formal lenders consider jobs in the informal sector as risky since they 
often assume that the poor will not be able to honour credit (Daphnis et al 2002: 2).  
 
The causes of such exclusion from the banking system have been discussed in the 
literature. Marx and Charlton (2003: 19) provides a common structure of these restrictions: 
the absence of collateral to guarantee the loan is common among the poor and a strict 
requirement for banks; lack of guarantee of funds; conventional mortgage terms; 
repayments through payroll reductions; lack of formal employment; and absence of a  
freehold title over poverty. Often, the urban poor perceive banks as abusive due to high 
interest rates and “hidden” fees on housing loans. Choguill (2007: 148) analyses the 
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restrictions, demanding a more creative approach in housing finance for the urban poor. He 
stresses that lenders should recognise informal sector income as valid for the granting of a 
mortgage loan. Yet, high management costs associated with reduced savings/credit and 
potential defaults in loans repayments appeared to be barriers to commercial institutions.  
 
After a quasi-permanent financial crisis in poorer countries, banks promote loans to 
arguably more reliable clients. Okpala et al (2006: 10) claim that this has limited the 
development of housing markets especially that focused on the very poor. In contrast, 
Payne (2001: 421–2) claims that the poor do not require large loans but small amounts of 
money for physical improvements; yet, commercial banks are not interested in extending 
such small amounts due to their administrative costs. The poor do not want to be burdened 
by “rigorous” methods of payments, especially because commercial banks require fixed 
payments that often, the poor cannot meet due to their uneven incomes. Varley (2002: 455) 
says that borrowing money from a bank or government agency means losing the flexibility, 
which is one of the reasons people house themselves illegally in the first place. Yet, Gilbert 
(2002: 11) claims that the “possession of a legal title makes little or no difference to the 
availability of formal finance”. Legal titles do not offer a direct solution for entering into 
the formal finance market and the poor remain as unattractive to bankers, but also, banks 
remain unattractive for the poor (Ibid: 13). This is not only due to the nature, unevenness, 
and levels of income, but also due to the features of the assets to be used to guarantee the 
loan. Many informal areas are located on dangerous topographical conditions –i.e., along 
riverbanks, boggy areas– and this prevents banks from granting credit due to the perceived 
physical risk of the assets.  
 
“If lender [i.e., the bank] has doubts about the values of the property, it 
matters little that the evidence suggests that poor families can be extremely 
reliable in repaying loans.” (Ibid: 12). 
 
Arguments favouring the potential benefits of small loans to help improve housing 
conditions for the poor are not questioned, but the extent of the reproduction of such 
schemes, the feasibility to access loans, the flexibility on the size of loans, and repayment 
terms must be analysed in detail in various settings. That credit is available once land titles 
are issued is a contested assumption in housing the poor. Due to limitations of income, 
saving are small and the process of home construction to reach a consolidation stage may 
take over 15 years in many cases (Ferguson 1999: 185). Yet, these savings are not 
necessarily represented in terms of constant money as these can take other forms. Ferguson 
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(Ibid: 189) identifies individual and group savings, windfalls, erection of their own 
building, materials, sweat equity, small loans from neighbourhoods, moneylenders, barter 
arrangements, and communal self –help, and remittances from family living abroad.  
 
These sources substitutes formal finance, as they are more flexible and adequate to the 
“size” of the resident’s needs. However, the sources vary and are usually unavailable for 
families, affecting the speed of home construction in informal areas. Some housing 
programmes condition access to beneficiaries based on previous savings (Rueda–Garcia 
2003: 20), which prevent the poor from participating due to the uneven and unpredictable 
of income in long term. The argument is that constant savings generate a habit in the 
potential buyer despite the fact that these may be of small amounts.  
  
2.10. Taxation and mobility. 
 
Often, an envisioned effect of legal tenure is the increase of the tax base (Payne 2001: 
422). Jansen and Roquas (1998: 82) say that after land titling takes place, “a property 
holder becomes connected to the state, thus enhancing tax–levying possibilities”. If legal 
tenure was envisioned to increase the number of people paying land taxes, evidence from 
Payne’s research shows that this is not often the case; once people feel safe in the place, 
they often refuse to pay taxes or simply are unable to meet the costs of taxation. 
Frequently, a feeling is that paying taxes is useless since the poor will not necessarily 
benefit with the introduction of missing municipal services, school, transportation, or 
security. The disenchantment with authorities is important. The poor pressure them for the 
provision of services. This seemed to increase during electoral periods. Gilbert (2002: 7) 
claims that the point is not “whether the poor suffer from the granting of title deeds, but 
whether they actually benefit from their entitlement”. If benefits of regularisation were not 
clear, or, if potential “beneficiaries” could not pay the insertion into a legal framework, the 
process frequently becomes irrelevant to residents who will refuse to participate.  
 
Varley (1987: 474) describes the lack of enthusiasm to participate due to the “attachment” 
to fixed monthly payments to cover the improvements and because of the poor quality of 
programme results. A legalisation process may represent an increase in living expenses for 
the “beneficiaries” and indirectly for those who are not direct beneficiaries (Gilbert 2002: 
7). When titling represents further taxation, the information regarding the amount, 
periodicity, and increase is usually unclear, discouraging residents to participate. Gilbert 
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(Ibid: 7) claims that land titling often takes place for reasons “that have nothing to do with 
helping the poor”. A genuine intention to improve their home conditions is not necessarily 
the main driver. It seems that a more direct beneficiary of such schemes, according to 
Gilbert, is the government as regularisation programmes seem to be cheaper than to build 
adequate public housing with all the services. The government will eventually increase the 
land taxation of newly regularised plots and the use of this money for improving 
infrastructure and services is not clear. Thus, regularisation is associated with planning 
purposes to re–organise zoning in order to insert some informal areas into the urban grid as 
cities absorb them over time.  
 
Yet, Payne (2001: 423) envisages that legalising a settlement could also be interpreted as a 
driver for generating further irregularities. Once an informal settlement is legalised “title 
provision or regularisation may therefore stimulate the very processes of unauthorised 
development they seek to prevent and therefore reduce, not increase, public sector 
influence over land and housing markets.” Recently legalised areas come to the attention of 
those with higher incomes once security and legal status have been granted. Payne called 
this effect as the “downward raiding” coming from better–off segments of the population 
causing a gentrification process as the ultimate effect of long regularisations programmes. 
This can generate an “accepted” gentrification in exchange for a lump sum that means a lot 
to them but little to wealthier groups.  
 
If generating wealth and income was arguably a goal in legalising informal settlements, the 
level of mobility was not as high as envisioned once legalisation was obtained as Gilbert 
(2002: 10) reports from various Latin American cities –i.e., Bogota, Caracas, Mexico City, 
and Santiago. In some cases, after many years of legalisation, residents remained in the 
areas and mobility was not as expected in comparison to Western countries as De Soto 
(2001: 47) suggests. A missing point regarding the actual capital generation attributed to 
legalisation via a new value of former informal assets was that the implied mobility was 
not necessarily a direct effect of regularisation. In addition, Payne (2001: 424) offers an 
analysis of the consequence of land titling on the efficiency of markets. He argues that the 
expectation of further legal titles in a given area might raise the costs of the assets and 
therefore reduce the security of the poorer groups that may be tenants in informal areas.  
 
The increased costs due to regularisation will be passed onto tenants who could be 
displaced if that cost cannot be met. Payne argues that the South have been unable to make 
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distinctions between the different segments of populations and that legal tenure was 
regarded as a linear rule applied the same way for everybody when it takes place. He 
ponders the need to identify more precisely the different segments even within a specific 
area, since the negative impacts cannot be corrected easily once legalisation takes place. 
Gilbert (2002: 9) reinforces the idea that home ownership does not guarantee money for 
those who make home improvements. Some factors were relevant to this assumption, i.e., 
the availability of resources to “cash” the improvements by selling the house.  
 
When an informal settlement is legalised and titles granted, the stock of houses are 
variable. From shacks, one–room houses, one–storey houses, to more consolidated 
properties, it was difficult to obtain profits from the selling of the house given the 
availability of cash needed for the transaction. More transactions were found in less–
consolidated homes since they were cheaper than consolidated houses improved over time 
(Gilbert 2002: 11). Therefore, the immediate benefits of the “unleashing” of the market did 
not derive necessarily from the legalisation of informal settlements. At the same time, yet, 
Gilbert (Ibid: 16) considers a less–favoured idea about the functioning of markets. He 
claims that, “in the unlikely event of a flourishing property market, there is little reason to 
believe that the poor will be major beneficiaries”.  
 
The economic development claimed by the authorities and the periodical booming of 
housing markets have not benefited the poor in the long term. Often, the change in laws 
intended to promote urban development and housing has resulted in the creation of more 
informal settlements. This is the case of the Mexican economy in the 1980s and 1990s. The 
economy was performing well and the law changed to incorporate communal land to the 
expected growth (Lea and Bernstein 1996: 87). Yet, the economy crashed in 1995. 
Informal areas became the place for millions.  
 
2.11. Conclusions. 
 
The role and impacts of land tenure in housing the poor remain contested based on the 
evidence reviewed in this chapter. The poor remain reluctant to participate in land 
regularisation programmes as they do not find attractive to be captured by the legal system. 
The fact that they often obtain basic services and consolidated housing without the legal 
possession of land means that regularisation does simply not make sense. For instance, 
access to credit is not necessarily eased by the fact that a piece of land has been legalised. 
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It remains unattractive to traditional banking systems anyway. This chapter illustrates also 
the challenge of dealing with informality and the impact of the advocates in favour of 
promoting the implementation in the South of a legal system similar to that in the North. 
Thus, it is evident the difficulties that replicating it represents in a place that presents a 
completely different set of rules.   
 
Existing poverty definitions has proven not to be operational for implementing efficient 
poverty alleviation programmes, creating confusion, and controversy. Policies have failed 
to facilitate a better environment for the poor, particularly in improving their housing 
conditions. The approach adopted by many institutions has deterred the solutions they 
advocate, worsening the situation for many people. Some elements are crucial to 
understand poverty and its impact on housing the poor in this dissertation: the dynamic 
character of poverty as a social phenomenon; poverty is both universal and local; third, it is 
a continuum concept; and fourth, its evolution still requires providing consistent benefits 
for the poor. The consistency of concepts remains crucial, especially in shaping urban 
development and housing programmes for the urban poor. This dissertation is aware of the 
difficulties of defining poverty and making it operational. It considers the benefits of 
reviewing the different approaches and the way other scholars have explained it. It 
acknowledges the efforts of international agencies to reach consensus but this has limited 
the participation of people in its definition and the definition of potential solutions.  
 
To assess, for instance, the role that plays informal housing transactions, helped this 
research understand the circumstances under which the urban poor make their decisions to 
select informal markets despite the challenges that they embrace. Besides, this section 
showed how security of tenure relates to factors others than exclusively those connected to 
the legal system. In particular, it was relevant to learn how people are prepare to deal with 
their limitations to access to the argued benefits of the legal land tenure and, at the same 
time, how they have learnt to build an environment where they implement their own rules 
to enforce their transactions. This analysis opened a wider perspective on how to approach 
further stages of this dissertation, particularly in the design of the strategies to apply in the 
planned case study and the fieldwork.  
 
Informal settlements are a self–solution promoted by people owing to the incapacity of 
institutions to deliver housing opportunities to the large mass of poor residents of cities. 
Often, the intervention of government through legalisation is cheaper than newly 
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constructed residential areas, as they progressively introduce roads and services over time. 
The urban poor have managed to house themselves by implementing their own 
mechanisms with no or a few public interventions. That is of a major value for this 
research, which engages with the assessment of home production by the poor in the 
following section. The housing mechanisms analysed often overlapped at some point in the 
process of home consolidation. Whether a limited state–led housing process or a restrictive 
private lenders approach, the poor are left still with a few possibilities to recur to formal 
bodies in search of financial support. The evidence has proved that the poor are able to 
build their homes with their own means and many are able to honour their debts as 
recognised by pro–poor institutions, such as the Grameen Bank.  
 
The scepticism of banks to lending to the poor apparently remains. Constraints on financial 
resources left governments the challenge to serve increasing poor communities with less 
money. It becomes necessary to review housing standards and implement follow–up 
schemes for home consolidation. Self–help will continue to be the most popular path for 
people towards a consolidated home as this only depends on their own means and effort. 
As long as the poor continue being regarded as incapable of honouring their debts by 
formal institutions, conditions seem to remain. On the contrary, public bodies must review 
and learn the way people make their living, consolidate their homes, and manage their 
finances. It becomes necessary for this dissertation to explore self–provision housing 
mechanisms directly on the field to assess the barriers and drivers for home improvements.  
 
The next chapter concentrates more specifically on dealing with these issues in the 
Mexican context. In particular, it deals with land tenure as a driver of housing the urban 
poor, particularly regarding ejido land and its participation in such an equation.   
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CHAPTER 3. LAND FOR THE URBAN POOR IN MEXICO. 
 
3.1. Introduction. 
 
This chapter engages with the analysis of the role of ejido land in the equation for housing 
the poor. Then, it reviews relevant urban policies, and finally, it critically reviews the 
accessibility of housing and credit for the urban poor. The goal of this section is to 
scrutinise the key aspects that have an impact on the process of housing the urban poor 
within the existing legal framework and both the formal and informal mechanisms to 
access a piece of land for housing. The aspects herein analysed reinforce the understanding 
of the Mexican context with respect of the scenario experience by the poor in their process 
towards shelter themselves, the barriers, and the limitations faced throughout.  
 
3.2. Ejidos, their role in housing the poor. 
 
In Mexico, ejido lands –a communal land tenure type– has played a key role in the 
equation of urban growth and housing in the last decades, particularly in cities with an 
increasing pressure for land to house their poorer sectors of the population. Their role, 
though, has evolved in the last decades as some conditions changed with respect to their 
original aims, i.e., location, distance to urban areas, poverty, and changes in the law. An 
ejido, as Varley (1985: 1) defines, is land held collectively by a particular social group 
rather than individual landowners or the government. It was, she adds, supposed the 
response that embodied in practice the Revolutionary principle of a social right to land 
(Ibid) in the 1910s. In fact, the Revolution’s slogan, “the land must belong to the tiller”, 
attracted many peasants to the rebels’ cause. When the Revolution ended, this land 
distribution was expressed in the Article 27 of the National Constitution (Cámara de 
Diputados 2014). As a result, the agricultural land was organised in ejidos
20
 and distributed 
to groups of peasants named ejidatarios. Ejidatarios were entitled to farm the land (named 
the parcelled lands); live in a plot provided (named the human settlement land); and enjoy 
a social zone (common or social use lands) intended for the amenities, i.e., a school, a 
health clinic, a park, and a church (Cámara de Diputados 2012; and INEGI 2014). A major 
                                                 
 
20 A suitable definition of ejido land, apart from the legal, is Herrera’s (2012: 633): “Ejidos are territories 
granted to groups of landless peasants upon demand… These lands were not allowed to enter the real estate 
market, therefore ejidatarios could not legally use them as guarantees for loans, nor were they able to rent, 
lease, sell, or use their rights on the land they worked, possessed or inhabited.” 
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benefit granted to the ejidatarios is that becoming one has no cost and their holdings, i.e., 
the plot and parcels, can be inherited by the ejidatario’ family by simply providing a list of 
those members to whom their rights have to be transferred after he/she dies (Cámara de 
Diputados 2012). In fact, the ejido is granted to peasants in perpetuity. After the 
Revolution ended, the government started a slow distribution of ejido land upon organised 
groups of ejidatarios. The ejidos were located in rural areas, outside the cities’ limits at the 
time. Although figures differ, Colin and Restrepo (1998) report the creation of more than 
27,000 ejidos and 3.5 million of ejidatarios. 
 
Yet, ejidatarios have been under an increasing pressure to keep the original aims of the 
ejido as agriculture activities have declined and the land they “possess” is their only asset 
available to sell. Besides, the expansion of cities puts additional pressure, as the land 
available for growth is precisely located in the neighbouring ejidos. Oliveira (2001: 5) calls 
this increasing cities advance as “an unceasing national urban growth”. This was especially 
critical, as the ejidatarios were not allowed to sell their land, neither the parcel –intended 
for agricultural purposes– nor their plots –intended for housing the ejidatarios. Yet, this 
limitation did not prevent many from selling their lands, resulting in ejidos as places for 
less expensive land mostly because the areas sold lacked basic services for housing 
purposes. Thus, ejidos became a low–cost land supply for developers (at a large scale) and 
individuals (who looked for a plot to build a house).  
 
These transactions were illegal so the land was cheaper than elsewhere. Ejidos attracted 
many with lower incomes and became a preferred place for informal settlements. They also 
became attractive to speculators who bought those lands near to the city, waited for the 
urban area to expand, or put pressure on local authorities to change zoning regulations, in 
order to develop formal housing areas. For instance, during the 1970s, ejido lands provided 
15 per cent of the land required for urban expansion in the metropolitan area of 
Guadalajara, and the 66 per cent during the 1980s (Siembieda 1996: 377). This growth, as 
occurred elsewhere, happened without and/or despite urban regulations.  
 
By early 1990s, ejido land “had become the most important single source of urbanisable 
land, and it is almost developed illegally” (Austin 1994: 327). However, the Mexican 
Constitution was amended in 1992 during the Presidency of Carlos Salinas. This 
amendment allowed the association between ejidatarios and land developers to insert their 
holdings into a more planned urban development (Cámara de Diputados 2012). It is 
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acknowledged that, as Herrera (2012: 647) claims, the reform cannot be studied in 
isolation from the general context and specificities. Yet, the agrarian law –intended to 
make the amendment operational– the possibility to sell, lease, and collateralise the land is 
now possible (Ibid.). Immediately, this amendment brought some important effects. For 
instance, Olivera (2004: 8) claims that such an amendment simply removed the taboo that 
the ejido was “untouchable”. The law establishes a sort of distinction among those ejidos 
closer to the urban areas or partially absorbed by the city growth by allowing them to 
expedite their process of incorporation to the urban fabric in the way by following the 
regulations as for the rest of the city.  
 
Siembieda (1996: 371) argues that this reform took place in response to the restructuring 
requirements demanded by the World Bank and in anticipation to the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, NAFTA, with the US and Canada. The structural changes, under 
Siembieda’s view, responded more to an external agenda intended for economic aims; the 
incorporation of communal land into the economic equation seemingly was a key factor. 
The ejido, thus, seemed to have finished their original function as a means to attempt to 
guarantee the social right to land and, in contrast, converted the land into a commodity. 
Actually, Perramond (2008: 356) portrays the ejido system as the “Mexico’s long 
experiment…” that had ended in 1992. He adds that Mexico abandoned the role of land as 
a means to address social inequalities (Ibid.). Moreover, the ejido reform and system 
remained as unattractive for some authors, such as Thompson and Wilson (1994: 448) who 
remained sceptical regarding the promoted benefits of such a reform. 
 
Nevertheless, ejido lands increased their role as potential land suppliers, both through 
formal and informal mechanisms particularly in growing urban areas. The new possibilities 
to transact land, made the ejido attractive to developers but it remained particularly 
attractive for the poorer residents who, despite the official efforts of modernising the ejido, 
kept finding it cheaper than in the formal land. Informal land sales and speculation 
continued after the constitutional amendment and ejidatarios openly continue promoting 
land sales based on demand and, at their convenience, their needs. Opportunely, ejidatarios 
do not consider ejido land transactions as illegal, only “informal” arguing that the change 
in the law actually allows them to do so. This position contributes to the dichotomy of the 
land of ejido in the equation of housing the poor. The institutional efforts to make the 
Article 27 operational after the amendment were also difficult to implement. For instance, 
the Comisión Reguladora de la Tenencia de la Tierra, CORETT, or the Tenure Land 
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Regularisation Commission, was in charge of regularising thousands of plots informally 
sold and developed within ejido lands (Olivera 2002: 182). The CORETT also 
administered the issue of titles to informal occupiers after the procedures were completed; 
yet, Jones and Ward (1998: 87) defined the process as slow. However, due to fact that 
CORETT initially depended upon the Agrarian Ministry, its role was more focused on the 
agricultural idea of its functions, leaving the urban role of ejido as land provider for 
development behind.  
 
After the amendment, other authorities could participate in the process, such as the 
municipalities (Austin 1994: 334). Yet, the intervention of different federal, state, and 
municipal agencies in the process has made it confusing, slow, and unclear. The intended 
incorporation of ejido lands into a more “logical” process derived in a series of 
dichotomies and difficulties. The ejido was not necessarily attached to the new rules after 
the Article 27 changed; ejido land continue to be a place for informal sales as ejidatarios 
were “unwilling to relinquish” the political patronage system, in Perramond’s words (2008: 
369) and continue to benefit from it. Besides, the regularisation process promoted after the 
amendment provided a new variant of the intended market–led orientation of the reform 
intended by Salinas (Ibid.) which, somehow, was served as the motivations to consider it 
as successful. The insertion of ejido lands into a formal system was more attractive to 
public agencies than to ejidatarios who continue regarding their land as a commodity ready 
to sell whenever they need or want based on demand.  
 
Evidently, the closer the ejido to the city, the better it can be sold at a larger scale to 
developers or even to the city whose agencies attempt to buy land reserves for different 
uses, especially for residential purposes. Varley (2002: 454) claims that the agrarian focus 
was always in detriment to the potential benefits of the reform in the urban arena. The 
scope of such a reform, thus, was insufficient as to promote the intended urban 
development desired to incorporate the country into a more dynamic economic relation 
within a globalised scenario. In such a contradictory scenario is that land markets has 
continue functioning attempting to comply with evolving regulations and a more effective, 
though, informal way to provide land for housing the poor.   
 
3.3. Land and urban development policies in Mexico.  
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As seen, land has been a key factor especially due to the difficulties of incorporating ejidos 
into the equation of urban development. From a “compensatory” policy intended to restore 
the dispossessed, i.e., the pre–revolutionary peasants, to a market–oriented approach, the 
land has been the centre of discussion among scholars and policymakers. For the purpose 
of this dissertation, however, land policies are scrutinised to understand their role in 
housing the urban poor. The availability of land at their grasp is central, as land policies 
and programmes dictated from the different governmental bodies impact on the way they 
may or may not access a piece of land for housing.   
 
Although different factors influence land policies design, this study focuses on some 
institutional, social, economic, and demographic drivers to illustrate the way these have 
had an impact on housing the urban poor. Garcés (2011: 15), for instance, claims that 
urban development programmes of 1978 and 1982 first called for the attention to establish 
the “ordenamiento territorial” –or the territorial planning– as a priority in the national 
policies towards a sustainable development and an equalitarian society. Then, the 1984–
1988 and the 1990–1994 programmes challenged the growth of the cities derived from 
various factors of the time, ranging from the financial crisis, the land reform, and the 
earthquake in 1985. Also, the institutionalisation of urban and land policies by the creation 
of special public agencies along the country, can be seen as an attempt to implement those 
policies. However, 1995–2000 and 2001–2006 programmes translated the national urban 
policies into the social development ministry, centring them more into a social approach 
intended to tackle poverty (Ibid.).  
 
This can be seen as a setback, as institutions in charge of land policies did not respond to a 
national urban policy. Instead, they worked separately in solving urban and housing 
problems without a clear institutional direction. Iracheta (2000: 15) claims that political 
will has been insufficient to promote innovative initiatives and to design long –term 
policies. During this time, state and municipal institutions dealt with land and urban 
policies within a restricted framework as a permissive Article 27 restrained them from 
intervening in land speculation and informal sales. Yet, after the reform which allowed 
them to participate more actively in regularisation programmes, such processes remain 
unarticulated, slow, bureaucratic, and from the viewpoint of ejidatarios, useless. Their 
difficulties to create land reserves from ejido land surrounding urban areas, including 
economic constraints, pushed many governments to tolerate an increasing informal market 
owing to their incapacity to provide suitable land for the urban poor.  
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More recently, as a new approach intended to concentrate the efforts toward land tenure, 
urban planning, and regularisation policies, the federal government created a new ministry 
in 2013 (SEDATU 2014) called the Secretaría de Desarrollo Agrario, Territorial y 
Urbano –Agrarian, Territorial, and Urban Development Secretariat. This office is in charge 
of both land and housing policies through the following programmes: a) Decent Housing; 
b) Rural Housing; c) Habitat; d) Land Reserves Consolidation; e) Regularisation of 
Informal Settlement; f) Incentivising Rural Urbanisation; g) Public Spaces Rescue; h) 
Informal Settlements Prevention Programmes; and i) Housing Finance and Subsidies 
Programme, among others (Ibid.). Certainly, the evolution of social and demographic 
conditions has had an impact on the way cities grew in the last decades. Millions found 
larger cities more attractive as the industrial development, thus jobs, concentrated in the 
three largest Mexican cities –Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey. At the same time, 
rural areas lost their intended attractiveness and competitiveness, which was supposed to 
be the aims of the restoration of land to peasants after the Revolution throughout the ejido 
land scheme. The evolution into an urbanised Mexico accelerated from 1950 as follows 
(Garcés 2011: 2–5): 
 
 The number of people living in urban areas with 15 thousand inhabitants or more 
increased from 6.6 million of people in 1950 to 70.1 million in 2010. 
 The number of urban areas increased from 93 to 630; those with more than 1 
million of inhabitants from one in 1950 to 11 in 2010.  
 The most important growth occurred in cities ranging from 100 thousand up to 1 
million of inhabitants; as 9 per cent of the population lived there in 1970 against the 
19 per cent in 2010.   
 People living in cities with a population range of 500 thousand up to 1 million 
multiplied by 11 times. 
 In contrast, the population growth rate dramatically reduced from 5.3 to 1.7 in the 
same period.  
The transformation of Mexico into becoming an urbanised country seemed to reach many 
places throughout the years. By mid 1990s, intermediate cities had become attractive areas 
for (industrial) development. For instance, border US cities, such as Tijuana or Queretaro 
and San Luis Potosi in central Mexico, received many industries because of NAFTA. 
Automobile industries, for instance, installed in the Bajio area corridor –i.e., León, Silao, 
and Salamanca–, which complemented those previously installed in Aguascalientes as 
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Nissan had in the 1980s. This industry, as many others, was highly export–oriented 
accordingly to the free trade agreement in place. The location of many industries, though 
of a low –wage type, had an impact on at least the increase of migration to cities and, 
eventually, the growth of those cities and its accompanying effects in social, economic, 
land, and housing aspects to mention a few. Garza (2002: 9) summarises the process of 
urbanisation in Mexico as follows:  
 
 From 1900 to 1940: Moderated –low urbanisation process. The country started a 
moderate path towards urbanisation, as this was eminently rural in the early 1900s. 
The main cities were Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Mexico City.  
 From 1940–1980: Medium –accelerated urbanisation process. A large portion of 
this stage was also known, at least locally, as the Mexican miracle due to the 
accelerated economic growth. Twenty–nine new cities were incorporated into the 
urban fabric. Largest cities remained industrial clusters, whilst border ones, i.e. 
Tijuana, Mexicali, Chihuahua, and Juarez City, increased their economic 
participation. Puebla, Toluca, Cuernavaca, and Querétaro also experienced an 
economic boom due to their proximity to Mexico City.  
 From 1980–2000: Low –accelerated. The 1980s are considered as the “lost decade” 
due to the recession and economic crisis. This affected the industrial and economic 
process, yet the population continued to grow along with unemployment and 
poverty. Mexico City reduced its growth rate in contrast to those close to it 
previously mentioned. A moderate boom occurred in touristic cities, such as 
Cancun, Puerto Vallarta, Acapulco, Oaxaca, Guanajuato, and San Miguel de 
Allende. Finally, interior cities accelerated economically, such as Aguascalientes, 
Saltillo, and San Luis Potosi, industrial cities all. Finally, cities with a more 
agriculture –oriented economy also become relevant at national level, such as 
Culiacan, Hermosillo, Celaya, Los Mochis, and Obregon City. Mexico City became 
a “megalopolis”, a predominance of a polycentric pattern. By 2000, the ten largest 
cities accounted for more than 45 per cent of the country’s population.   
 
As a result of the urbanisation “boom”, the federal government attempted to first, 
understand the complexity of Mexican cities relationships and, second, to “organise” and 
“structure” them in an urban system intended to support the design of social and urban 
policies (SEDESOL 2012: 7). One of its arguments was that the country’s urban profile 
engineered as a “system”, would expedite Mexico’s capacity to develop and growth and, at 
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the same time, alleviate poverty, unemployment, and contribute towards education, 
housing, land, and water supply and transport (Ibid.). The result was the National Urban 
System, NUS, which included basic concepts ranging from defining a city within the 
Mexican context, to the difference between urban development and growth. By 2000 
(CONAPO 2014), the NUS reported 364 cities, of which 42 were metropolitan areas and 
322 cities with more than 15 thousand inhabitants; two out of three Mexicans lived in these 
cities.  
 
 Large cities: seven metropolitan areas and two cities with more than 1 million 
inhabitants. One third of the population lived in these cities.  
 Intermediate cities: thirty–five metropolitan zones and thirty–six cities ranging 
from 100 thousand to less than one million people. One out of four Mexicans lived 
in these cities.  
 Small cities: comprised by 284 cities ranging from 15 thousand to less than 100 
thousand people. One tenth of Mexicans lived in these cities.  
 
All these cities occupied more than 800 thousand hectares in the whole country, which 
represented the 0.4 per cent of the national territory (SEDESOL 2001: 16). Finally, in 
2012, SEDESOL updated the NUS with information of the 2010 National Census. The 
result was an evident increase in the number of urban areas and of people living in cities. It 
divides the urban areas into three categories as follows (SEDESOL 2012: 13): 
 
 Metropolitan zone: comprised a central city and the agglomeration of various 
highly interrelated functionally municipalities. A MZ is also an urban centre with 1 
million inhabitants or more.  
 Conurbation: it is the physical continuum of two or more urban centres with more 
than 15 thousand inhabitants. Its population ranges from 15 to 49 thousand people.  
 Urban Centres: urban areas with less than 15 thousand inhabitants.  
 
Figure No. 8. National Urban System: Cities and Population by Type, 2010. 
 
Total 
Metropolitan 
zones 
Conurbations Urban centres 
No Population No Population No Population No Population 
NUS 2005 358 73,718,053 56 57,878,905 64 3,680,319 238 12,155,829 
NUS 2010 384 81,213,281 59 63,836,779 78 5,175,008 247 12,219,494 
Increase  7,516,228  5,957,874  1,494,689  63,665 
Changes 26  3  14  9  
Source: SEDESOL: 2012. Sistema Urbano Nacional. Mexico.  
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The two first categories, i.e., MZ and Conurbations, are defined under the basis of their 
physical and demographic characteristics. This seems to respond more to a descriptive 
approach of the history of the cities rather than to a more functional focus. Yet, the aim of 
this dissertation focuses on the dynamics of these cities in relation with the impact on the 
provision of land for housing the poor. In the end, the relevance of the NUS and its 
evolution is its application in urban policies. Yet, its implementation as a tool for decision–
making processes is limited. For instance, the Development National Plan 2013–2018 
(published by the federal government) did not mention the NUS at all (Gobierno de la 
República 2013). The National Housing Programme 2014–2018 did not mention the NUS 
either (SEDATU 2014). It is not until recently in the National Urban Development 
Programme 2014–2018 (SEDATU 2014: 65) that the NUS is mentioned not only as a 
reference but also as a strategy to follow in order to accomplish a better urban system. In 
particular, the contribution of NUS is that the Programme proposes to consider the MZs 
and conurbations as “territorial units” for planning.  
 
It also reinforces the goal of channelling federal funds towards MZs as a means to 
incentivise urban development. This seems to be only the beginning to insert the NUS into 
a more comprehensive planning system. Thus, the approach to achieve better cities and 
urban areas is incipient not only in its concepts but also in the implementing process. The 
review of the planning system shows how land intended for the poor is even further from 
being institutionalised in strategic planning instruments. The articulation of national, state, 
and municipal land and housing policies is still pending and each of these governmental 
bodies attempt to tackle land and housing for the poor following their own policies and  to 
take advantage, if any, of the rest.  
 
3.4. The process of land and housing for the urban poor in Mexico.  
 
The challenge of making urban development and housing policies operational remains in 
place in the country. Its evolution towards an urban Mexico has represented some 
challenges, especially in the provision of land and housing for the urban poor. The first 
challenge has been to face economic conditions. This is more evident when recurring 
economic recessions and crisis affect economic growth and land markets. For instance, in 
1995, the economic crisis of that year led to the banks stopping lending for housing and 
millions of people lost their homes after defaulting on their mortgages (Babatz 2004: 42). 
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Since then, Mexico has experienced a slow recovery; today, it is included among the so–
called emerging economies. By 2011, its Gross Domestic Product, GDP, was $10,064 US, 
similar to those of Turkey ($10,498 US), Venezuela ($10,810 US), and Argentina 
($10,941), but far from those of Luxembourg ($115,038 US) or Norway ($98,102 US) 
(World Bank 2012).  
 
Other Latin American countries have higher GDPs, such as Brazil ($12,594 US), Uruguay 
($13,866 US), and Chile ($14,394 US). The Gross National Income per capita, GNI, was 
$15,060 US, similar to Mauritius ($14,070 US), Romania ($15,140 US), and Malaysia 
($15,190 US), but far from Qatar ($87,030 US), Luxembourg ($64,410 US), or Norway 
($62,970). However, it is still a country of major inequalities, in which millions struggle to 
find a job sufficient for their basic needs. Mexico struggles with the unique problem of 
bordering the richest country in the world. Economic challenges evidently influence the 
country’s capacity to deliver land for housing the poor. This second challenge has been 
critical during the last decades, especially in terms of increasing and improving the housing 
stock. The World Bank (2004: 2) calculated a deficit of 750,000 housing units per year in 
Mexico and that, by 2030, the demand of housing would double to embrace about 45 
million households. A 40 per cent of this demand comes from low–income earners unable 
to buy a house in the formal sector.  
 
In 2005, the National Population Council in Mexico –CONAPO– claimed that, due to the 
formation of new families, households would increase from 27.8 million to 30 million by 
2020 among the population 20 to 34 years old, putting an enormous pressure on housing 
provision (CIDOC 2005: 23). Besides, it was estimated that 10.8 million new households 
would be formed by 2020 entailing 36.6 million more Mexicans (Ibid: 24). The 
demographic bulge was supposed to be a bonus since the country would have the youngest 
population in its history in the following decades. In 2001, the National Housing 
Commission –or Comisión Nacional de Vivienda, CONAVI– was created as a public 
federal decentralised body in charge of coordinating the national housing policies 
(CONAVI 2012). In 2006, the Commission estimated that by 2012, the total housing 
deficit would be of 7,357,948 housing “needs” in the country, of which 4,427,754 would 
be new homes and 2,939,194 in need of improvement (CONAVI 2006: 14). This meant 
that, of the total housing needs in Mexico, 60 per cent was for new homes and 40 per cent 
for home improvements.  
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The number of houses in need of improvement was as important as that for new homes. 
Moreover, the Commission predicted that the current housing stock of 24.9 million of 
homes would increase by 14 million new dwellings or 560,000 new homes per year over 
the next 20 years. Since 2001, the CONAVI estimated that from 11.3 million beneficiaries 
of housing actions, 50 per cent of them had access to a mortgage and the rest had received 
a loan for home improvements (CONAVI 2012b). However, the inability to satisfy housing 
demand reflects the economic conditions of millions of people who cannot cope with the 
costs of the housing promoted by the formal sector. For instance, like many other 
developing countries, Mexico presents economic and social disparities. Unemployment has 
worsened over the last 12 years. From a 2.71 rate in 2000, it increased up to 5.01 in 2012 
(INEGI 2012) (see Figure No. 9). While, this rate might be not as high as in other 
countries, the measure requires consideration that is more accurate. For instance, 
unemployment differed according to gender. Often, it has been higher among women than 
men; by 2010, women headed 24 per cent of households (INEGI 2010).  
 
Figure No. 9. Unemployment rates in Mexico (2001–2011). 
 
Source: INEGI (2012). “Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo” (National 
Employment Survey). In 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/Sistemas/infoenoe/TriPreliminar.aspx?s=est&c=27736&p. Last 
accessed in September 2012. 
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Another challenge in making policies operational is the growing informal sector in the 
country. Many people are self–employed outside the formal and taxation system. Whether 
low–profit or higher–profit occupations, the range of activities have allowed people to 
survive and support their families. Many worked on the streets as vendors, while others 
were drivers, plumbers, salespersons, and traders. Many women find work as domestic 
employees. Some authors rejected official statistics and methodologies to measure 
employment rates and the informal sector in Mexico. On one hand, the circumstances have 
changed. By 1999, 59.9 per cent of the Mexican work force remained in the formal sector, 
while 40.1 per cent informally (OIT 2011). By 2012, 29.35 per cent worked in the informal 
sector at national level (INEGI 2012). Figure No. 10 shows that the informal sector has 
grown. This increased the dependency ratio
21
 to 62.27 by 2010 (INEGI 2011). 
 
Figure No. 10. Informal workers from the EAP in Mexico (2000–2012). 
Year 2000 2005 2010 2012 
Percentage 26.9 28.4 27.2 29.3 
Source: INEGI (2012). “Sistema para la Consulta de Indicadores Estratégicos 
InfoLaboral”. In 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/sistemas/enoe/infoenoe/default.aspx?s=est
&c=14042. Last accessed in October 2012. 
 
An additional challenge is the low–income levels in the country. Here, a person is 
considered as poor if he/she earns less than three minimum wages, a middle–income level 
earner has between three to five minimum wages, and an upper–income earner receives 
more than five minimum wages (INEGI 2010). In 2000, 60 per cent of the Economically 
Active Population, EPA, earned less than three minimum wages.
22
 By 2012, the percentage 
was much the same at 59.4 per cent (INEGI 2012). People earning more than five 
minimum wages reduced from 12 per cent to 8.1 per cent during the same period. Yet, in 
12 years, the income levels have shown no significant improvements. Created in 1962 by 
Constitutional mandate, the National Commission for the Minimum Wages, CONASAMI, 
was designed to police the income levels of Mexican workers (Cámara de Diputados 
2011: 93). Its creation was to define a minimum wage “sufficient to satisfy the normal 
                                                 
 
21 The dependency ratio is the number of dependents (0 to 14, and 65 and older) for every 100 independent 
people of working age (15 to 64 years) (INEGI 2011). “Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010”. In 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/Proyectos/bd/censos/cpv2010/PT.asp?s=est&c=27770&proy=cpv10
_pt#. Last accessed in January 2011. 
22 A national commission of representatives of the federal government, employers, and union leaders define 
the minimum wage and agree on the annual increase of salaries based, in theory, on changes in the cost of 
living during the previous year (CONASAMI 2012). 
 83 
needs of a head of household in physical, social, and cultural terms and to provide for the 
obligatory education to his children” (Mexican United States Political Constitution, Art. 
123, Chapter VI, p. 93). The approach by which the authorities define minimum Mexican 
wages, does not relate to, for instance, the poverty line defined by the World Bank or any 
other international organisation.  
 
Figure No. 11. Earners by income levels in Mexico (2000– 2012) (%). 
Period 
Up to 3 
Minimum 
Wages a/ 
From 3 to 5 
Minimum 
Wages 
More than 5 
Minimum 
Wages 
No 
income 
NA 
2000 60.8 15.2 12.0 8.7 3.3 
2005 54.3 19.7 11.4 8.6 5.8 
2010 55.2 19.1 10.1 6.9 8.5 
2012/a 59.4 15.0 8.1 7.8 9.6 
Source: INEGI (2012). “Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo. Indicadores 
Estratégicos.” (National Employment Survey). In http://dgcnesyp.inegi.org.mx/cgi–
win/bdieintsi.exe/CONTN#. Last accessed in October 2012. 
a/ By 2012, three minimum wages equalled $181.98 Mexican Pesos per day or £8.63 UK 
Pounds per day whilst five minimum wages equalled $303.30 Mexican Pesos per day or 
£14.39 UK per day. 
 
A controversy arose from the fact that the Commission divides the country into regions 
with different salary scales, which means that similar jobs are paid differently simply 
because of their location. The Commission argues that the cost of living differs 
geographically and has refused to set a national minimum wage (CONASAMI 2010); yet, 
this is contradictory as the Constitution in its Article 123 (Cámara de Diputados 2011: 93) 
states that the salary must be the same for similar jobs. Yet, the Commission established 
three zones for the country: Zone A –with the highest costs of living–, Zone B, and Zone C 
–with the lowest costs of living (see Figure No. 12). 
 
Figure No. 12. Municipalities by minimum wage zones. 
Zones Municipalities  
Zone 
A 
All the municipalities in Baja California, in Baja California Sur, the Federal 
District (Mexico City) and some municipalities in Chihuahua, State of Mexico, 
Guerrero, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and some in Veracruz. 
Zone 
B 
Some Municipalities in Jalisco, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz 
(where the main cities are located) 
Zone 
C  
All the municipalities in Aguascalientes, Campeche, Coahuila, Colima, 
Chiapas, Durango, Guanajuato, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Nayarit, Morelos, Puebla, 
Oaxaca, Querétaro, Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Tabasco, Tlaxcala, 
Yucatán, and Zacatecas. The rest of municipalities not included in Zones A and 
B in Chihuahua, Guerrero, Jalisco, State of Mexico, Nuevo Leon, Sonora, 
Tamaulipas, and Veracruz 
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Source: CONASAMI (2012). In 
http://conasami.gob.mx/clasif_muni_area_geografica.html. Last accessed in October 2012. 
  
Around 95.2 per cent of Mexican municipalities belong to Zone, C, while 2.2 per cent to 
Zone B, and only 2.7 per cent to Zone A. This policy can be read in two ways. People may 
prefer to search for jobs where wages are higher whilst investors may prefer Zone C as 
labour is cheaper but, at the same time, the purchase power is lower. The differences 
between Zones have reduced since 2000. For instance, the difference between Zone A and 
Zone B is 8.62 per cent in 2000, 9.40 per cent in 2005, but 5.3 per cent in 2012. 
Controversially, the poorest regions in Mexico are located in Zone C. 
  
Figure No. 13. Minimum wages in Mexico by zones (pesos per day). 
Period 
National average 
(Mexican pesos) 
Zones 
A B C 
1990 9.27 10.08 9.33 8.41 
2000 35.23 37.90 35.10 32.70 
2005 45.40 46.80 45.35 44.05 
2011  58.01 59.82 58.13 56.70 
2012 60.66 62.33 60.57 59.08 
Source: CONASAMI, the Minimum Wages National Commission. In 
http://www.conasami.gob.mx/indice.htm. Last accessed on October 2012.  
 
Yet, the same geographical criterion does not apply to other economic matters. For 
instance, price inflation affects everyone almost the same regardless of their geographical 
location. From 1975 to January 2011, inflation increased 329,036 per cent (Banxico: 
2011)
23
 with a 1.94 per cent increase on average every month during the period. In the last 
ten years, the increase in salaries has never reached above 5 per cent per year. Figure No. 
14 compares the evolution of the increases in the minimum wage and inflation since 1993. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
23 Inflation calculated in the Banco de Mexico self–calculator software available in the Internet. In 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/politica–monetaria–e–inflacion/servicios/calculadora–inflacion.html. Last 
accessed in January 2011. 
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Figure No. 14. Inflation VS. minimum wages evolution in Mexico (1993-2012). 
 
Source: BANXICO (2012) and CONASAMI (2012), in 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.htm and 
http://conasami.gob.mx/nvos_sal_2012.html, accessed in October 2012. 
 
The policy seems to be designed to favour the upper Zone A rather than approaching a 
more comprehensive strategy to improve incomes in the poorer Zones B and C. In Zone A, 
the search for a job can be highly competitive simply because of the number of people 
living in these larger cities. However, even with the installation of industries in Zones B 
and C, the search for jobs has become equally competitive due to the existing 
unemployment rates accompanied by a growing informal economy. Evidently, the location 
of industries and, thus, sources of employment affect land and housing policies and, as 
seen, although jobs can be offered, these are of the low –wage type. The creation of jobs 
does not necessarily mean that these formally employed workers have access to formal 
housing, as many do not qualify for a mortgage due to their salary level.  
 
On the other hand, many people may earn higher incomes informally; formal lenders do 
not regard them as eligible just because they do not have a formal proof of income. The 
following section scrutinises how these land and housing policies are implemented in 
practice; in particular, it reviews the four main paths towards housing by which the poor 
attempt to gain access to it and how the state attempts to provide options to them through 
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its own programmes. This helps illustrate that accessing programmes “designed” for the 
poor is limited and how their impact has been throughout the last years.    
 
3.5. Poor’s housing promoted by the State. 
 
As the constitutional mandate indicates, the federal government has the duty to promote 
housing for all Mexicans (Cámara de Diputados 2011: 5). To pursue it, it has promoted 
public policies, created agencies, and established several trusts and funds for many years. 
All this activity attempted to create a legal housing framework, a structure in which 
housing is supposed to be delivered to the population. Yet, the growth of housing needs 
has surpassed its capacity to deliver for the millions of the urban poor. In 1973, the 
Institute for the Workers’ Housing Fund, INFONAVIT, was launched to deliver housing to 
employees in the formal sector. INFONAVIT has become the largest formal housing 
finance institution in Mexico. By law, formal employers, regardless of the size of their 
companies, are required to register workers in the Institute and pay 5 per cent from the 
workers’ salary into the fund to finance mortgages (INFONAVIT 2012). 
 
Eventually, the worker is entitled to apply to the fund for a mortgage, a housing loan for 
home improvements, or to buy a plot. By 2011, INFONAVIT had granted more than 6.3 
million housing loans across the country to its affiliates, of which 82 per cent have been 
mortgages (CONAVI 2012). Yet, INFONAVIT has still to cover a growing demand for 
mortgages. By 2012, the demand published on the Institute’s web page was for 4.6 million 
housing loans, while only 913,748 credits were offered (INFONAVIT 2012). This meant 
that supply covered only 19 per cent of the demand. Many of its affiliates still wait for 
finance to satisfy their housing needs. The second largest formal public housing institution 
is the Federal Mortgage Society, or SHF. This body is a development bank run by the 
federal government. Its objective is to incentivise primary and secondary housing markets 
through credit (SFH 2010). SHF funds savings entities and credit unions who grant loans 
to people who, in theory, are ineligible to apply to the large housing funds. Loan 
applications are usually for home improvements as the amounts are relatively low due to 
the levels of income of applicants.  
 
Although, this seems to be a positive approach to tackle the housing needs of the urban 
poor, the applicant must show proof of legal tenure of the plot in order to apply for a loan. 
This deters those who cannot meet this requirement. The third formal public housing 
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institution, the Institute for the State Workers’ Housing Fund, FOVISSSTE, specialises in 
financial assistance exclusively to workers in the public sector. Created in 1972, the Fund 
follows a similar mechanism to INFONAVIT with the exception that loans are exclusively 
granted to public sector workers. By 2011, FOVISSSTE had granted 1.2 million housing 
loans of which 72 per cent has been mortgages (CONAVI 2012). Yet, the fund has only 
met about 30 per cent of the demand from its affiliates (FOVISSSTE 2011). This brief 
review of the three main formal housing sources promoted from the state illustrate that 
even the more consolidated schemes have been unable to cope with demand and, 
moreover, this seems to continue increasing. Paradoxically, people still pending to access 
these schemes need to solve their housing needs and presumably they cope with this 
through other means, e.g., informal schemes.  
 
Figure No. 15. Main formal housing sources in Mexico (1973–2011). 
 HOUSING INSTITUTION TOTAL a/ % 
Source type  TOTAL 19,609,415 100.00 
Public 
Public housing bodies 9,636,999 49.14 
INFONAVIT 6,392,844 32.60 
SHF 1,247,998 6.36 
FOVISSSTE 1,246,771 6.36 
FONHAPO 633,831 3.23 
INDECO 115,555 0.59 
Federal subsidies 6,486,113 33.08 
State housing bodies 1,504,915 7.67 
Private Financial institutions 1,418,287 7.23 
Private Banks 1,083,607 5.53 
Intermediary SOFOLES
24
 181,691 0.93 
Public  
BANOBRAS
25
 128,230 0.65 
Army bank 24,759 0.13 
Others 434,342 2.21 
Emergency programmes 128,759 0.66 
Source: CONAVI 2012. “Estadísticas de Vivienda”. In 
http://www.conafovi.gob.mx/documentos/vivienda%20en%20cifras/estadistica–
vivienda/EV–1993–2010_a_284.pdf. Last accessed in October 2012. 
a/ Includes new houses, initial house (a one–room house), upgrading, financial support, 
and infrastructure improvements in dwellings. 
 
                                                 
 
24 SOFOLES: Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado or Limited Object Financial Societies. In 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/sistema-financiero/material-educativo/basico/fichas/estructura-del-sistema-
financiero/%7B2B7B661D-368D-BCC5-7B7C-EB7E764FF408%7D.pdf, last accessed in January 2014.  
25 BANOBRAS: Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Públicos or Works and Public Services National 
Bank. In http://ww.banobras.gob.mx/quienessomos/Paginas/Inicio.aspx, last accessed in January 2014.  
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FONHAPO,
26
 the Army Bank, and INDECO
27
 have had a less important role in public 
housing finance. In fact, INDECO closed in the mid–80s.28 Housing promoted through 
federal subsidies comprised 33 per cent of the whole market. Yet, housing programmes 
and the design of subsidies often change at the beginning of each federal government term 
and the continuity of policies is limited. For instance, one of the most appealing 
programmes was the self–construction in place for many years. Nevertheless, it stopped in 
1999; that year, only 1,385 households accessed a loan for home improvements. Since 
then, the federal government practically eradicated self –help programmes. State housing 
bodies represent the fifth source of housing loans, maybe low if millions of the urban poor, 
as seen, face difficulties accessing formal housing programmes. For instance, in 2011, state 
housing bodies only granted 4,446 mortgages, for home improvements 10,902, and 71 
small loans for self–help in the whole country (CONAVI 2012). Only 15 per cent of all 
credit from state housing states bodies was directed to mortgages and 2 per cent for self–
help (Ibid).  
 
To reduce housing shortage, the federal government created the Limited Object Financial 
Societies, SOFOLES, as intermediary bodies to channel housing subsidies (AMFE 2011).
29
 
However, their impact on markets is still only a minor one. The role of the state as an 
enabler for housing in general, but for the poor in particular, still has to improve as demand 
continues to increase. Based on the historical series since 1973, 49 per cent of the total 
credit was in the form of a mortgage; 39 per cent for home improvements; 1.6 per cent for 
self–help; and 1.6 per cent for sites and services schemes. The main housing funds remain 
focused on formal workers, leaving millions in the informal sector ineligible for credit.  
 
3.6. The formal financial sector. 
 
                                                 
 
26 FONHAPO: Fideicomiso Fondo Nacional de Habitaciones Populares, or Social Housing National 
Housing Fund Trust. In http://www.fonhapo.gob.mx/2013/index.php, accessed in January 2014.    
27 INDECO: Instituto Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y de la Vivienda Popular, or National 
Institute for Community Development and Social Housing. In http://www.gobierno.com.mx/conafovi.html, 
last accessed in January 2014.  
28 The analysis of the private housing bodies is included in the next section. 
29The SOFOLES were corporations that specialised in lending to a particular activity or sector. For example, 
mortgage, consumer, automotive, agribusiness, micro, capital goods, and transport. The Credit Institutions 
Act empowered them to obtain resources from the placement in the market of debt securities registered in 
the National Registry of Securities and Intermediaries. They can also get bank financing.  
Source: Banxico (2011c). “Sociedades Financieras de Objeto Limitado SOFOLES”. In 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/CatInst_Consulta/sistemafinanciero.BuscaSector.do?sector=67&seccion=2. 
Last accessed in January 2011. 
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Although, Mexican banks were privatised in the mid–1980s, access to financial services 
has been limited for many people. For instance, by  2010, only 30 per cent of adult 
Mexicans had a bank account (CGAP 2010: 1) to either buy things via the Internet, pay 
school fees, receive remittances from abroad, or receive their salary from the employer. 
However, this bank account did not make them automatically eligible for credit from the 
same banks or any other financial institution. For instance, a builder company may pay 
workers’ salaries through a debit card to avoid having cash at construction sites, but this 
did not make bricklayers bankable or eligible for other bank’ services. Only a few people 
in Mexico are considered eligible for credit from a bank and, even fewer for a mortgage. 
As Figure 17 shows, banks served only 5.5 per cent of the total housing market. Banks 
have struggled from economic crises. First, the Mexican economy crashed in December 
1994 during the transition of powers between Presidents Salinas and Zedillo. Then in 2008, 
the USA housing markets crisis also hit the national housing sector.  
 
Figure No. 16. Housing loans by banks in selected years in Mexico. 
Year 
Housing 
units 
Events 
2011 6,063  
2008 33,433 USA housing markets’ crises. 
2007 61,000  
2000 1,101 A new party took power for the first time in 70 years. 
1999 865 
Lowest in history. The political party in power for 70 years 
lost the presidential election for the first time. 
1996 2,317  
1995 17,503 Mexican economy crisis. 
1994 85,198  
1993 102,416  
1992 129,362 Highest in history. 
1983 43,085 First housing credit granted by banks recorded. 
Source: After CONAVI (2012). 
 
Banks’ lending levels have not attained a steady performance. Only about six thousand 
housing loans were granted in 2011. Given the banks’ restrictive approach to housing 
finance, one needs to know the requirements imposed by banks in order to grant a loan to 
potential clients. The main banks’ web pages and their housing credit simulators were 
consulted in October 2012 to ascertain when a person is eligible for credit. It transpired 
that for the National Bank of Mexico, Banamex, for instance, the minimum income 
required to buy a new house through a mortgage is $15,000 Mexican Pesos per month, or 
£714 UK/month (Banamex 2012). Thus, only a person earning at least eight minimum 
wages is eligible for a mortgage from this bank. 
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Figure No. 17. Screen from the Banamex Credit Simulator. 
Source: BANAMEX (2011). Note: the pop–out message indicated “Please, type an income 
higher o equal to $15,000” Mexican Pesos or £714 UK per month.  
 
This simulator indicates that with a minimum income of $15,000 Mexican Pesos per 
month, a person is eligible for a house valued at $500,000 Mexican Pesos –or £23,825 
UK– on a 15 year mortgage, an annual interest rate of 10.9 per cent, and a 12.4 per cent 
total annual cost before VAT. The 85 per cent of the value is financed by the bank and the 
applicant must pay a 15 per cent initial fee or down payment. The monthly repayment is 
£221 UK over the life of the credit. Life insurance is required and the mortgage includes 
unemployment insurance for up to 18 months at extra cost. The home must be finished, 
fully serviced, and located in a formal settlement. Applicants must show proof of current 
address, income slips, annual tax form, or bank account statements.  
 
The same calculation was made using the HSBC bank credit simulator. To acquire a house 
of the same value, terms, and conditions as in Banamex, HSBC requires a lower income of 
$13,793 Mexican Pesos –or £657 UK per month–, which is 7.3 times the minimum wage. 
The monthly payment for the house would be of $4,228 Mexican Pesos or £201UK (HSBC 
2012). The total annual interest is 12.2 per cent, but this bank applies a 1.94 per cent 
interest to adjust the final cost. The bank requires a proof of current address, credit 
references, and the annual tax form. The house must be fully serviced, the construction 
area must be at least 35 sqm in a 60 sqm plot, and located in a formal settlement.  
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Figure No. 18. Screen from the HSBC Credit Simulator.  
Source: HSBC Mexico (2012). 
 
Finally, a third bank’s housing credit simulator was activated using the same house value 
of $500,000 Mexican Pesos. The Santander’s bank simulator indicated that the amount 
financed would require the client to have an income of at least $12,932 Mexican Pesos –or 
£207 UK per month. This amount was 6.9 times the minimum wage. However, the 
monthly payment would be higher, at £237 UK for the whole credit (Santander 2012). The 
applicants were required to provide the same documentation as Banamex and HSBC. The 
bank financed only 85 per cent of the house cost and it required a 15 per cent initial fee.  
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Figure No. 19. Screen from the Santander Bank Credit Simulator. 
Source: Santander Bank, 2012. 
 
This brief review of three of the main banks’ housing finance options for the public shows 
that even the cheapest mortgage offered was unaffordable by the poor or an informal 
worker. First, the urban poor earn much less than the minimum income required by banks. 
Even those earning up to five minimum wages, do not reach the threshold required. 
Santander required 6.9 times the minimum wage, which is the lowest between the three 
banks consulted. Yet, this amount is still very high in comparison to what a low–income 
earner made –up to three minimum wages– or a middle–income earner –up to five 
minimum wages. Applicants must prove a steady income in ways that the poor cannot. 
They are asked to demonstrate a constant income for at least two years in the same job or, 
if self–employed, they need to show the income tax form that demonstrated earnings in the 
previous years and, evidently, their registration in the taxation system.  
 
Many self–employed worked informally and do not pay taxes to the revenue office so this 
requirement cannot be satisfied. Another requirement for all is the review of the credit 
history of potential clients in the credit bureau. The client must have a “clean” financial 
record to be regarded as eligible. Yet, millions of poor do not have a credit history, as they 
have never accesses any sort of credit. In addition, the house value in the three credit 
simulators is $500,000 Mexican Pesos, the cost of a social housing unit, which, in theory, 
is intended for low–income earners. Thus, the banks do not offer a product suitable for the 
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urban poor due to cost, requirements, and the characteristics of the houses eligible for 
mortgages. The poor clearly need to find housing through other means than banks.  
 
3.7. Self–help housing. 
 
CIDOC and SHF (2009: 38) estimated Mexico’s housing stock at 26.1 million units of 
which 31 per cent was considered overcrowded, precarious, or built with inappropriate 
materials. These units house 35.4 per cent of the population or 36.7 million people (Ibid.). 
They also estimated that 8.9 million housing units needed to improve due to their current 
physical conditions (Ibid.). More than 41 per cent of those living in these houses were 
officially poor, as they earned less than three minimum wages (Ibid: 40). These houses 
were built by the residents in 40 per cent of the cases, 40 per cent with the help of a 
bricklayer, only 2 per cent for by a commercial builder, and 0.6 per cent involved an 
architect (Ibid: 39). This is, according to CIDOC and SHF, the real picture of the paths 
followed by Mexicans in sheltering their families.  
 
Hence, the path towards achieving a consolidated and fully serviced house may take many 
years due to the limited financial support. Often, the process may be interrupted for many 
years more. Without formal financial options available, the poor embarked on a process to 
attain housing through their own abilities, for instance, by learning how to build a house on 
their own and to negotiate for services and infrastructure with local authorities. They learn 
how to deal with the fact that the places where they live does not comply with local 
regulations. They often manage to transform initial shacks or small rooms built with 
materials found in the dumps, into more solid structures of bricks and mortar, or/and 
concrete. The process is uneasy. It requires effort, creativity, and the ability to read the 
environment to decide when and how to invest.  
 
Knowledge about the assembly of a shelter is important in the process towards home 
consolidation. However, one cannot assume that all the poor know how to build their 
homes. This may be a stereotype, which also requires to be scrutinised. With the growth of 
the informal economy, many urban poor work in sectors not necessarily related to 
construction. They could be street vendors, sellers of products from the home, and traders 
in street markets. Yet, through building and improving their own homes, many learn how 
to do it on their own or with the assistance of friends or relatives. However, a starting point 
for young members of families in search of a job is often as apprentices. These are usually 
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the sons of bricklayers or other construction workers who take them to a site to learn a skill 
and contribute to the family. The same happens among other workers in the informal 
sector. Street vendors also bring their children onto the streets with them to teach them 
how to sell goods.  
 
In any case, families need to acquire some basic knowledge to perform the construction 
tasks needed to assemble a shelter. Sometimes, this knowledge is acquired in practice 
while they actually build something in their own places. Certainly, for those working in 
construction, their knowledge is, in theory, useful for their own homes. It is common to see 
both women and men making bricks, mixing mortar, or simply carrying materials on the 
site. The process is much the same even for female heads of households. Some are able to 
get help from a friend for more specialised tasks such as the electricity or plumbing. This 
helps the poor expedite the construction of a house that, otherwise, they would not be able 
to afford. Some of the most representative strategies implemented by the urban poor to 
raise resources available for various tasks, especially for housing–related aspects, have 
been listed by Fekade (2000: 139), Ferguson (1999: 189), and O’Keefe (2002: 33) as 
follows: 
 
 Using individual or group/family savings,  
 Keeping spare money under the mattress,  
 Using windfalls (extra income),  
 Using local building materials and/or implementing indigenous technologies–i.e., 
vernacular architecture,  
 Seeking small loans from money lenders, bosses, or workmates 
 Exchanging some arrangements or activities/jobs with landlords,  
 Receiving community self–help,  
 Using remittances from family members living abroad, and 
 Participating in rotative savings groups. 
 
Often, some families keep livestock and poultry in urban areas as a way of making money 
for potential emergencies (Taber 2004: 118). However, not all income is available for 
construction. People need small savings or loans requested from local moneylenders to 
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cope with health problems, the death of a member, the birth of a new child, an emergency, 
or to celebrate special family events, such as the “sweet fifteen”30 of daughters.  
 
In Mexico, there is a widespread practice of rotating savings group schemes called tandas 
(Campos 1998: 199). Here, small groups agree to pay a weekly/monthly fee. One of the 
members receives the total sum on a rotating basis. There is no limit to participants, and 
groups can be of as many as 20 people. The idea is to keep the tanda for as long as 
possible to “plan” the dates on which to receive it when a person needs it most. Members 
run the tandas based on trust, keenness, knowledge about each other, and references. The 
group agrees on the fees, their periodicity, and the turn of each member to receive the 
money. Usually the turns are drawn in front of the members as a way to make the process 
transparent. These sorts of schemes are not exclusive to Mexico and take place in other 
countries (see Ashe 2002: [127]; Campos 1998: 199; Gallardo 2001: 12; O’Keefe 2002: 
34; Taber 2004: 118; and Titus 1997: 230). Although, tandas are built on trust, unexpected 
events may cause members to default. Taber (2004: 18) reports up to 6 per cent of non–
compliance or defaulting in these sorts of groups. Yet, tandas are a flexible mechanism to 
finance land and housing needs. Defaulting in a tanda is complicated as people know each 
other, some may be even neighbours, and the social pressure is an important driver for 
complying with the commitment.  
 
Another source of finance among the poor is local moneylenders, often called usurers. 
Often, people regard moneylenders as abusive, as their interest rates are often higher than 
other sources. Zapata (2002: 186) reports interest rates of as much as 20 per cent per month 
or even 20 per cent per day, at the extreme, in poorer urban areas. This activity is 
unregulated, yet, based on demand. Indeed, many people make their living as 
moneylenders. They may live in the same area as their borrowers. They often know each 
other, as this is the basis for having access to the loan. These transactions are often written 
off on small pieces of paper torn out of notebooks and kept as the proof of the loan. Once 
the loan is repaid, the paper is destroyed in front of the borrower. The poor try to avoid this 
type of loan since it is expensive and it is often an option only in emergencies. Yet, access 
                                                 
 
30 This is probably one of the most important celebrations in a Mexican family; it includes a big party with 
relatives and neighbours when the daughter celebrates her fifteen birthday. This represents her “formal” 
insertion into the society, leaving her childhood and entering into her adult life. The celebration includes a 
religious mass, a traditional dance, and a waltz selected by the girl and prepared with months of 
anticipation by a group of young escorts. If resources are limited, the celebration takes place in the street, 
often in front of the house of the family, where people gather to party.      
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to moneylenders does not require collateral or pre–requisites in order to obtain a loan. 
Probably the most common way of financing housing needs among the urban poor is to 
invest small sums of money in building materials whenever they can. It is common for 
people to buy a bag of cement or some bricks just after receiving their salaries before the 
weekend. Many buy these materials and use them in their homes on the same day. Others 
accumulate and use them when they have sufficient to complete a wall or a part of the 
house. This way, the process is lengthy and people need to combine other sources of 
financing, such as tandas or loans from local moneylenders, especially when the cost of 
some parts of the house demand more money or a lump sum, i.e., the roof.  
 
When the money is scarce, many people use building materials collected from nearby 
construction sites or dumps (Fekade 2000: 139), such as wood, cardboard, or defective 
building materials. Gilbert (1994: 88) describes a typical initial shack in a poor urban area 
as one built from scratch, with cardboard boxes, wood, and of discarded material 
elsewhere. The shack will eventually show signs of consolidation, more solid walls, floors, 
and roofs replace some of the initial materials.  
 
Figure No. 20 illustrates such a shack. This shelter is located in Aguascalientes, Mexico. 
One can observe both a more consolidated room built with bricks and mortar, and two 
small rooms built with corrugated cardboard and wooden pallets. Electricity cables lie on 
the unpaved street from which the house takes its power. These are illegally connected to a 
public lamppost. The entrance presents a number for identification on a fence built for 
security reasons and delimitation of private space. Clothes are dried in the sun by hanging 
them up from the walls outside the house. There is no running water. This is saved in big 
cans filled by a smaller bucket full carried from elsewhere.  
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Figure No.  20. A typical shack in an informal settlement in Mexico. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
On the left, one can see a pile of sand needed for mortar and concrete in the future, along 
with another of rocks to lay the foundations of other rooms. The room made of brick has 
concrete columns at the corners with extended steel bars projecting from the roof. These 
are for a potential second floor. The difficulties faced by people living in these types of 
dwellings include health issues, security concerns, and safety matters, such as those of the 
risk of electrocution due to the cables on the streets. People hope to be able to cope with 
the challenging environment and improve their living conditions over time. The ways they 
are able to finance their homes determine the period of the consolidation process.  
 
Another example of this process is shown in Figure No. 21. The shack has been built using 
different materials collected from nearby areas; the owner is buying periodically, for 
instance, some brick, which will eventually replace the planks of the shack.  
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Figure No. 21. A house in the process of consolidation process. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
3.8. Microfinance institutions as financial sources for the poor. 
 
Microfinance in general, but housing microfinance in particular, is a relatively new 
financial approach in Mexico (ProDesarrollo 2008: 15). By 2012, ProDesarrollo, the 
national organisation that gathered the most important 87 microfinance institutions, MFIs, 
reported 2,094 branches in 30 per cent of the municipalities in the country (ProDesarrollo 
2011: 22). MFIs have privileged smaller communities for their services but they have 
progressively extended their provision to larger communities. Even so, two thirds of the 
branches are located in municipalities with less than 100,000 inhabitants and only 8 per 
cent in areas with more than 500,000, and only 10 per cent were located in areas with less 
than 15,000 people (Ibid: 24). In fact, MFIs operated in 60 per cent of the areas with lower 
human development indices according to the national category (Ibid: 25).  
 
There are two types of MFIS in Mexico. First, there are those, which do not manage 
savings from clients named unregulated MFIs. These comprise not–for profit associations, 
charities, for profit organisations, and limited object financial institutions. The rest are  
regulated MFIs, which are allowed to receive savings from their clients, i.e., specialised 
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MF banks, popular financial societies, savings and loans cooperatives, and communitarian 
financial societies. The number of clients for MF services has increased in the last years. 
By 2007, microfinance institutions reported 2.2 million clients and this number reached 7.6 
million in 2011; 80 per cent of beneficiaries were women and 53 per cent lived in rural 
areas (Ibid: 16). Around 35 per cent of credit was to individuals and 65 per cent followed a 
group credit scheme (Ibid). Meanwhile, average credit has reduced. In 2008, the average 
was $7,022 Mexican pesos or £326 UK (ProDesarrollo 2008: 15) and in 2011 only $5,701 
Mexican Pesos or £271 UK (ProDesarrollo 2011: 16). This means that MFIs are reaching a 
larger number of clients but the loans granted are smaller year after year. This may have 
resulted from the fact that many MFIs were small and needed time to reach a consolidated 
portfolio. The average age of Mexicans MFIs is only 8 years (Ibid: 16). Their portfolio has 
almost tripled, increasing from $10,019,069,808 Mexican Pesos in 2007, to 
$28,902,963,031 Mexican Pesos or £1,377,265,196 UK in 2011.  
 
Figure No. 22. The five largest MFIs in Mexico (2011). 
No Name of MFI Clients 
Portfolio 
(Mexican 
Pesos) 
Active 
borrowers 
1 Compartamos Banco 3,393,440 11,882,000,000 2,334,440 
2 Financiera Independencia  1,617,170 7,347,670,050 1,617,170 
3 Provident México  670,925 1,817,773,350 670,925 
4 Came 298,564 970,481,218 298,564 
5 Finca–Mex 142,511 566,994,324 142,511 
 Total  6,122,610 22,584,918.942 5,063,610 
Source: ProDesarrollo (2011). 
 
Three aspects make housing microfinance unattractive to the poor. First, although the MF 
sector is growing, its focus on loans for productive activities remains. Only 18 per cent of 
MFIs offer housing loans (ProDesarrollo 2011: 8) whilst MixMarket (2011) reports only 5 
per cent. Second, in order to access a housing loan, 9 per cent of MFIs require previous 
savings to clients. Clients need to prove they are as reliable for credit as they are for 
savings. Third, in addition, MFIs still require collateral when applying for a housing loan 
(ProDesarrollo 2008: 116). Many people are unable to save money for a consistent period 
as income is not constant and, at the same time, it is difficult to find a person willing to 
provide collateral for someone else in the savings group. For the other types of credit, 
ProDesarrollo (Ibid: 16) reports that 72 per cent was based on social collateral to groups of 
up to six people with a one–year period for repayment. The five largest MFIs in Mexico 
are Compartamos Banco (37 per cent of market), Financiera Independencia (25 per cent), 
Provident (10 per cent), Came (5 per cent), and Finca–Mex (2 per cent). Together, they 
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account for 72 per cent of the clients in the market (ProDesarrollo 2011: 18). Compartamos 
Banco and Financiera Independencia, however, dominate the market, with 62 per cent. 
Although, living in informal areas or working in the informal sector may not make the poor 
ineligible for microcredit, the interests charged are still high. Despite the recent trend in 
MF, its limitations for financing housing are evident. Potential clients are still reluctant to 
apply for credit. MixMarket (2011: 12) reports that more than half of the population use 
their own resources to finance their needs, 19 per cent ask for loans from friends and 
relatives, and 20 per cent believe that interest rates are high. Figure No 23 shows the main 
features and requirements to apply for a microloan. The amount of money lent is small but 
it can be used for home improvements rather than for home acquisition.  
 
Figure No. 23. Housing MF products in the two largest MFI’s in Mexico. 
MFIs 
Housing MF 
product 
Features Requirements 
Financiera 
Independencia 
a/ 
Crediconstruye 
Maximum credit: $20,000 
Mexican Pesos –£953UK. 
Up to 2 years to repay. 
Implemented through 
building materials vouchers. 
10 % start–up commission. 
78 % Total Annual Cost 
without VAT. 
Official ID 
Proof of address 
Proof of income 
Compartamos 
Banco b/ 
Crédito 
Mejora tu 
Casa –Home 
Improvements 
Credit. 
Exclusively for 
women 
Maximum credit: $30,000 
Mexican Pesos –£1,429UK. 
Up to 2 years to repay. 
No start–up commission. 
96 % Total Annual Cost 
without VAT. 
Proof of home 
ownership or proof 
of a minimum five 
years residency in 
the place. 
Collateral within 
the savings group. 
a/ Financiera Independencia (2012). Crediconstruye. In 
http://www.independencia.com.mx/credito.aspx. Last accessed in October 2012. 
b/ Compartamos Banco (2012). Crédito Mejora tu Casa (Home Improvements Credit. In 
http://www.compartamos.com/wps/portal/ProductsServices/Credit/HomeImprovement, last 
accessed in October 2012. 
 
Although CEMEFI (2011) reports more than 10,000 NGOs in Mexico, their impact on 
housing programmes is still low. Less than 1 per cent of them work in housing– related 
activities, services, and infrastructure. More than 66 per cent concentrate on social 
programmes. Another issue is their concentration in Mexico City where more than 26 per 
cent of them located. Less than 6 per cent work in Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Zacatecas (Ibid), 
the poorest Mexican states. 
 
3.9. Conclusions. 
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This chapter engages with the analysis of the role of ejido land in the equation for housing 
the poor. Then, it reviews relevant urban policies, and finally, it critically reviews the 
accessibility of housing and credit for the urban poor. The goal of this section is to 
scrutinise the key aspects that have an impact on the process of housing the urban poor 
within the existing legal framework and both the formal and informal mechanisms to 
access a piece of land for housing. The aspects herein analysed reinforce the understanding 
of the Mexican context with respect of the scenario experience by the poor in their process 
towards shelter themselves, the barriers, and the limitations faced throughout.  
 
This chapter illustrated the relevance of the ejido in the provision of land for urban 
development and, in particular, its role as provider for the poor. Herein, it is evident that 
ejidos will continue to play an important role, especially those closer to urban areas. Their 
value for formal and informal developers will continue to increase, as the institutional 
framework has been unable to ease the process of incorporating them into the urban 
equation. Thus, it seems that they will continue to be a place for informal sales and an 
option for millions of the poor in search for a place to live. In exceptional cases, ejido land 
will be incorporated into the urban fabric as long as the local authorities were able to 
negotiate with ejidatarios the necessary conditions for it. Yet, this seems to be difficult as, 
based on the review, ejidatarios do not find it attractive to participate in the established 
procedures to sell their land. Enforcing ejidatarios to comply with the law after the land 
reform has simply been limited.  
 
Consequently, the urban poor find difficult to access land for housing purposes throughout 
the existing formal mechanisms. Both banks and public programmes demand for a number 
of pre–requisites that millions of the urban poor cannot cope simply because their income 
is insufficient or jobs are informal. Besides, the disinterest of public programmes to 
incentivise self –help programmes pushes millions to make housing efforts in isolation. 
The poor, nevertheless, have been able to manage sheltering themselves; though, 
innovative schemes are needed to help them expedite access to land, housing loans, and/or 
simply assistance.  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY. 
 
4.1.  Introduction. 
 
This chapter engages with the methodology followed to address the aims and objectives of 
this dissertation. This is based on an approach that scrutinises the way people perceive 
their context and act consequently in pursuing shelter and better housing conditions in 
order to hear the voice of the poor. Briefly, the aim of this research is to assess the 
motivations and barriers of the urban poor to invest and achieve fully consolidated and 
serviced housing. The first objective is to assess the living conditions of the urban poor by 
contesting the utility of the dichotomy of informal and formal in categorising the poor. The 
second examines critically the circumstances under which the urban poor make choices 
regarding their efforts to achieve permanent housing. The third objective scrutinises the 
contribution of security to informal house construction. Thus, the present chapter discusses 
the rationale behind the selection of the methodology employed to incorporate the voice of 
the main actors involved in housing the poor. First, it discusses the conceptual framework 
of the methodology to, second, explains the reasons behind the selection of the City of 
Aguascalientes as the case study in this dissertation.   
 
4.2.  Perceptions and interpretations of housing, and decision making. 
 
The places where people live are the result of a series of decisions made over time by 
individuals within a community. Harvey (1981: 18) claims that the place where people live 
is the physical expression of their decisions and is highly influenced by their 
environment.
31
 People respond not only by considering their own interpretation but also to 
a series of limitations imposed by and interpreted from previous and current circumstances. 
Giddens (1984: 8) argues that agents/actors decide on actions as a response to their 
environment and that these depend on their capability of doing those things in the first 
place –called agency. This implies that in interacting with the environment, knowledge 
shall be relevant at the same pace as the capability of the individual to achieve their goals 
through actions.  
 
                                                 
 
31 For the purpose of this research, environment refers to both the tangible (physical) and the intangible 
context (social, economic, cultural, and political) that relates to the life of an individual or a community.  
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Over time, in theory, people accumulate experience and knowledge within a specific social 
structure that influence on their choices. The interpretation of the people’s environment is 
crucial as it eases or deters the housing process. Human agency is a key in this process as it 
deals with past, present, and future events based on people’s perceptions. The relationship 
between a person and his/her environment is often called the “human–environment 
relationship” and it is central to this research. Following the assumption that legal tenure is 
a relative driver for housing choices, the analysis of the environment is pertinent at 
different stages in this process. For instance, people have to make decisions when they 
choose to start a family or to leave the parental home, or when they need to select a place 
in which to buy land, or buy a house, or rent a room. What drives such choices? What 
makes one option more appealing than others do? Is a land title so appealing that people 
are willing to pay the extra cost of living in formality? On the other hand, does it deter 
contrary?  
 
This dissertation scrutinises the human–environment approach shaping housing choices. 
The challenge was to find a framework that allowed the voice of the urban poor to be heard 
from their own perspective rather than dealing with that from officials or governments. 
This dissertation follows a behavioural perspective based on the perceptions, learning, and 
actions of people resulting from their interpretation of the environment, or as in Giddens 
terms, the structure (Ibid.). This approach helps provide insights from perspectives seldom 
analysed by Mexican policymakers and in medium–sized cities in particular. This also 
provides an understanding of the process of house production by the poor. Johnston (1986: 
5) reinforces the relevance of such an approach by considering that it offers “objective 
investigation of these individual worlds”. He emphasises the role played by people’s 
perceptions within a specific set of conditions which are true for them but he does not 
claim for the “replicability and truth” for everyone. It is only true for those involved. The 
study of people’s behaviour does not attempt to generalise, as other schools of knowledge, 
such as positivism claims. Instead, it attempts to offer useful knowledge by comparing 
similar situations across different groups, finding similarities, or spotting differences.  
 
Another challenge is that, as perception is involved, it demands an interpretation at a very 
“imaginative extent” as Holt–Jensen (1988: 108) suggests. For instance, in terms of 
housing, the researcher needs to demonstrate, as Perkins et al (2008: 35) claim, an 
“understanding of the subjective experiences of housing and neighbourhood, and the 
social, economic, and regulatory forces that influence those experiences”. This is the 
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intangible extension of the (tangible) environment. This is the “structure” constraining the 
lives of people as Giddens (1984: 17) suggests, i.e., power, institutions, political, and 
economy.  
 
There is an environment in which social, economic, legal, and political aspects overlap 
which, at the same time, makes interpretation challenging. Golledge and Stimson (1987: 4) 
highlight the significance of behavioural analysis by emphasising the focus on the process 
–i.e., the decisions and the human–environment interaction –or the human agency, rather 
than emphasising the form– i.e., the outcome. By understanding the process, the results 
become outcomes intimately connected one to another. The outcome of the interpretation 
can result in an image of what people actually perceive and interpret. Giddens (1984: 19) 
argues that sometimes this relationship overlaps to the extent that it takes a dualistic form 
in which it can be undistinguishable whether the environment shapes people’s actions or 
these shape the environment (hermeneutics).  
 
Van Kempen and Sule (1998: 1638) coincide that the study of people’s interaction with 
their surroundings provides an image of the preferences, perceptions, and their decision–
making process. These are, for instance, images constructed by the results derived from the 
satisfaction of perceived needs and by the knowledge of the housing issues of dwellers 
(Golledge and Stimson 1987: 263). Knowing people’s opinions –i.e., learning from the 
images they construct– helps distinguish between the enablers and disablers in the housing 
process. Blaxter et al (2001: 61) support the idea that asserting people’s opinions is 
essential to understanding their surroundings. By exploring these images, the evidence of 
what legal tenure represents among the poor allows us understand its relevance.  
 
It is also important to approach other actors or agents who influenced the environment in 
different ways, such as policymakers. Walmsley and Lewis (1993: 181) consider that 
access to housing is not only a reflection of constraints on people but also on the mode of 
operation of those involved in organising the housing market. This is part of the structure –
in Giddens’ terms (1984: 17) – in which the urban poor make decisions. It is the person, 
though, who can reflect better on their decisions. It is the role of the researcher to make the 
analysis from a comprehensive viewpoint. In summary, this approach fits with what 
interpretivists proposed as the way to explain the social construction from a person’s 
viewpoints. Golledge and Stimson (1987: 5) claim that in studying people’s behaviour, 
researchers have: 
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“…recognised their thought processes from the base up, starting with the 
individual, searching for commonalties across groups of individuals, 
aggregating on the basis of commonalities, and then searching for potential 
generalisations that might be used to modify existing theory or to develop 
new ones.” 
 
An interpretivist approach provides a suitable perspective to the problem of housing the 
urban poor. As Fay (1996: 113) recalls, “interpretivists think that to comprehend others is 
to understand the meaning of what they do, and that to understand this meaning is to 
understand them simply in their own terms”. Although, this is also its major critique, 
arguing that such analysis is limited to its own settings and generalisations cannot be made. 
It is also important to recognise that individual’s viewpoints are of great value when the 
human factor and human behaviour shape the decision–making process. Additionally, 
Blaxter et al (2001: 61) claim that interpretivism is a philosophical paradigm that provides 
both the understanding and the explaining of a phenomenon as the basic elements in 
investigating social sciences. An interpretivist focuses on a smaller number of people than 
large–scale studies, which increases the possibilities of obtaining relevant information 
about people’s activities and experiences (Johnston 1986: 74. and Travers 2001: 11).  
 
Furthermore, Flowerdew and Martin (1997: 15) suggest that a comprehensive perspective 
goes beyond a descriptive exercise to understand how and why people make their housing 
choices within a constraining urban environment. What is needed is to analyse critically 
the outcomes as the results of an environment, which may enable or deter people’s 
decisions. In brief, asserting people’s viewpoints helps understand the elements, which are 
relevant to them in making housing choices (Blaxter et al. 2001: 61). A behavioural 
approach represents two additional challenges for the researcher when collecting 
information in the field. First, information from primary sources is relevant to whether to 
use a structured or a more flexible/open approach to ascertain peoples’ viewpoints. 
Golledge and Stimson (1987: 4) recommend conducting fieldwork that puts the participant 
subjects at the centre of the research process. Second, the next step is to compile and 
analyse the information from the various actors intervening in the process. Travers (2001: 
11) stresses the importance of developing an inclusive analysis by comparing “insiders and 
outsiders in the course of daily affairs”. In pursuing this, a case study provided sufficient 
elements to scrutinise human agency among the poor within their environment –or 
structure– in which they make their decisions to attain a place to live.  
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For that reason, this research not only approaches the process from the dwellers’ 
perspective but also from other actors, such as policymakers, officials, political leaders, 
and academics. In summary, this methodology helps shape the further sections of this 
dissertation. In particular, it is suitable for the design of the methods and tools to deal with 
the fieldwork. For instance, it is evident that this approach puts the viewpoints of 
individuals in the centre of debate. Hence, trying to understand the environment in which 
people make housing choices –structure– their opinions are both central and the focus of 
the efforts in conducting the fieldwork. In addition, it highlights the relevance of 
scrutinising the viewpoints of the different actors involved in the housing process. Thus, 
the data collection process must include the voices of the urban poor and the decision–
making actors.  
 
4.3.  Choices in the housing process. 
 
To understand what shapes people’s choices, it is necessary to understand the factors 
shaping their behaviour. For the analysis, these factors can be divided into three central 
elements: perception, learning, and actions. These are the core in the process of interaction 
with their environment and central to human agency, as people’s capacity to accomplish is 
fundamental in achieving shelter. Perception relates more to the capture of the environment 
by people. It is an individual action fed by some of the elements around them –or the 
structure. Learning is a process of interpretation and accumulation linked to experience, 
knowledge, and expectations, whilst, acts relate more to the capacity of people to interact 
with their environment by responding in an active or passive way to a stimulus. For 
instance, Golledge and Stimson (1987: 46) claim that, “the location of human activities and 
the spatial pattern of their movements will be the outcomes of their perceived and 
cognitive structuring of their environment”. They are the tangible results of acts.  
 
At community level, the way cities have been created is the consequence of the 
accumulation of peoples’ acts arising from their perception and interpretation. The 
resulting city is the product of a collective human agency. At individual level, shelter is 
also the result of that process. Yet, the behavioural perspective relies on these elements as 
the drivers of spatial behaviour (Anderson 1989: 133). The place where an individual lives 
is the result of many factors interaction. Walmsley and Lewis (1984: 4) suggest that the 
underlying rationale of a behavioural approach is the intervention of people in the 
environment:  
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“…an understanding of the spatial distribution and pattern of man–made 
phenomena on the earth’s surface rests upon knowledge of the decisions and 
behaviours which influence the arrangement of the phenomena rather than on 
knowledge just of the positional relations of the phenomena themselves.” 
 
The reaction to the environment –i.e., the acts –finds motivations at different levels– 
depends on the intensity of the stimulus/information and of individual experience. As a 
result, the behaviour may show some patterns in the life of people. For instance, Golledge 
and Stimson (1997: 155) define three types of behaviours in human beings that, they 
claimed, explain how people react to their context: a) weakly motivated and random 
behaviour; b) the behaviour resulting in a problem–solving interaction where conscious 
thinking is involved to solve the problem; and c) the repetitive learned behaviour. Housing 
choices in particular differ from one individual to another and within the life of the same 
individual depending of his/her stage of life, experience, and knowledge. For instance, 
moving to a new place to live might mean something different to the same person 
depending on whether he is moving when young or at the age of 40 with his own family. It 
might also mean something different whether the move is to the city or to a rural area. The 
perception, learning, and acts are, eventually, different. At this point, it is necessary to 
establish how to deepen the analysis, becoming necessary to survey frameworks that 
translate the theories of behaviour into operational ones. Three frameworks are assessed to 
understand how scholars have dealt with human behaviour: a) the Golledge and Stimson 
model (1987: 11), b) the Rossi’s model (1955: 174), and the Giddens’ Theory of 
Structuration (1984: 16). First, the Golledge and Stimson’s model (1987: 11) is known as 
the “man–environment behavioural interface”32 (Figure No. 24).  
 
It focuses on how three elements –i.e., attitudes, cognition/perception, and learning– 
interacts between them and how through interpretation, the spatial behaviour of people 
changes over time. In this framework, the central interacting elements comprise the core of 
people’s response to the environment. This is transformed into a spatial behaviour in 
relationship with the environmental structure. The feedback is constant and enables the 
process continually to repeat that behaviour. This process is modified or reinforced 
                                                 
 
32 Hereafter referred to as the “human–environment behavioural interface”. The “man” concept as to refer to 
human was accepted at the time of Golledge and Stimson’s model. That is not acceptable now in terms of 
equality and gender discourses.  
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because of the permanent man–environment interaction reflecting various aspects of 
people’s lives.  
 
 
Figure No. 24. The Human–Environment Behavioural Interface. 
Source: Golledge and Stimson (1987: 11). 
 
This model explains subjective transactions between people and their context, which, as 
for the majority of the urban poor, is likely to be an environment of uncertainty
33
 (Golledge 
and Stimson 1987: 11). The elements interpreted can be eventually modified accordingly. 
For instance, people evaluate their economic conditions, priorities, needs, and aims and 
reassess them eventually to make, in theory, better decisions, i.e., making housing 
investments. Feedback plays a key role as this provides the opportunity to re–interpret the 
environment to accommodate people’ needs better. In housing, the core elements interact 
transversally by shaping people’s behaviour. If housing conditions are regarded as 
inadequate, the behaviour –specifically, the acts– would be reflected by a modification 
within the individual’s system –i.e., the environment– which as a result, would offer a 
modification of the structure with new elements. This process can be repetitive as many 
times as needed. In other words, this interaction modifies the behaviour of the individual 
who, at the same time, modify their living environment through the acts based on their 
interpretations.  
 
                                                 
 
33 Here, uncertainty referred to the precision and accuracy with which something was known or predicted by 
people from knowledge (Golledge and Stimson 1987: 206). Uncertainty related to knowledge, whether 
existing or assumed, in connection to people’s own lives and experiences.  
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People’s decisions may offer a sensible explanation regarding the housing issues that this 
dissertation seeks to address within this interface. Some elements may be seen as a 
dichotomy during the process. For instance, the legal framework can be perceived as an 
enabler or a disabler in the same environment and for the same people. Van Kempen 
(1998: 1683) notes that such a process is especially relevant to housing. People’ 
perceptions and their transformation into a decision–making process provide an insight to 
their preferences. The environment is a decisive element in knowledge accumulation and a 
driver for making decisions, i.e., people’s mobility or, when decisions are made for the 
enhancement of housing conditions. On the other hand, Rossi (1955) develops a model to 
study the relationship between people and their context focused on housing behaviour in 
which people’s decisions are claimed not to be isolated events.  
 
To the contrary, these are shaped by their needs, dissatisfactions, and aspirations to find 
better conditions (Ibid: 175). This model attempts to explain why people decide to move to 
a different place and comprises three stages (Ibid: 174): a) the reasons to leave the existing 
household; b) the search for a new place stage; and c) the reasons for choosing the new 
place. Rossi puts emphasis on changes in family composition and in life cycles (Ibid: 9). 
Although this is evident as changes are part of family life, it is an interpretation of these 
changes that pushes people to move or to stay. Rossi claims that people tend to move when 
families experience “greatest growth” when children are born, or extended family members 
arrive. Yet, needs are different when an individual lives in the parental house to the needs 
faced when living on their own or with a family of their own. The house is adapted to 
accommodate such the needs of its residents. People perceive, interpret, and face these 
cycles differently. An individual might decide to move from his parental home due to 
reasons related to the house itself –i.e., overcrowding– or to changing personal 
circumstances, such as getting married or finding a job elsewhere– or for externalities –i.e., 
eviction, or flooding.  
 
Figure No. 25. The Rossi Model summary. 
Stage I. Reasons for 
leaving the old home 
Stage II. The search for a 
new place 
Stage III. Reasons for choice 
among alternatives 
Decision forced by 
outside circumstances 
Channels of information 
employed: 
a) formal and  
b) informal 
Only one opportunity offered:  
Reasons presumed to be 
identical with specifications 
Decision made because 
of dissatisfaction with 
old place 
Specifications (features 
desired in new home) 
Several opportunities:  
Choice made because of 
comparative attractions of 
alternate opportunities 
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Source: Rossi 1955: 174. 
 
The elements driving decisions or “stressors”, along with the stress, and the stress response 
as proposed by Rossi (see Figure No. 26) may explain people’s behaviour still in many 
places in the world today, despite this model was designed a few decades ago.  
 
Figure No. 26. Stressors, stress, and stress reactions. 
Stressor 
Processes 
Stress measurement Stress response 
Size–facilities of dwelling 
Access to work 
Access to friends 
Kind of people in 
neighbourhood 
Air pollution (smog) 
Derived from stress mode, 
using individual household 
attitude scale on stressors. 
N.B. subjectively 
evaluated by households 
Desire to move 
Actual movement 
Modification of dwelling 
Public action, i.e., petition for 
more services. 
Source: Rossi 1955: 474. 
 
Rossi’s study would have benefited from analysing what actually happened once people 
moved, but, as he explained, that was not the scope of his research. Neither Golledge and 
Stimson nor Rossi include other aspects that may have enriched the discussion, such as the 
legal status of land, or family growth, or informality as drivers/stressors. However, for the 
purposes of this research, the two models complement each other. They both help illustrate 
the life cycles as they are reflected in the housing choices process –i.e., from deciding to 
move to making home improvements. Their importance relates to the fact that other 
elements can be incorporated, such as land tenure. This plays a role in different ways. For 
instance, an individual may prefer a formal area simply due to its social status or so as not 
incur in bring legal problems for the household in formation.  
 
Sometimes, legal tenure may imply associated costs that people are simply unwilling or 
unable to fulfil whilst, for others, formal tenure may represent various costs but for 
different reasons. A decision has to be made as to whether a person is willing to pay the 
cost in either place. Walmsley and Lewis (1993: 173) argue, “…residential preferences 
seem to be strongly influenced by factors such as socio–economic status and stage in the 
life/family cycle”. A young couple may be more willing to embark on a process of housing 
in an informal area as time, effort, and willingness to improve shelter may be more 
difficult for a couple at a different life stage. In practice, resources are often most limited 
among the younger urban poor. Although, the parental home is often a place where young 
couples start their life together, this research dealt with the actual decision to move and its 
drivers up to the fact of moving, choosing a place, arriving, and making home 
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improvements in the selected place. Renting a place is also an option for many and its 
selection relates to perception and choice. However, this research only dealt with those in 
search of a place of their own and the subsequent processes involved. 
 
After deciding to leave the parental/original home, a young couple starts the search by 
using the information available from formal and informal sources. At this point, risk is a 
central issue besides the quality and availability of that information. Golledge and Stimson 
(1987: 210) warn that risk plays a major role. They argue that the interpretation of that risk 
depends, first, on the information available and actually regarded as a truth; second, on the 
social experiences and values of the people involved; and, third, on the cognition 
(knowledge or their lack of knowledge) of the world they now face. The risk can be 
associated with the risk of either buying a home through a mortgage (i.e., debt for many 
years). Potential evictions in in an informal area or the risks of actually moving to a place 
associated with some potential problems (i.e., health problems and flooding). People 
evaluate the risks under considerations of past, present, and future events that will often 
influence the decision. The common assumption is that risks are negative attributes but, at 
the same time, people evaluate the positive aspects of either decision taken too. These 
factors may be considered as the values people attach to the targeted place, which makes it 
favoured or not.  
 
The factors or values often relate to the proximity to jobs, the topographical features of 
potential sites, the legal status of land, affordability, potential neighbours, and costs 
involved. Then, based on the number of alternatives, a decision is made to match the 
aspirations and capacity with the offers in the surroundings. People also evaluate their 
capacity to honour the commitments that such decisions represent in the long term, i.e., 
mortgage payments or those to the landowner. In tracking people’s decisions, some 
patterns help understand people’s behaviour. Decisions also relate to economic issues. 
Williamson (1996: 18) notes that the rationality and the behaviour of the buyer are key 
aspects during the transaction processes. Thus, the decision to acquire a piece of land or for 
improving housing conditions in formal or informal housing is the result of the 
interpretation and the actions leading to such investment. 
 
In buying a piece of land or a house in either formal or informal sector, the perceived 
security of the transaction is a major driver. This may not necessarily depend on the legal 
status of what is actually acquired, as this research assesses whether the dichotomy about 
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safer transactions associated with either sector prevailed. The conditions may change over 
time and people’s commitments may not be completely fulfilled, especially in terms of the 
money available to pay for lengthy mortgages. Golledge and Stimson (1987: 11) suggest 
that people base on their knowledge/experience accumulated over time to screen such 
variability and take their decisions. The transaction, as such, is an important decision 
whenever it has to take place. Risks then take an important position in evaluating the 
surrounding environment. Among many of the poor, informal land occupation provides the 
security sought by buyers despite of the illegal character of its transaction. The legal 
environment dictates the rules. Yet, people often perceive them as unenforceable. People 
moved from one place to another or make home improvements to stay for many years as 
their aspirations neither match nor achieve according to these decisions. Housing is one of 
the most tangible results no matter the stage of consolidation that one investigates. Thus, 
human behaviour and its logic are relevant to this research. These help contribute to the 
existing knowledge on housing that is not often approached from this standpoint in 
emerging markets. 
 
4.4. The methodological framework. 
 
As this research focuses on how poor people’s decisions are based, on how they perceive 
the environment, and the extent to which land tenure impacts on their housing options, a 
methodological framework is proposed to organise the way the theories reviewed above 
and the aims and objectives could be tested in the field by a case study. The models 
presented by Golledge and Stimson and Rossi and the structuration proposed by Giddens 
are not sufficient to fully explain the impact of land tenure on housing choices but provide 
guidance as to the experiences to be taken into account. I proposed a methodological frame 
that organises my case study, the primary data, and the conclusions. 
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Figure No. 27. A Shelter Process Framework. 
 
This framework comprises five stages, each of which is a process by which an 
individual/family follow in their attempt to achieve, first, shelter, and then to improve it 
later on. Each stage comprises a number of factors/drivers shaping the decision to advance 
on or to inhibit the process towards owned housing. These stages are first, leaving the old 
home; second, searching for a new place to live; third, choosing the new place; fourth, 
moving to the new place; and fifth, improving the new place. This process is not linear –
i.e., not everyone follows this traditional life stages cycle– focusing on the possibilities that 
people face when deciding to continue or not onto the next stage due to changes in the 
personal, family, or environmental circumstances.  
 
There is also the issue of the overlap of stages. A person could attain a more or less 
consolidated home before moving whilst living in the parental home, for instance. In any 
case, this framework provides a general structure to help analyse what many people 
experience in practice and how theories fit as it comprises three aspects on which this 
research was based: the human–environment relationship; the behavioural perspective of 
the main actors involved; and the activities of outside agents, such as policymakers. The 
three aspects comprise the relationship between human agency and structure within a given 
environment. This framework provides a structured housing path for the analysis to 
understand the process towards home consolidation among the poor. It is necessary, yet, to 
understand the context in which to assess the theories and the framework herein included. 
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The next sections introduce the environment in which the urban poor attempt to achieve 
housing in the selected case study and the fieldwork strategy.  
 
4.5.  The case study design. 
 
The reasons behind the case study design are the following: first, a case study is necessary 
to assess the extent to which the set of theoretical approaches reviewed actually applied to 
specific locations. Second, some contradictory evidences had been found in the literature 
claiming, in particular, the effects of a formal housing market on alleviating poverty. The 
insufficiency of data about informal housing in Mexico and, in particular, in the City of 
Aguascalientes also led to this decision as this made a quantitative approach impractical 
within the constraints of time and cost. This approach has not been explored much in in 
cities of this size in Mexico, as most of the literature refers to larger cities such as Mexico 
City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla, or the border cities in the North. However, scholars 
have disregarded the study of medium–sized Mexican cities, which represented an 
opportunity for this research to contribute to their understanding. Third, the completion of 
this research will add to the literature on housing by the poor in a medium–sized city 
following a behavioural perspective.  
 
I chose to follow a nonprobability approach to obtain the data directly from residents and 
key informants who became the primary sources for this dissertation. This approach is 
common in the social sciences. Frankfort–Nachmias and Nachmias (1992: 175) observe 
that social scientists employ nonprobability samples due to the “convenience and 
economy” of exploratory research conducted in areas where the sampling population is 
unavailable, such as people living in informal settlements, as that information is often 
vague, out–of–date, or imprecise. Moreover, no datasets on informal housing choices 
existed at local or at the national level in Mexico. Therefore, a qualitative approach became 
essential based on a proper selection of participants. Blaxter et al (2001: 71) suggest that 
the number of participants had to be suitable for small–scale research if good or bad 
practices are to be assessed and a real problem illustrated.  
 
A number of informal and formal areas were selected to illustrate the variation likely, 
given their scale and time of formation. Residents in both areas along with key informants 
were interviewed. The selection of the areas to visit within the case city and the people in 
the colonias to interview follows a purposive sampling procedure. This allows the 
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inclusion of settlements in different locations, of different legal status, and very 
importantly, at different stages of consolidation. Yet, it is acknowledgeable that this 
sample helps identify the role of the topics investigated only in the areas visited. The 
sample contributes to the understanding of housing the poor but does not provide 
generalisations about the topic. De Vaus (2001: 238) claims that the strategic selection of 
case studies “contributes to literal and theoretical replication” leading to the verification of 
specific arguments in specific locations. The purposive sampling helps identify areas with 
potential for providing insights into the theoretical concepts rather than statistical by 
significant results (Cohen and Manion 1995: 123; and de Vaus 2001: 240). The limitations 
on claiming representativeness are acknowledged but this was compensated by previous 
personal experience in the field.  
 
4.6.  Secondary sources. 
 
Research of this sort requires independent sources of data on topics ranging from poverty, 
urbanisation, and informality, to service provision, and finance. There are various levels 
and sources of data consulted, varying from journals, working papers, and books obtained 
directly from libraries, to the data from various Internet pages. The data at international 
level, for instance, was consulted from the World Bank, the United Nations, Habitat, and 
the International Labour Organisations sources. This allowed analysing data at the macro 
level to make comparisons to illustrate the progress of housing for and by the poor in 
different contexts. Access to data from these agencies was relatively easy by Internet. Yet, 
this research is aware of the implications of its use.  
 
Some of these organisations almost exclusively respond to particular agendas related to 
their own purposes. Additionally, the National Statistics Institute, INEGI, the Bank of 
Mexico, the National Housing Commission, CONAVI, various private banks, the National 
Commission for Evaluation, CONEVAL, the Workers’ Housing Fund Institute, 
INFONAVIT, and the Social Development Secretariat, SEDESOL, are among the various 
sources of data consulted at national level. They provided information in the form of 
technical reports, working papers, statistics, surveys, and censuses within the Mexican 
context. I accessed these data by their interactive Web pages.  
 
Yet, the reliability and consistency of data from official Mexican sources is a challenge. 
For instance, some data and the concept of poverty itself differed over a relatively short 
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period. CONEVAL changed its definition three times in the last 10 years, i.e., moving 
from poverty lines approaches and three–dimensional, to multidimensional poverty. The 
INEGI published the censuses and surveys based on criteria that have changed from one to 
another. The 2000 census provided data on people’s income levels, whilst the 2010 census 
eliminated it. The reliability of the data from private banks is also a challenge. Banks offer 
credit simulators on their Web pages. Although the digital tool is practical, its accuracy is 
not. The banks explain in a small footnote that the information is only valid as a reference 
and it may vary without previous notice. At the local level, data was obtained from public 
bodies, political leaders, and experts, by visiting their offices and through the Internet. The 
local government was the main source of secondary data, including that related to housing 
the poor. Moreover, once I interviewed some of the key informants, they referred to me 
some additional materials to consider, such as maps, plans, and unpublished reports.  
 
In some cases, public agencies lacked information or were unwilling to disclose it to me 
often arguing that data were “being processed”. Some public offices counted on data that I 
found biased or lacking sufficient methodological rigour. For instance, in defining an 
informal settlement, the local public agency in charge offered me different lists of areas 
considered as informal. These lists have changed over time as some settlements were 
simply erased and others included with no apparent reasoning. That is the case of 
settlements categorised as “deactivated” since there was no clear definition of what this 
meant among officials. Some lists were inherited from previous government periods and 
the classification was unclear. Additionally, lack of continuity of officials jeopardised the 
consistency of data in the long term. The academic studies in the form of articles in 
professional journals and books were other sources of data. These were useful for the 
literature review, the methodological approach, and to construct the theoretical approach in 
this dissertation. Most of these data were consulted in libraries at the Universities of 
Glasgow and Aguascalientes. Most of the journals consulted were accessed through the 
University of Glasgow services.  
 
4.7.  Primary data collection. 
 
The fieldwork comprised two types of activities. First, interviewing residents and second 
interviewing key informants. An important issue was to decide the best time to make the 
visits to housing areas as security issues are a major concern in the city at present. 
Violence and crime have increased and these were especially acute in poorer areas. This 
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also made me discard making appointments with residents. I considered that arriving at the 
place and conducting interviews was a more effective way to deal with security fears and 
availability. It is fair to say that I never felt threatened in these places and I found people 
kind to respond. I decided to visit the colonias on weekdays during the morning. As many 
residents have informal jobs, their schedules were flexible but arranging an appointment 
was too great a commitment to demand from them. This situation was also found in formal 
areas. People here were also low–income earners and their schedules were often 
unpredictable, ruling not appointments. I decided to make the visits from Tuesday to 
Friday from 9 AM to 2 PM. this way I avoided the presence of gangs on the streets as 
much as possible as, from my own experience of living in the city, they tended to gather in 
the afternoons and evenings.  
 
I avoided also Mondays and weekends. From experience, people often take Mondays off 
especially because they drink excessive alcohol over the weekend. This was common not 
only among mature men but also among younger people. From my own experience as an 
architect, the construction sites were usually empty on Mondays with work starting on 
Tuesdays. This is an unfortunate common practice locally known as San Lunes–or “Saint 
Monday”– as a way to justify ironically a holiday. It was difficult to interview residents on 
the weekends for two reasons, the presence of youth gangs on the streets increased and 
because some families visit or receive relatives and friends, which might jeopardise the 
willingness to participate in the interview. Indeed, some people leave the city to visit 
relatives in the nearby communities as confirmed during my visits. 
 
I followed the ethical procedures of the University in terms of the way the interviews were 
conducted. I showed my University identification to all the interviewees, explained the 
reasons of my visit, the way the information provided was to be used, and guaranteed the 
confidentiality of people’s identities and responses. Presenting my University ID was 
useful as residents and key informants saw me as an outsider, with no personal or political 
interests and only hoping to obtain academic information. I did not offer any compensation 
or prize to those who deliberately and freely accepted to participate. My interviews did not 
harm or threaten interviewees in any way. As for key informants, some of them occupy a 
position in governmental offices. They often belonged to the political party in power or, at 
least, sympathised with them. I also guaranteed the confidentiality of their responses and, 
in particular, the exclusively academic use of information. This was especially important 
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when I interviewed political parties’ leaders. They found my affiliation totally outside their 
political context and they were very willing to answer.  
 
4.8.  The City of Aguascalientes, Mexico, as a case study. 
 
This section assesses key factors influencing the choice of the City of Aguascalientes, a 
medium–sized city located in central Mexico, as a case study. This city is located within 
the fifth smallest state of the country of nearly 5,500 square kilometres.
34
As widely 
predicted for mid–sized cities (see Baross 1998; Brambila 1992; Lustig 1992; SEDESOL 
2001; Shaiken 1990; Warnock 1995), Aguascalientes experienced a booming growth due 
to the industrialisation process and the decline of agriculture (Aguilar 1990: 137). This 
transformation was accompanied by inflows of migrants in search for jobs (Ibid: 42): 
 
“Rapid urban growth associated with poorly defined and deficiently 
implemented legislation has led to an incongruous land use pattern. 
Commercial activities are being spread over housing areas in the city centre. 
Housing elsewhere is surrounded by warehousing, mechanical workshops, 
parking lots for heavy vehicles, specialised commerce and, above all, by 
industry.”  
 
The city was attractive to investors given its relative strategic position in the country. It is 
located relatively close to the main national urban centres, such as Mexico City (to 500 km 
to the South), Monterrey (590 km to the North), and Guadalajara (250 km to the West). 
Aguascalientes is located on the Pan–American motorway that crosses the whole country 
from North to South, providing a direct link to the US. Two events have been significant in 
the growth of the city. First, in the early 1980s, the car assembly plant Nissan was installed 
on the outskirts of the city, offering around 5,000 new jobs. Its arrival was accompanied by 
the installation of many other smaller suppliers. The majority of the jobs offered were low 
skilled that required little training after hiring. The factory has been a sort of a “symbol of 
success” among politicians who claimed that the city was selected due to their positive 
social and economic environment for investors.  
 
In fact, Nissan launched a second plant in early 2012, which will be more technology–
driven. The new plant will create another 5,000 direct jobs by early 2014, when production 
                                                 
 
34The whole State of Aguascalientes is approximately half the size of the Strathclyde Region in Scotland.  
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starts. The two Nissan plants follow the maquiladora
35
 scheme as the North America Free 
Trade Agreement, NAFTA, signed by Mexico, the US, and Canada in the early 1990s, 
promotes (Warnock 1995: 56). Maquiladoras’ output is for export to the US and their 
stability depends on the evolution of the American and Canadian economies. The second 
event was the arrival of a large government ministry after a severe earthquake hit Mexico 
City in 1985. The National Institute of Geography and Statistics, INEGI
36
, arrived with 
more than 4,000 public federal employees as part of the decentralisation policies promoted 
by the federal government after that event (INEGI 1992: 52). According to INEGI, 
Aguascalientes offered the potential benefits of its location, climate, and its apparent social 
stability:  
 
“A few years ago, the city of Aguascalientes was considered as an urban 
centre with ample perspectives for development due to its location, 
topography, climate, and for being a non–seismic zone. In addition, it had the 
capacity to satisfy additional demands for jobs, housing, and infrastructure. 
Thus, the city was considered as an option where changes would not affect 
drastically its equilibrium in the short term. The state had sufficient 
transportation networks, schools at all levels and health centres along with a 
dynamic economic growth due to its industrial strength. Because of the 
above, linked to the willingness of local authorities and the people to 
collaborate with this decentralisation effort, the city of Aguascalientes was 
selected as the new site of INEGI’s headquarters.” (Ibid: 51–2).i  
 
As a result, the population has experienced considerable growth. In 1970–2010, it 
increased 3.9 times in comparison to the 2.3 times in the rest of the country (INEGI 2010). 
By 2010, 20 per cent of its residents were born elsewhere (Ibid). Furthermore, the majority 
of the State’s population –60 per cent– was concentrated in the city alone (Ibid). The city 
changed in a relatively short period and the demands for services, jobs, housing, and 
employment were and are critical. One of the tangible effects of this growth was increasing 
urban sprawl towards peripheral lands as the city extended beyond its traditional limits. 
This growth resulted in the creation of a new metropolitan area that now comprised of two 
small cities –Jesús María and San Francisco de los Romo. This new metropolitan area 
totalled 1 million inhabitants (Ibid) 
 
                                                 
 
35 In–bond processing plants established to manufacture products exclusively for export, especially of 
clothing, electronic, and automobile parts. They were first established on the USA borders to soak up 
illegal migration northwards. 
36 Originally, the INEGI was part of the central federal government. Recently, it transformed into a 
decentralised public body. The major tasks of this Institute are to conduct the national housing and 
population censuses every five years.  
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Figure No. 28. Population evolution. 
Location 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Mexico 48,225,238 66,846,833 81,249,645 97,483,412 112,322,757 
State of Aguascalientes 338,142 519,439 719,547 944,285 1,184,116 
City of Aguascalientes 181,277 293,152 443,594 601,225 722,218 
Sources: IX Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1970; X Censo General de Población 
y Vivienda 1980; XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1990; Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000; II Conteo General de Población y Vivienda 2005;  and Censo 
de Población y Vivienda 2010 in 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/ResultadosR/CPV/Default.aspx?texto=aguascalientes. 
Last accessed in November 2012. 
 
Since the 1970s, this growth was accompanied by an increase in the housing stock. This 
grew 6.4 times in Aguascalientes compared to the national level of only 3.4 times (Ibid). 
The city alone contained 63 per cent of the state housing stock (see Figure No.29) and 60 
per cent of the total population. 
 
Figure No. 29. Housing stock evolution. 
Location 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Mexico 8,286,369 12,142,555 16,035,233 21,513,235 28,607,568 
State of Aguascalientes  52,722 84,353 129,832 199,398 290,777 
City of Aguascalientes 28,596 49,165 83,074 131,488 185,120 
Sources: IX Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1970; X Censo General de Población 
y Vivienda 1980; XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1990; Censo General de 
Población y Vivienda 2000; and Censo de Población y Vivienda 2010 in 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/Proyectos/ccpv/default.aspx. Last accessed in 
March 2012.   
 
Owing to its image of growth, the tertiary sector dominated the composition of 
employment despite the investment in large industries (see Figure No. 30). Only 24.6 per 
cent of the EAP worked in the secondary sector. With the arrival of the new Nissan 
factory, the share is expected to increase. The majority of the EAP –74.6 per cent– worked 
in commerce, trade, transportation, professional services, and government.  
  
Figure No. 30. Employment by sectors in Aguascalientes. 
Sector of occupation 2010 2012 
Primary 0.8 0.7 
Secondary 26.4 24.6 
Extractive and electricity industries 2.3 1.9 
Manufacture 73.3 71.4 
Construction  24.4 26.6 
Tertiary 72.6 74.6 
Commerce 29.2 30.0 
Restaurants and accommodation 9.8 10.6 
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Source: INEGI 2012 “Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo: Indicadores de 
Ocupación y Empleo al Segundo Trimestre de 2012”, in 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/Sistemas/temasV2/Default.aspx?s=est&c=25433&t=1. Last 
accessed in October 2012. 
 
The city has also experienced also some economic difficulties. Unemployment grew from 
5.7 per cent in 2005 to 6.3 per cent of the EAP in 2012, above the national unemployment 
rate of 5.2 per cent (INEGI 2012: 13). This was accompanied by the increase of informal 
sector employment from 20.6 per cent in 2005 to 24.7 per cent in 2012 (Ibid). 
Additionally, earnings were low. The share of the EAP earning less than 3 minimum wages 
rose from 45.4 per cent in 2005 to 46.1per cent in 2012 (Figure No. 31) which represented 
an income of $174 Mexican Pesos per day or £8.3 UK, a wage low enough to be ineligible 
for a mortgage in the formal sector. This is contradictory, as a place apparently attractive to 
jobseekers resulted in unaffordable housing.  
 
Figure No.31. Selected economic indices for the City of Aguascalientes. 
City of Aguascalientes information  2005 2010 2012 
Economically Active Population  58.6 60.6 59.9 
      Employment Rate  94.3 93.7 94.0 
      Unemployment Rate 5.7 6.3 6.3 
Employed workers by income levels     
      Up to 1 minimum wage 6.2 6.5 6.3 
      From 1 to 2 minimum wages 17.5 18.0 19.5 
      From 2 to 3 minimum wages  21.7 20.1 20.3 
      From 3 to 5 minimum wages 23.6 19.0 13.7 
      More than 5 minimum wages 12.2 8.7 8.3 
      Unspecified  16.0 24.8 29.0 
Informal workers 20.6 22.8 24.7 
Source: INEGI (2012) “Encuesta Nacional de Empleo”. In 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/espanol/sistemas/enoe/infoenoe/default.aspx?s=est
&c=14042. Last accessed in October 2012.  
 
4.9.  Housing the urban poor in Aguascalientes. 
 
The total number of housing loans and mortgages extended, over nearly 40 years was 
380,171 (CONAFOVI 2012). Yet, only two funds supplied almost half of the total, i.e., 
INFONAVIT with 26 per cent of the market and Popular Housing Fund, FONHAPO, with 
Transportation, communication, postal services, and storage 6.8 8.0 
Professional services, finance, and corporative 11.1 13.5 
Social services 17.4 14.2 
Other services  15.6 15.4 
Government  10.1 8.3 
Unspecified 0.2 0.2 
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23 per cent (see Figure No. 32). The local State Housing Institute, IVEA, a state funded 
agency, comprised 17 per cent of the market. This has limited the urban poor to a very few 
formal housing options as these focused mainly on formal employees. Moreover, many 
housing funds have disappeared over time, reducing the poor’s options even more. The 
participation of private banks in housing finance was almost nil, as this accounted only for 
0.63 per cent of the market. This confirmed their limited contribution to supply housing not 
only for the poor but also for the rest of the population.  
 
Figure No. 32. Mortgages in Aguascalientes, 1973–2011 (%). 
 
Source: CONAFOVI (2012). “Estadísticas de Vivienda” in 
http://www.conafovi.gob.mx/documentos/vivienda%20en%20cifras/estadistica–
vivienda/EV–1993–2010_a_284.pdf. Last accessed in October 2012. 
 
Obtaining information on informal housing settlements is difficult in Aguascalientes. In 
2007, the extinct state planning office reported 115 informal settlements of which 32 were 
located in the city alone whilst informal residents were estimated as 7,105 in 2,000 
dwellings (SEPLADE 2007: 5). However, by 2009, the newly created state housing 
institute reported only 99 informal settlements –16 less than two years before– and 9,685 
inhabitants –or 26 per cent more residents (IVSOP 2012). It reported 506 hectares of 
informal areas comprising 2,243 dwellings at state level. In the city alone, there were 28 
informal settlements covering 165.30 hectares and containing 751 dwellings with 3,505 
residents (Ibid). The Urban Development Commission is responsible for the change in 
figures from one year to the other. It makes recommendations relating to the process to 
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deal with –and to define– informality. For instance, in 2009, the Commission ruled that 45 
informal settlements were “feasible” for regularisation, 30 were inactive, 99 were “active”, 
and 49 were approved for pursuing regularisation (IVSOP 2012).  
 
Feasibility was based on an evaluation in the field as to whether the settlements were 
“ready” to proceed with the process of regularisation due to their consolidation levels, the 
number of municipal services introduced, the fulfilment of processes required prior to 
regularisation (i.e., study of water installation feasibility), and the proximity to –or 
insertion into– the urban area (IVSOP 2012). Yet, the same 30 informal areas were 
reported as “in the process of deactivation” since 2005 and those in the process of 
regularisation were 47 in 2005 whilst in 2009, they were 49. There was no clear process. 
The representatives of public agencies involved made the decisions during the 
Commission’s meetings based on their own perception. Accurate numbers of informal 
areas were not evident in either primary or secondary sources of data. When visiting 
informal areas in the city, one realised that the number of dwellings, for instance, seemed 
to be far higher than the 751 dwellings reported by the Commission. Although, a survey of 
informal areas is not the subject of this dissertation, it is clear that a review of the numbers 
is necessary in further research to measure the extent of informal areas.   
 
The ejido lands have played an important role in the dynamics of housing and informality. 
These are lands handed over to the peasants for agricultural purposes after the Mexican 
Revolution in 1917, as the demand for land was a major claim of the society at the time. 
“Land should belong to those who work on it” was the Revolution’s slogan that attracted 
many peasants to the rebels’ cause. When the Revolution ended, this distribution was 
expressed in the Article 27 of the National Constitution (Cámara de Diputados 2011: 26). 
The agricultural land was distributed to organised groups of peasants called ejidatarios 
who received large land areas, which was subdivided into three zones within each ejido. 
The first zone was for agricultural purposes only. Each peasant received a parcel to support 
his or her family. The second zone was for building the settlement in which ejidatarios 
could live. They were given plots for housing purposes in an area called the asentamiento 
humano del ejido or the ejido’s human settlement. The third area of the ejido was the 
community zone supposedly to be the areas where the parks, schools, and churches were to 
be built based on community needs. A key aspect of the ejido system was that ejidatarios 
were not allowed to sell their land, neither the parcel (for agricultural purposes) nor their 
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plots (for shelter). They were only allowed to use their lands for productive activities and 
inherit them from generation to generation as long as they lived there.  
 
The ejidos remained rural for many decades until the city’s limits reached them. Ejidos 
became close or even absorbed by urban sprawl, and attractive land to developers. Many 
ejidatarios started selling their parcels and plots after informal land subdivisions. With a 
declining agricultural economy, the land became a source of income for many ejidatarios 
and a source of land for others. These transactions were illegal so the land was cheaper 
than elsewhere. Ejidos attracted many with lower incomes and became a preferred place 
for informal settlements. They also became attractive to speculators who bought those 
lands near to the city, waited for the urban area to expand, or put pressure on local 
authorities to change zoning regulations, in order to develop formal housing areas.  
 
The Constitution changed in 1992, allowing association between ejidatarios and land 
developers to, in theory, insert their holdings into a more planned urban development. 
However, informal land sales and speculation continued and ejidatarios openly promoted 
land sales based on demand. Thus, it seemed that ejidatarios did not consider land 
transactions in ejidos as illegal, only “informal”. In fact, the surrounding ejidos have been 
absorbed by urban sprawl; though, information was unclear regarding the precise areas 
involved, Figure No. 33 shows the evolution of this phenomenon in Aguascalientes. The 
dependency of urban growth on ejido land is evident; whilst ejido land only contributed 
with 5.61 per cent of the total land incorporated to the city in the 1980s, this share has 
continuously evolved in the following decades. This share was critical in 2010 when it 
represented 57.25 per cent of the total urban growth. Preliminarily, ejido land will 
contribute to 45.57 per cent of the total urban growth in 2014. This puts enormous pressure 
onto surrounding ejidos, which are now targeted by developers to incorporate them into the 
urban equation.  
 
Figure No. 33. Ejido land share in the City of Aguascalientes. 
Year 
City area 
(Has.) 
Ejido land 
incorporated 
to the city 
(Has.) 
Share of ejido 
land from the 
total increase 
(%) 
Change in 
urban area 
from previous 
decade  (Has.) 
Change from 
previous 
decade (%) 
1970 1,749.88 80.40 -- -- -- 
1980 3,825.25 116.62 5.61 2,075.37 118.60 
1990 7,472.56 406.64 11.14 3,647.30 95.35 
2000 8,936.21 332.81 22.73 1,463.65 19.59 
2010 10,498.75 894.55 57.25 1,562.53 17.49 
 125 
Year 
City area 
(Has.) 
Ejido land 
incorporated 
to the city 
(Has.) 
Share of ejido 
land from the 
total increase 
(%) 
Change in 
urban area 
from previous 
decade  (Has.) 
Change from 
previous 
decade (%) 
2014/1 13,002.00 1,140.96 45.57 2,503.24 23.84 
 
TOTAL 2,971.98 
/1. Preliminary figures.  
% 22.86 
Source: Aguascalientes Municipal Planning Institute (2014). 
 
The land from ejidos is either promoted plot by plot or in large extensions. Now it is 
common to see signs promoting sales via mobile numbers. Figure No. 34 shows a sign 
promoting land sales in Los Pocitos.  
 
 
Figure No. 34. Informal sales openly promoted along the roads; it says: “cheap plots 
for sale in this zone”. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2009). 
 
4.10. The sampling process. 
 
Based on an initial evaluation of the number of settlements available, the areas selected 
were expected to reflect the variation of consolidation as to attain the aims of this research. 
The settlements were classified into two types, those informal in origin (Group 1) –
although some of them may have been regularised subsequently– and those formal in 
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origin (Group 2). The schedules allowed for interviewing any person willing to answer 
them. Dwellings were chosen with a snowball strategy. The interviewees were either the 
male or female head of household or the couple who were willing to provide some 
information. The third group of informants (Group 3) comprised the key actors involved in 
the decision–making process about housing, services, planning, regularisation, or in 
politics, academia, and professionals. The twelve settlements were the following: 
 
Figure No. 35. Housing settlements visited during the fieldwork. 
Origin 
Name of 
settlement(legend)
37
 
Current land 
tenure status 
Creation 
Year of 
regularisation 
Informal  
(promoted by 
ejidatarios) 
El Rocío (ER) Regularised 1980’s 1995 
Los Pocitos (LP) Regularised 1980’s 2008 
Paso Hondo (PH) Regularised 1980’s 2007 
Cumbres III (CU) Regularised 1980’s 2007 
Jaltomate (EJ) Irregular 1980’s NA 
Los Caños (LC) Irregular 1980’s NA 
El Soyatal (SO) Irregular 1990’s NA 
Formal   
(promoted by 
state/national 
public 
housing 
agencies) 
Guadalupe Peralta (GP) Regular 2002 NA 
Valle de los Cactus (VC) Regular 2005 NA 
Palomino Dena (PD) Regular 1989 NA 
Ojocaliente (OJ) Regular 1991 NA 
Morelos (MO) Regular 1988 NA 
 
Figure No. 36 shows some basic characteristics of the sampled areas: the surface areas, the 
municipal services provided, and their legal status at the time of visits.  
 
Figure No. 36. Selected characteristics of the areas visited. 
Name of settlement Areas 
Municipal 
services 
Notes 
Informal origin 
El Rocío  21.5 has / 163 plots Partial Regularised in 1995 
Los Pocitos 8 has / 259 plots Partial Regularised in 2008 
Paso Hondo 
13.04 has / 471 
plots 
Partial Regularised in 2007 
Cumbres III  
50.37 has / 823 
plots 
Partial Regularised in 2007 
Jaltomate 
54 has, number of 
plots not available 
Partial 
Under legal dispute as the 
authority requested a size 
reduction of plots to proceed 
with regularisation  
                                                 
 
37 Legends for settlements are used throughout the dissertation. For instance, for the first house visited in Los 
Pocitos, LP-01 is used to identify this settlement in the text, or the third house visited in the Guadalupe 
Peralta settlement is identified by GP-03. 
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Name of settlement Areas 
Municipal 
services 
Notes 
Los Cañosa/ 
47 has, number of 
plots not available 
Partial 
No negotiations reported for 
regularisation 
Soyatalb/ 383 has / 310 plots Partial 
An urban development scheme 
was published and authorised 
to allow residential uses in the 
informal settlement 
Formal Originc/ 
Guadalupe Peralta  83 has / 4,403 plots All Municipalised in 2007 
Morelos 
195 has / 5,667 
plots 
All Municipalised in 1995 
Ojocaliente NA All Municipalised in 1995 
Palomino Dena 33 has / 1,452 plots All Municipalised in 1995 
Valle de los Cactus 57 has / 2,235 plots All Municipalised in 2010 
a/ SEPLADE: 2010. b/ Data estimated by the Municipal Planning Institute and published in the 
Periódico Oficial del Estado de Aguascalientes in October 4th, 2004 (Gobierno Constitucional del 
Estado de Aguascalientes: 2004). c/ These settlements were promoted by the State government 
(Congreso del Estado de Aguascalientes 1989; and Gomez et. al. 1998: 200) 
 
In terms of location, the urban growth has absorbed most of the settlements selected over 
time. Only two areas selected –Jaltomate and Los Caños– remain further away from the 
city but they have begun to experience some pressure on their land occupation. Both 
formal and informal areas are located mostly in the eastern part of the city as city planners 
designated this zone for low–income residential projects. Informal dwellers have found 
cheaper land on this side of the city too. The northern side of the city accommodated high–
income earners whilst the southern– and western sides accommodated a mix of economic 
groups, with the majority of them being middle–income earners.  
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Figure No. 37. Location of visited fieldwork areas in Aguascalientes. 
 
The following figures present a brief information about the areas visited, which includes 
the location with respect to the city, the legal status of the settlement, year of regularisation 
if applies, and some relevant aspects to consider during the fieldwork and analysis.  
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Figure No. 38. Basic information of Los Pocitos. 
 
 
Name of settlement: Los Pocitos Location 
 
Current status: Regularised 
Created: in the 1980s 
Year of regularisation: 2008 
 
Notes:  
The area visited is surrounded by upper–income 
residential areas, industrial estates and the 
Tecnologico de Monterrey. Residents are often 
pressured by developers to sell their land for new 
residential projects.  
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Name of settlement: Los Pocitos Origin: Informal 
2003 
 
2009 
 
Figure No. 39. Los Pocitos in different years (Google Maps: 2013).
 
 
 
 
 
 131 
 
Name of settlement: El Rocío Location 
 
Current status: Regularised 
Created: in the 1980s 
Year of regularisation: 1995 
 
Notes:  
The area visited is surrounded by formal public 
housing intended for low–income people. It is 
under pressure for housing developers as it is 
located by the main road.  
 
Figure No. 40. Basic information of El Rocío. 
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Name of settlement: El Rocío. Origin: Informal 
2005 
 
2009 
 
Figure No. 41. El Rocío in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
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Name of settlement: Paso Hondo Location 
 
Current status: Regularised 
Created: in the 1980s 
Year of regularisation: 2007 
 
Notes:  
The area has been neglected by the authorities, as 
it is located outside the urban pattern. It still lacks 
of some services. 
 
Figure No. 42. Basic information of Paso Hondo. 
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Name of settlement: Paso Hondo Origin: Informal 
2004 
 
2011 
 
Figure No. 43. Paso Hondo in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
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Name of settlement: Cumbres III. Location 
 
Current status: Regularised 
Created: in the 1980s 
Year of regularisation: 2007 
 
Notes:  
The area is highly polluted, as brick is produced 
without technological assistance.  
 
Figure No. 44. Basic information of Cumbres III. 
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Name of settlement: Cumbres III. Origin: Informal 
2003 
 
2009 
 
Figure No. 45. Cumbres III in different years (Google Maps: 2013).
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Name of settlement: Jaltomate. Location 
 
Current status: Irregular 
Created: in the 1980s 
 
Notes:  
The area has been neglected due to the distance to 
the city. It is inhabited by ejidatarios families 
mostly.  
 
 Figure No. 46. Basic information of Jaltomate.
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Name of settlement: Jaltomate. Origin: Ejido 
2004 
 
2011 
 
 Figure No. 47. Jaltomate in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
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Name of settlement: Los Caños. Location 
 
Current status: Irregular. 
Created: in the 1980s 
  
 
Notes:  
The area has been neglected due to the distance to 
the city. It is inhabited by ejidatarios families 
mostly. 
 
Figure No. 48. Basic information of Los Caños. 
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Name of settlement: Los Caños. Origin: Informal 
2004 
 
2012 
 
 Figure No. 49. Los Caños in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
 
 
 
 141 
 
Name of settlement: El Soyatal. Location 
 
Current status: Irregular 
Created: in the 1990s 
 
Notes:  
The area has been neglected due to the distance to 
the city. It is inhabited by ejidatarios families 
mostly.  
 
 Figure No. 50. Basic information of El Soyatal.
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Name of settlement: El Soyatal. Origin: Ejido 
2004 
 
2012 
 
 Figure No. 51. El Soyatal in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
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Name of settlement: Guadalupe Peralta. Location 
 
Current status: Regular 
Created: in the 2002 
 
Notes:  
It is a low–income housing project promoted by 
the state housing agency.  
 
 Figure No. 52. Basic information of Guadalupe Peralta. 
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Figure No. 53. Guadalupe Peralta in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of settlement: Guadalupe Peralta Origin: Formal public housing 
2005 
 
2013 
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Name of settlement: Valle de los Cactus Location 
 
Current status: Regular 
Created: in the 2005 
 
Notes:  
It is a low–income housing project promoted by 
the state housing agency. Residents have a 
condominium type of ownership, i.e., they share 
common open spaces and have to pay a small fee 
for maintenance. 
 
Figure No. 54. Basic information of Valle de los Cactus. 
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Figure No. 55. Valle de los Cactus in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Name of settlement: Valle de los 
Cactus 
Origin: Formal public housing 
2006 
 
2013 
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Name of settlement: Palomino Dena. Location 
 
Current status: Regular 
Created: in the 1989 
 
Notes:  
It is a low–income housing project promoted by a 
political party throughout an informal plots sale. 
Eventually, the same party promoted the 
regularisation.  
 
 Figure No. 56. Basic information of Palomino Dena. 
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Figure No. 57. Palomino Dena in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
 
 
 
 
Name of settlement: Palomino Dena.  Origin: Formal public housing 
2005 
 
2009 
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Name of settlement: Ojocaliente.  Location 
 
Current status: Regular 
Created: in the 1991 
 
Notes:  
It is a low–income housing project promoted by 
the state housing agency, INFONAVIT, and 
FOVISSSTE as most of the mortgages were 
granted to workers coming from Mexico City after 
an earthquake   
 
 Figure No. 58. Basic information of Ojocaliente.
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Figure No. 59. Ojocaliente in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
 
Name of settlement: Ojocaliente.  Origin: Formal public housing 
2005 
 
2009 
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Name of settlement: Morelos.  Location 
 
Current status: Regular 
Created: in the 1988 
 
Notes:  
It is a low–income housing project promoted by 
the state housing agency, INFONAVIT, and 
FOVISSSTE. 
 
 Figure No.  60. Basic information of Morelos.
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Name of settlement: Morelos.  Origin: Formal public housing 
2005 
 
2011 
 
Figure No. 61. Morelos in different years (Google Maps: 2013). 
 
In terms of the selection of informants or interviewees, the goal was to access those of the 
highest rank possible within their organisations. I selected those representatives of 
organisations implicated in the processes of housing the poor, or in the improvement of 
their housing conditions, such as those promoting regularisation, city planners, members of 
public and private housing bodies, of political parties, and a professional association 
concerned with urban development. They were contacted by telephone and/or electronic 
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mail to arrange an appointment for an interview. All the interviews took place according to 
a fixed schedule in their offices. No banker was willing to be interviewed. Only the 
manager of the most important MFI in the city accepted. Group 1 comprised 40 interviews; 
Group 2 of 15 interviews; and Group 3 of 10, as follows:   
 
 Figure No. 62. Key informants interviewed. 
Type of Informant 
Name of settlement / 
organisation (legend) 
No. 
Interviews 
Notes 
Group 1 
Informal settlers 
El Rocío (ER) 10 Resident 
Los Pocitos (LP) 13 Resident 
Paso Hondo (PH) 3 Resident 
Cumbres III (CU) 2 Resident 
Jaltomate (EJ) 3 Resident 
Los Caños (LC) 3 Resident 
Soyatal (SO) 6 Resident 
Group 2 
Formal settlers 
Guadalupe Peralta (GP) 3 Resident 
Morelos (MO) 3 Resident 
Ojocaliente (OJ) 3 Resident 
Palomino Dena (PD) 3 Resident 
Valle de los Cactus (VC) 3 Resident 
Group 3  
Federal officials 
CORETT, Regularisation of 
Land Tenure Commission 
(COR) 
1 State’s delegate  
INFONAVIT, Institute of the 
National Workers’ Housing 
Fund (INF) 
1 
State’s delegate of the 
national housing body 
State officials 
IVEA, State Housing Institute 
(IVE) 
1 General director 
SEDESO, State Social 
Development Secretary (SED) 
1 State Secretary 
SEPLADE, State Development 
Planning Secretary (SEP) 
1 General director 
Municipal officials 
IMUVI, Municipal Housing 
Institute (IMU) 
1 General director 
Political party 
leaders 
PAN, National Action Party 
(RWP) 
1 
Right–wing party 
leader at state level 
PRD, Democratic Revolution 
Party (LWP) 
1 
Left–wing party leader 
at state level 
Private MFI official LI, Lomelí Real Estate (LI) 1 MFI General manager 
Expert 
Urban development expert 
(UDE). 
1 
Urban development  
association 
                                                         TOTAL:     65 
 
I had the opportunity to visit a few informal residents two times and hence had the benefit 
of the comparison of their housing conditions over time. One the other hand, one challenge 
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found during fieldwork in the housing areas was that a few residents were reluctant to be 
interviewed. As security problems, often due to drug trafficking, were unfortunately 
common in the country and in Aguascalientes, people were suspicious about strangers in 
their areas. As a way to build trust, once the first interview took place in a colonia, I 
commented to the next person that another neighbour had already participated, though 
securing his/her confidentiality. Some people warned me where not to go in the colonia in 
order to avoid risk of mugging and where the safer areas were in order to secure more 
interviews. In the end, this “snowball” strategy was useful to identify people willing to 
participate in the project and secured me a certain level of protection.    
 
The next chapters include more details of residents’ profiles; yet, the following is a brief 
review of some general features of those interviewed during the fieldwork in 
Aguascalientes, such as family type, gender aspects, and employment. This helps visualise, 
first, some basic aspects about the interviewees and positions the reader with respect to 
them. Besides, it also includes some aspects related to the plot and/or the house. These 
profiles reveal interesting elements for discussion; in general, although formal and 
informal households present some important differences, they keep the picture of a 
traditional Mexican family: that composed by a married couple and headed by a male. This 
picture varied whether a family occupies a formal area or an informal, For instance, men 
predominantly headed the households in both types of settlements; yet, 88 per cent of 
households were headed by male in informal areas, only 80 per cent in their formal 
counterparts. Women–headed households in formal areas reached 20 per cent whereas only 
8 per cent in informal areas.  
 
In formal areas, 6 per cent of head of households were divorced and none was found in 
informal areas. On the other hand, more nuclear families were found in formal areas, 86 
per cent, and only 66 per cent in informal ones. Yet, there were no extended families in 
formal areas whilst informal households were composed of extended families in 22 per 
cent of the cases. Another difference was the type of employment found in the two areas. 
For instance, more than 61 per cent of heads of households in informal areas worked as 
bricklayers or in a construction related job; this, it is assumed, helped people build their 
own houses as they have some skills to do it. In contrast, only 26 per cent of formal heads 
of households worked in a job related to construction. In terms of the years living in the 
area, informal settlers averaged more than 19 years at the site whilst formal dwellers were 
there for only 10 years. In terms of the plots, their average size differs significantly; whilst 
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informal plots measured 179 square meters on average, formal plots stretched only 94 
square meters; this often allows informal residents to host extended families and count on 
larger spaces to build their homes.  
 
As for the Group 3 interviewees, they were predominately males; only one was a female 
and nine were male. From the ten people interviewed, eight were related to a government 
agency or a political party; yet, all of them had a political background and experience in 
working in the government, including the manager of the microfinance agency interviewed 
who had been a top rank official in the finance office just two years before the interview. 
The urban development expert interviewed also had experience as a head of the planning 
office in the city a few years ago. As volatile as employment in public offices is often in 
the South, none of the officials interviewed, either from a government office or from a 
political party, are working as heads in their respective offices any longer by the time of 
the publication of this dissertation. All of them have been removed; a few are working 
elsewhere; and some are facing judicial procedures for corruption. Additionally, all the 
state and municipal offices visited have been eliminated or transformed into a different sort 
of public agency over the last months. As for the political leaders interviewed, they have 
finished their terms in office and new leaders are now in charge. Finally, the federal 
delegates have been substituted by new delegates in the last months too. This seems to 
jeopardise the chances of continuity of policies and programmes as the following chapters 
will explain.  
  
4.11. The schedules and the analysis of results. 
 
Most of the fieldwork data were obtained through the application of semi–structured–face–
to–face schedules, one for each group of informants. These allowed the informants to 
explain further the topics that they considered as most relevant for them. The semi–
structured approach helped encourage interviewees to reflect on topics that could not be 
captured otherwise, such as those related to behaviour. The interviews design followed two 
conditions. First, usually the questions were useful to start the conversation on the 
corresponding topic but this did not mean that the sequence of questions was kept to at all 
times. This was because I asked people to develop their ideas in order to capture deeper 
insights. It was necessary to review whether all the topics on the schedule were covered 
before ending. Second, the initial organisation of the schedule followed the framework 
proposed in the methodology chapter, i.e., the five stage processes of land and shelter 
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provision. Most questions for Group 1 and Group 2 were similar but there were additional 
questions depending on the information that emerged from the schedules (see Appendix 
No. 3). These two groups were asked for to consent to the voice recording of the interview 
in order to make it flow more easily than if answers had been written.  
 
I asked residents for consent to take some photographs following the interview once I had 
gained some confidence of the interviewee. Besides, as I had both offered and guaranteed 
the informants’ confidentiality, their names were not asked nor their exact address 
requested and they did not appear in the photographs. All the interviewees accepted to be 
recorded and have their houses photographed. Only a few refused the request to 
photograph inside the dwelling. Interviews took place at people’s dwellings, either on the 
threshold of the house or even inside the house. All the interviews in these groups took 
place in the home areas. No resident was asked to go somewhere else for interviewing.  
 
All the interviews in Group 3 took place in the informants’ offices according to a meeting 
arranged by telephone with their assistants. I found it more difficult to access the 
interviewees in this Group, as an appointment was necessary. The interviews had to be 
arranged through gatekeepers, their personal assistants. However, once the appointment 
had been set, this took place as arranged. Specific schedules were designed for each 
informant as they belonged to different organisations and their roles differed. For instance, 
a schedule with a political party leader had different concerns in terms of the questions and 
structure than those to officials of the local government. These schedules were also asked 
for their consent to be recorded. They all accepted. No photographs were requested. In all 
the three Groups, the schedules conducted were transcribed into Spanish. Their analysis 
was also conducted in Spanish. The quotations inserted in the following sections were 
translated into English.  
 
Once the schedules took place and I transcribed them, I followed Hahn’s (2008) guidelines 
for qualitative analyses. He defines a simplified process, ranging from capturing and 
organising, to identifying valuable comments and potential quotations from the schedules. 
The use of Word and Excel programmes made this process easy to follow. Hahn proposes 
a direct Excel template for coding the schedules that I used. This tool was helpful in 
providing an insight to the fieldwork data based on the amount of information gathered. I 
found Han’s tool practical and easy to use for the purposes of this research. The tool 
identifies “levels” of information depending on the relevance judged by the interviewee. 
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The higher the code level, the higher the importance of the information contained. For 
instance, Code Level 1 meant that the information was very important, whilst Code Level 2 
referred to the information from which the former was derived. This was useful for 
knowing why something was regarded as important and who said so. On the other hand, 
the information obtained from schedules in Group 3 was analysed individually due to their 
specificity. The analysis of the schedules was the main input for the following fieldwork 
sections.  
 
4.12. The researcher and the case study 
 
Factors driving the selection of the City of Aguascalientes for the case study ranged from 
practicability, access to information, the potential of the research, and my personal 
experience. I considered that researching a place where housing the poor had not been 
studied sufficiently yet, would contribute to a better understanding of this phenomenon to 
scholars and policymakers dealing with currently rapidly urbanising/industrialising– 
medium–sized cities in Mexico. I also have work experience in urban development and 
informal settlements in public bodies in Aguascalientes. That role allowed me to be aware 
of the relevance of housing to the increasing numbers of the urban poor in the city where I 
have lived for more than 25 years. In addition, visiting poor areas and interacting with 
residents was usual for me and resulted in a valuable experience in conducting this 
research. Part of my professional duties in public bodies included dealing with the 
branches where data were generated, organised, distributed, and published. This helped me 
find and access sources of data. All of the above allowed me to count on a small network 
of officials and policymakers to access information as required. Accessing information 
from public bodies within a restricted environment otherwise would have been difficult.  
 
Aguascalientes also challenges the common understanding of housing the poor by scholars 
and policymakers. First, informal housing followed informal sales rather than land 
invasions
38
 as in many parts in Mexico. Second, the effects of “unlocking” the value of 
informal areas through regularisation has not been tested in the city. Third, housing 
research was practically non–existent in Aguascalientes. I regarded this research as an 
opportunity to contribute to the understanding of the process by which people achieve 
                                                 
 
38In the City of Aguascalientes, there has been only one land invasion registered in the last 50 years –i.e.,  in 
ejido Las Huertas in the southern urban area (Gomez et al 1999: 29) 
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housing from a fresh perspective –i.e., following the approaches defined in the 
methodology section. It was difficult to find a theoretical basis or a rationale behind the 
existing housing programmes for the poor, as only officials designed the programmes. 
Aguascalientes lacked the participation of researchers in the study of housing the poor 
where the issue was an issue exclusively for state and local governments. Personal reasons 
were also important drivers in selecting housing the poor as my research topic. For 
instance, living myself in the sorts of areas like those herein included for many years was a 
motivation to try to help others through research.  
 
Finally, I have a professional interest in housing the poor and have worked on it for some 
years. I received the state housing prize in 2003 and the national housing prize in 2006 for 
a social housing project designed for the urban poor with disabilities built in one of the 
poorest areas in the city. This keeps me thinking that I can still contribute to some extent to 
the understanding of such an important aspect in people’s lives. Additionally, due to 
personal reasons, I interrupted my studies in 2004 and re–started in 2009. The design of the 
fieldwork reflects this by considering the initial interviews conducted in 2004 not only as a 
pilot study but also as an opportunity to make a comparison between the housing 
conditions of the dwellings visited at different stages over time. Thus, the fieldwork took 
place at these two different moments; a set of interviews were conducted in 2003, mostly 
with residents in Los Pocitos, El Rocío, Paso Hondo, and Cumbres III. The rest of the 
interviews took place in 2009, including new interviews in these four settlements, those in 
the rest of the informal and formal areas included, and with the officials and experts. 
 
4.13. Conclusions. 
 
The methodological approach followed by this dissertation allowed me to define a suitable 
path to pursue its aims and goals. I had to take a number of key decisions; for instance, 
defining the methodology, taken after the review of different approaches, the consideration 
of my own background, the availability of data, and time and costs constraints. As a result, 
I decided to adopt a qualitative stance. Additionally, the selection of the range of 
informants was made under the consideration of including representative agents involved 
in the process of housing the urban poor. This resulted in the selection of agents living in 
diverse settlements under study and agents shaping the structure in which the process of 
housing takes place. This decision was influenced by the fact that I have some working 
experience in public planning bodies during which I had visited some of the areas as part 
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of my duties. I already knew some of the senior officials, which allowed me easier access 
to some of them and to unpublished materials.  
 
Another decision was about the type of schedules to conduct in the fieldwork. I decided to 
use semi–structured schedules to help me capture more in–depth opinions of informants 
and, at the same time, maximise their voice. The schedules followed a set of basic 
questions but informants were free to expand on the issues they considered as the most 
important. I decided to allow the interviewees to explain as much as they wanted without 
imposing time limits. That allowed me to gain time building trust with the interviewees 
and the possibility to revisit them in the future if needed. In addition, that allowed me to 
gain their consent to photograph most of the houses.  
 
Another decision dealt with the selection of the tools suitable for analysing the data from 
the schedules. I selected Hahn’s guide as this provided an easy–to use tool for processing 
the information obtained in the field as is based on common software such as Word 
Processor and Excel that I have used regularly. Despite their simplicity, they provided me a 
clear understanding of what was important for the informants. Finally, it was necessary to 
research about the local and national context of the city selected as a case study. The rules 
governing the tangible and intangible environment in which the urban poor struggled to 
attain a place to live were central to the discussion. In summary, all the national and local 
secondary data, the case study, and the schedules conducted were not separate elements but 
these were complementary and reinforced each other. The context within which this 
fieldwork was conducted is scrutinised in the following section.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE URBAN POOR AND THEIR EFFORTS TO ACQUIRE 
PERMANENT HOUSING. 
 
5.1.  Introduction. 
 
The following three chapters engage with the analysis of the data obtained in the fieldwork 
in order to address the second and third objectives of this dissertation. In particular, this 
chapter focuses on the second objective aimed to analyse the circumstances under which 
the urban poor make choices regarding their efforts to acquire permanent housing. These 
choices vary according to the conditions of either an individual or a family throughout their 
life cycles. The data is organised in a five–stage framework along with a cross–section 
analysis based on both the structure–agency approach and land tenure as drivers for 
housing choices.  
 
The five–stage framework starts when, first, an individual decided to leave the parental 
home or the place where he/she previously inhabited. This house could be owned, parental, 
or rented. The second is when he/she searched for the information needed to select a new 
place to live, whilst the third stage is when the individual/family actually chose the place. 
The fourth stage comprises the arrival process at the place selected, and the fifth stage 
engaged with the process of home improvements. I did not expect to find a linear process 
in every case among the interviewees, as unanticipated events are always potential threats 
to the path towards a consolidated home. The five–stage framework is useful in organising 
the fieldwork data, helping understand how people’s agency capacity allowed them to 
achieve or not their housing goals. 
 
5.2.  Leaving the parental/previous home. 
 
The first stage is when an individual decided to leave the parental house, as some 
circumstances were about to, or had already changed. These are, for instance: the 
individual is in a relationship and needs a space of his/her own, the individual decides to 
pursue the aspiration to own a house, the parental home becomes overcrowded, privacy 
issues raise, and an opportunity to access land or a house arises so the individual seized it. 
This step is one of the first big decisions that many people take in their lives and means 
several challenges according to their life cycle and experience. For the majority of the 
interviewees, one of the most important challenges is the income required to cope with the 
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expenses that this endeavour represents. As most residents start this journey towards 
acquiring consolidated housing when they are young, job opportunities are limited, 
especially because the majority are poorly educated. This limits the access to a competitive 
labour market with higher salaries.  
 
Generally, they got low–paid, low–skilled, and/or informal jobs with intermittent incomes. 
These circumstances had hardly changed over the years for many. None of the 
interviewees was able to buy a house/plot before leaving the parental home and needed to 
decide the way through which they would achieve consolidated housing. Only a few had a 
formal job but earned low too and they spent many years before they became eligible for a 
mortgage in a social housing development or fund. At this initial stage, both land and 
housing seekers, either in formal or informal areas, were under quite similar circumstances 
in terms of age, income, background, familiarity to the city, skills, and education.  
 
Moreover, most interviewees were forming a new family at the time of deciding to leave 
the original home; the need for accommodating the family in formation is a major driver in 
seeking a new place to live. Others also considered leaving their place of origin in order to 
seek a better job in the city. LP–08, for instance, was composed of a newly created family 
at the time of deciding to move to the colonia; their main reason was the idea of obtaining 
a better job in the city. A plot of 150 square meters found in Los Pocitos, at the city’s 
outskirts at the time, was sufficiently attractive to start their journey into the urban life. 
This young couple with no children were able to cope with the lack of municipal services 
and transformed their initial one–room house into a more consolidated dwelling over the 
years.  
 
The majority of informal residents interviewed were familiar to either the city or the ejido 
system. Most of them were young and had lived in poverty in settlements similar to those 
eventually selected to move. This seemed to limit their options about the places where to 
start searching for a new place. Their poverty’s background seemed to have conditioned to 
design their search for the new place to live. Many had the feeling of a lack of 
opportunities in many aspects of their urban life, but in particular in terms of employment 
and housing. Within these circumstances that most interviewed perceived as restrictive, the 
“opportunity” to access a piece of land needed to be seized. Although at present some 
informal residents mentioned that they would have preferred to live elsewhere, it was 
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probable that formal housing would have restricted access to those who regretted choosing 
informal areas anyway.  
 
For the urban poor, especially if young, deciding to leave the parental home was the 
beginning of a long journey of struggle. The dichotomy started with choosing either a 
formal or an informal place to live. Most of them “dreamt” of owning the house to avoid 
paying for rented housing. Homeownership was, in fact, a major aspiration among the 
urban poor as it built up on the rationale of securing a patrimony for their children. For 
that, many people preferred to live in a settlement that partially or totally lacked basic 
services rather than living in a fully serviced rented house. For instance, VC–01 mentioned 
that after living in a rented house for 13 years, they left it with their “hands empty”. Many 
considered renting a house as “transitory” while the opportunity to access a house/a piece 
of land arose. Among the interviewees, the main target was to own a house. 
 
For young couples, coping with the expenses of newly formed families was difficult. Their 
resources needed to be allocated as much effective as possible. Renting a house was seen 
as a way to delay their goal to achieve an owned home, as money had to be divided in 
both, the rented home and the land/house where they aimed to live. Thus, many considered 
that achieving an owned house was a symbol of success and one of the major goals in life.  
 
“Look, before living in this neighbourhood I thought that I never ever was 
going to make it [having a house] and yet there was the opportunity to get 
hold of this small piece of land and here I am.” SO–03ii 
 
In embarking on this initial stage, the “dream” seemed to be more “achievable” among 
those who had lived already in an ejido and/or they were part of one, or knew some of the 
ejidatario’s family members. Many knew that the ejidos were feasible places to start a 
house despite legal tenure issues or the lack of municipal services. Their personal/family 
experiences and networks played a key role in deciding to move further, yet, to afford the 
costs remained important. Some ejidos were targeted more than others were by land 
seekers. The farther the ejido, the cheaper the land. In Soyatal, Jaltomate, Los Caños, and 
Paso Hondo –originally peripheral ejidos– the pressure to sell plots seemed to be less 
strong than in Pocitos and El Rocío –ejidos closer or next to the city.  
 
Young couples reported that children arrived soon at early stages of marriage. This 
represented additional expenses besides those related to housing. Some reported staying at 
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the parental home for some time which served as a temporary “buffer” that allowed young 
couples to channel their money towards the acquisition of a piece of land. For instance, 
ER–05, SO–01, SO–02, and PH–02 lived in the parental house when they got married. 
They gained some time, saved some money, and made the search more easily. The support 
received from the family was a key as their itinerant jobs and intermittent incomes were 
insufficient to make a commitment to pay for a piece of land or a house at this stage. Yet, 
the family supports played a key role in the decision to move and search for a new place, 
as young couples count on their help and complement their decisions.  
 
If present, it seemed that parents–in–law’s involvement provides young couples an 
additional driver for them to make such a decision to move. In two cases, the decision to 
move to an informal area was taken at a more advanced life stage. First, LP–03 was unable 
to keep paying for the rent of the previous house. They had to reduce the cost of housing as 
much as possible and decided to move to an informal area in an ejido. Second, SO–02 was 
unable to keep paying for the mortgage of the previous house and had to move to a piece of 
land that the father –an ejidatario– had given them. In both cases, the ejidos meant 
affordable areas that helped, often during critical events. It meant re–starting a housing 
process from an empty plot and the loss of all the previous investments, yet it provides an 
opportunity to start over again. Either as a couple or individually, young people needed to 
decide where to make a search for a place to live.  
 
Having some job experience helped some of them in targeting a place where access to a 
job would be more feasible. The ideal situation was to find a place to live close to job 
sources to avoid the transportation costs. Many urban poor used a bike as a means of 
transportation in order to reduce their costs of living. In fact, many years ago, the City of 
Aguascalientes was “pejoratively” called as la ciudad bicicletera or the “biker’s city” due 
to the number of people –mostly poor– using their bikes. Now, the distances and the risks 
of riding a bike have seen this transformed. Moreover, many policies attempting to 
promote sustainable development, including some in Aguascalientes, promote the 
awareness of air pollution, traffic, and mobility and try to incentivise the use of bikes 
again. Often, it seems to be too late. Mid– and low–income earners have had access 
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recently to very cheap/old cars –called carros chocolates or carros piratas–39 introduced 
by Mexicans residents in the USA who leave them in the country illegally.  
 
Several pirate or very old cars were parked along the streets during the fieldwork and a few 
belonged to some of the interviewees. Those working as a gardener or a bricklayer in 
different locations now have the opportunity to commute more easily, though, at a different 
cost. However, these cars were old, had no insurance, openly contaminated, and practically 
had null maintenance. Access to chocolate cars has eased the limitations on selection of a 
place to move, leaving the distance factor as a less decisive element for assessment. Access 
to a cheaper car –though of these characteristics– has slightly changed the need for 
matching locations. Generally, jobs came first and the house, second and, thus, jobs and 
house locations rarely matched.  
 
Only a few residents in formal settlements reported having formal jobs at the time of 
deciding to leave the parental home. In fact, this is most evident among formal residents, as 
working formally for some years to become eligible for credit is a pre –requisite to apply. 
Thus, deciding to leave the original home was more a matter of aspiring to access the 
mortgage they were entitled to, making the choice of a specific place less relevant, as this 
was based on availability and formal housing supply in the city.   
 
Only one interviewee mentioned that the city would provide a job opportunity for the wife 
in case that the husband was unemployed. Coming from a rural area with the husband 
commuting to the city to work, LP–08 claimed that they decided to move to the city simply 
because she would be able to find a job too. 
 
“In fact, my husband worked outside all the time, so living there (in the rural 
area) or here was the same. Yet, it would be easier for me to find a job, for 
instance, if he does not work.” SO–02iii 
 
                                                 
 
39The introduction of chocolate or pirate cars is common practice in Mexico, as both legal and illegal 
migrants buy old cars in the USA and eventually brings them on their return. Some keep them for a while 
and sell them later. This is a way to “invest” some money. The law allows these cars to enter the country 
for up to six months with minimum requirements. After that, the cars must return to the borders to arrange 
new permits, which is expensive. Cars remain in Mexico with no permits. The most common origins of 
pirate cars are California, Florida, Illinois, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas, seemingly the preferred 
locations for migrants. 
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In summary, the decision to leave the original home where an individual or a couple lived 
relates to: a) the formation of a new family and couples deciding to go to a place to live on 
their own; b) the original home has become unpractical in terms of location, size, privacy, 
and overcrowding; and c) a chance to seize a piece of land or a house arises making people 
consider it as an opportunity.  Certainly, belonging to an ejidatario’s family is an advantage 
for young couples as, at least, the provision of a piece of land is practically a fact taken for 
granted. This way, young couples can concentrate resources in building the house from the 
beginning, in comparison to those without this “benefit”. The next step was to the search 
for the place.. Again, although this is a non–linear path, these steps help understand the 
complexity in the decision–making process.   
 
5.3.  Searching for a new place to live. 
 
In this step, the ability of people to gather and analyse information was key. The most 
common sources of information ranged from that obtained directly during the visits to the 
place of interest to live, the relatives and friends, acquaintances, and by experience. 
Among the most relevant information was –for informal land seekers–the availability of 
land, locations, flexibility of transactions, deal arrangements, trustworthiness of the 
landowners, and –for formal ones– the availability of mortgages and their length, amount, 
and interests. Thus, their possibilities to obtain formal housing were based on their 
capacity to “document” their reliability. Yet, the information about formal housing 
programmes was very limited. Even the local housing body, IVEA, mentioned that they 
did not have any strategy to promote their programmes. They claimed no need for that as 
housing demand was high anyway. Formal settlers mentioned that they had to seek for the 
information in person by visiting the housing agencies, which, some mentioned as difficult, 
expensive, bureaucratic, and lengthy.  
 
Although, little information about formal housing programmes was available on Internet, 
this played a very limited role. Access to Internet was still low in the city in general and 
even lower among the urban poor. None of the interviewees reported using the Internet to 
search for information about the place where they lived at the time of my visits. This 
restricted housing seekers to search the information in person, increasing the searching 
costs of commuting to the potential places to live, the developers’ offices, housing 
agencies, or even banks. Even those living in the recent public housing areas did not use 
the Internet. People were used still to search for the information in person and face–to–
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face. Some interviewees who actually obtained some information in the IVEA, found 
unattractive the new housing policies promoting low–cost gated communities.  
 
These comprised of communities under a condominium system where people shared green 
areas, parking, and pathways and paid a monthly fee for maintenance. The urban poor were 
not used to live in gated communities. Their awareness about the new schemes discouraged 
them from searching further. The condominium scheme and/or a gated community housing 
area are more associated with mid– and high–income groups in the city; thus sharing 
common spaces, such as the parking lots, are uncommon among the poor. Some 
interviewees totally reject these “innovative” schemes, which, as seen further, also limited 
them to make some income–generating activities in their homes as these are forbidden by 
the condominium regulations. Hence, searching in low–income gated communities was 
disregarded by most of the interviewees.  
 
As for informal land seekers, taking an “opportunity” of buying a plot in an ejido widely 
depended on the trust built between the land seeker and the ejidatario from the search stage 
when they met or started talking. The agency capacity of land seekers demanded certain 
ability to negotiate a deal with ejidatarios and convince them to be a reliable client. 
However, this resulted in a relationship based on mutual perception of trust. The results 
were an agreement on the land price, availability of plots, and the methods and length of 
payments. Evidently, when newcomer is an ejidatario’s family, the task is eased simply by 
this fact. LC–02 and EJ–01 live in a plot that their fathers –ejidatarios– gave them 
precisely for building their home once married.  
 
For instance, SO–03 received 25 hectares of land, including a plot for the house, during a 
redistribution of land occurred a few years ago among ejidatarios. In cases like this, the 
resident is not only benefited by the fact of belonging to an ejidatario family but also, 
he/she has land available to continue informal sales. Figure No. 63 shows a view of what a 
person in search of a plot can find in the nearby ejidos where land is sold on an everyday 
basis, e.g., unpaved streets and lack of municipal services.  
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Figure No. 63. A general view of Cumbres III . 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
The search relates also to gender aspects. It was found that men were in charge of the 
search and of the selection of the place. It was common to hear women saying, “They were 
brought by the husband” to the place. It seemed that women played a minor role in 
selecting the place because they were brought.  
 
“Because I got married and they brought me here.” SO–03 iv  
 
Women seemed to play a supplementary role probably because the households were 
headed by men, at least, during the initial family formation. In addition, there was a sense 
of “following” the husband apparently to wherever he wanted to go. SO–02 illustrates this 
research’s perception of the reason why the wife accepted to live in the place selected as 
follows: 
 
“Because I followed him, my husband.” SO–02 v  
 
Although, this would be interpreted as a men–only decision, the wives interviewed seemed 
not to be against such decisions. Their answers seemed to include a sense of approval of 
their husbands’ choices. Nevertheless, there were found some female–headed households 
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in the fieldwork but these were formed initially in the traditional way with the men as a 
head of household. Hence, as the search for information depended mainly on men, this was 
contingent upon their time availability and abilities. Thus, the search prioritised some 
places limited to reduced geographical areas to reduce additional costs and commuting 
time. In addition, some limited their search to the weekends, as most of them worked 
during the rest of the week.  
 
For many, the ejido practically represents an option for land. Most residents considered 
informal land as almost available permanently and flexible to purchase. Available because 
of the existing number of ejidos around the city and flexible because they knew that some 
payment arrangements could be reached with ejidatarios according to people’s needs and 
financial capacity. With these two aspects in mind, seller and buyer negotiated and made 
the transactions engagements. This “customised” transaction has recently evolved based on 
land demand. This drives people to decide where to search and, eventually, to make their 
decisions. ER–02 claims that: 
 
“If this (the plot) were not irregular, they would ask you for more money. 
This way, you pay as you can”. ER–02vi 
  
For instance, in Los Pocitos, the plots were smaller as land was subdivided in a more 
traditional urban pattern –though informal. Plots, although still customisable, were smaller 
and the chances to select the specific location more limited. In addition, due to its 
proximity to expensive residential neighbourhoods and the Tecnológico de Monterrey –the 
most expensive higher education institution in Aguascalientes and the country– the plots 
have increased in price recently but decreased in size. In fact, it is more difficult to find a 
plot in Los Pocitos informal area nowadays. Today, Los Pocitos remain as an attractive 
area for developers despite the fact of having the informal settlement inserted in the middle 
of the zone, e.g., next to the most expensive golf course, a high–income residential tower, 
and some of the most expensive gated communities in town.   
 
However, ejidos remained flexible. Two families that were not related to ejidatarios 
obtained their plots free of charge through donations, provided because they were 
extremely poor. Donations were rare cases though. LP–10 mentioned that his donated plot 
was more a matter of charity for the family, showing that searching for a window of 
opportunity for an extremely poor family to buy land was indeed possible. Yet, in such 
cases, the families obtained “land that nobody wanted” in the first place but this caused 
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some problems later among settled residents. The family reported that some neighbours 
disagreed with the donation to the point that the ejidatarios asked for the plot back when 
the water company requested a piece of land on which to build a well for the community. 
The pressure escalated but they did not leave the plot. Thus, land donations were not as 
safe as expected. This family faced potential eviction from the people who donated them 
the plot. The eviction threat came from “insiders”. Presumably, this usually would come 
from outsiders.  
 
In summary, some factors were found as relevant at the time of searching for a place to 
move. First, certainly access to information of value is highly relevant in order to guide the 
search. The preferred means of search was an in–person face–to–face search in both formal 
and informal settlements. The Internet did not play any role in such a process. Second, the 
search stage lasts differently for everyone. On one hand, ejidatarios’ relatives find the 
search eased simply for being part of the family, whilst, on the other, the rest of potential 
residents face different conditions simply in gathering the information. The decision–
making process seemed to result easier for ejidatarios’ offspring than to the rest. Third, the 
poor found formal housing agencies, particularly the public ones, difficult to access for 
requesting valuable information. These agencies do not promote their housing programmes 
simply because they know these are insufficient to cope with demand, making this process 
subjected to the decisions made by public workers in selecting the beneficiaries. Some of 
them, as seen further in Palomino Dena, are connected to certain political parties, which 
make them eligible to the programmes.    
 
“(I knew about the place) after having some meetings with a person who was 
closely–tied to the party (in power at the time).” PD–02.vii  
 
Finally, trust is a value of main concern among those searching for a place to live. This 
obviously is more relevant among ejidatarios’ circles but becomes relevant after gathering 
some information from public bodies, private developers, and banks. The fact that some 
people partially paid for their plots by other means but money, illustrates a scenario where 
both the ejidatario and the buyer often go through difficult economic conditions, on one 
hand, or as ER–02 claimed, the ejidatario was “such a good person” and allowed him to 
pay as he could. In some cases, although these are not the original deals, it seemed that a 
relationship between the buyer and the seller is built and payments flow based on the needs 
of the both parties involved. Certainly, this is not the case in a formal transaction where 
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payments are fixed in terms of periodicity and amounts and there is no possible negation to 
accommodate dwellers’ unanticipated events.  
 
Many people must have withdrawn from the process towards finding a place to live during 
this stage of searching for information due to the same reasons this was favourable to 
others, e.g., location, price, access to information, trust, and arrangements. Yet, the value 
of information gathered and the capacity to access to it are remarkably important in making 
the next step, choosing the place to live. Agency capacity has been tested throughout the 
whole process and most people have to make their decisions with the information 
available.   
 
5.4.  Choosing the place to live. 
 
After the individual decided to leave the parental/original home and sought a new place, 
the next stage focuses on its selection. At this point, housing seekers have assessed their 
needs, wants, and aspirations, and at the same time, their present and future possibilities. 
Such a decision seemed to be motivated by two main drivers. First, the internal ones, 
which referred to those related to the individual or families who made the decisions. 
Second, the external drivers that referred to the perception / interpretation of the context in 
which decisions were made.  
 
The income available, for instance, is a key internal driver. This is low, intermittent, or the 
job is unstable, informal, or temporary in all the cases. Many of the interviewees 
mentioned that labour market has been often tough for them. Many acknowledged the 
barriers they faced to obtain a job or even to keep their current employment. For others, 
their circumstances changed over time. For instance, VC–02 is now headed by the female. 
The husband lost his sight and the wife cleans houses to support the family. They do not 
receive any help from relatives and they are both in their 50s. At time of the interview, 
they had paid one year only of their mortgage and needed nine more to finish it. This 
illustrates how difficult making the decision to select a formal place to live must be. 
Despite the fact that informal areas must offer flexible arrangements, the couple decided to 
go for a formal one. It would be worth to revisit this family in the future to know how they 
managed such difficult circumstances.  
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In addition, education levels among poor’s residents were low and searching for better 
jobs, thus, limited –i.e., the majority only attended some years of the primary school, only 
a few secondary school, and none attended a high school or a University. Most informal 
residents worked as bricklayers, street sellers, gardeners, house cleaners, and peasants, 
whilst formal residents were employees of or retirees from public bodies in the city. In 
both cases, income was low. Most households counted only on one single income earned 
by the head of household. However, intermittent incomes from young children or the 
spouse sometimes complemented the family expenses. When the household was comprised 
of extended family members, more help was available to cope with the expenditures or the 
costs of home improvements.  
 
Another aspect was the assessment regarding the potential help from friends or relatives. 
Only a few informal residents mentioned receiving help for coping with the cost of the new 
place selected. For instance, LP–08 received help from a brother–in–law to pay for the 
plot. The rest neither expected nor received any help. Some factors influenced the 
possibilities of receiving this help, such as the distance from potential helpers, the 
availability of resources, and of the time to help. The help from friends and relatives was 
practically inexistent, which contrasted to the initial assumption of this happening among 
the urban poor. Most people relied on their own resources and capacities. Thus, the help 
from friends/relatives was not a main driver in selecting the place to live.   
 
In selecting the place, the value of peoples’ word when making deals was something that 
seemed to be much appreciated among informal settlers. Trust is a central element in this 
stage, particularly among informal deals. ER–06 said that one’s word was sufficient before 
at the time of making a deal. Now, ER–06 continues, “papelito habla” –or a signed paper 
is much better. A simple piece of paper as a proof of the transaction among previous 
settlers gave new comers also the confidence about doing it the same way. Informal 
residents regarded this “contract” neither informal nor illegal. Some showed me this paper 
as a proof of the transaction. During the regularisation processes, these were valid before 
the authorities. When asking the interviewees about the way they could demonstrate land 
ownership, most mentioned that transactions were often verbal, or relied on a signed piece 
of paper between them and the ejidatario. This “paper”, referred to as the “contract”, came 
from a notebook. Each payment was registered with the dates and the landowner’s 
signature in each piece of paper.  
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“Yes, we paid for it [for the plot]. It was only by word. They [the ejidatarios] 
used to write it down how much I owed them”. EJ–01viii 
 
LP–10, for instance, although received his plot by donation, asked the ejidatario a 
piece of paper as a proof of such donation. 
 
“With that paper I could move over here. It would be more difficult to get 
expelled once I had the paper because they [ejidatarios] authorised me to 
enter the plot”. LP–10.ix 
 
Although many informal residents mentioned that trust was a key, a signed paper 
reinforced the idea of making a “formal” transaction with ejidatarios. Yet, this deal was not 
safe from potential problems with local authorities. When these happened, the ejidatarios 
needed to react in order to guarantee the transactions. In El Rocío, some interviewees were 
pushed by the ejidatarios to sign some documents through which they “accepted” that their 
plots were donated rather than sold, presumably to avoid potential sales taxes. This 
happened many years after the transactions took place. Most residents refused to sign this 
to prevent frauds or the re–sale of their plots.  
 
The arrangements with informal landowners were also flexible and convenient, especially 
during difficult times for residents. ER–02 and ER–07 partly paid for the plot with poultry 
and labour, ER–06 used an old TV and a pig, and LP–07 sold a few cows to complete the 
initial fee. Although, sometimes a fixed monthly payments and a deadline were fixed, only 
a few buyers stuck to the original deal. Some claimed that ejidatarios were “such a good 
people” for selling them the land under those conditions. These arrangements also illustrate 
people’s agency capacity to negotiate payments with landowners despite of having a 
previous deal they could not cope with. As seen, this relationship was more convenient 
when the buyer was part of an ejidatario family. SO1–01 and SO2–02 received their plots 
from their respective fathers–in–law who were ejidatarios.  
 
For families like these, the search for information became necessary only if they decided to 
look elsewhere. In Jaltomate and Los Caños, some informed that they originated from 
there and that having a piece of land was something that was “taken for granted” among 
ejidatarios’ children. They have learnt a lifestyle that became their first choice in selecting 
a place to live. Some respondents were married with others living in the same ejido, 
keeping the traditions and inheriting land. Easing access to land to ejidatarios’ children has 
become a survival and institutionalised housing practice for many. Thus, ejidos have been 
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able to absorb their own population growth and much of the needs of many urban poor in 
the city. In fact, Los Caños, Jaltomate, Paso Hondo, and Cumbres III still have large 
portions of land that will eventually be distributed to the next generations or, as it is now 
happening in particular in the last two, these will be sold to external buyers in search for 
land for housing, either individuals or developers.  
 
In contrast, some formal settlers considered the local housing agency programmes as an 
option. Some found attractive the “draw system” offered in which people were eligible for 
winning free monthly payments or the full balance of their mortgage. The distribution of 
housing modules to applicants was through the draw also as so people could access them 
from the very first month of application if they were lucky. The process of accessing a unit 
often took around one year, but the draw was the opportunity to reduce the waiting period. 
Residents in Valle de los Cactus and Guadalupe Peralta obtained their units through the 
draw. The agency claimed that this incentive kept people paying on time, which was the 
requirement to participate in the draw. Nevertheless, none of the interviewees had won free 
instalments or the full balance of the mortgage so far. However, this keeps them thinking 
that someday they will eventually win the draw and will have their mortgages paid in full.   
  
The physical characteristics of the land/house were important drivers in selecting the place. 
For instance, many informal settlers regarded the size of their plots as attractive. ER–02 
said that they selected the place because it reminded them of the countryside settings where 
they lived before. ER–02 claimed that “...my mom always love the outskirts…”x They 
planted trees and flowers in pots to keep that image. Surprisingly, most plants were 
ornamental; only a few produced something for the family. When present, people sow 
chile, lemons, or oranges, as these are easier to maintain.  
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Figure No.  64. The façade of ER–02 full shows plenty of plants and trees as in their 
original home at the countryside. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
The possibilities of “customising” the plot were higher in a bigger plot. In contrast, formal 
housing projects were less flexible in terms of size and location. Generally, formal plots 
were smaller than those located in informal areas. Indeed, all the formal plots visited were 
smaller than even the smallest informal plot visited. The newer the housing project, the 
smaller the plot. Ojocaliente and Morelos –the oldest formal housing areas visited– offered 
plots larger than 90 square meters, whilst Guadalupe Peralta and Valle de los Cactus –the 
newest– the plots were less than 72 square meters. Indeed, the IVEA planned to reduce the 
plot size even more in the future. These plots and the housing module limited the 
accommodation of their family members or extended members. Many lived overcrowded 
and privacy issues became important due to the size of the dwellings. For instance, the 
Guadalupe Peralta housing development offered a 21–square metres unit –called a módulo 
or a housing module– in a 90–square meters plot (see Figure No. 65).   
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Figure No. 65. A housing module floor plan in Guadalupe Peralta. 
Source: Instituto de Vivienda del Estado de Aguascalientes (2010). 
 
The module floor plan comprised of a small bathroom, a cooking area, a multifunctional 
space used as a living room during the days, and, as a bedroom, at nights. Both the front 
and the small yard on the back were unpaved. The size of these modules has been widely 
criticised for many who claimed that this was too small even for the urban poor. Figure No. 
66 shows the façade of a housing module in Guadalupe Peralta. This was a one–storey 
attached unit with walls built of painted concrete blocks. These walls were non–plastered 
and were exposed to climate conditions. The interior height was 2.30 meters, which was 
the minimum height allowed in the building code. In the outside, there was a parking space 
for one small car or a small yard. The authority stated that this should be considered as an 
initial space where people can progressively build more rooms. These modules were called 
pies de casa or house foot holds.   
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Figure No.  66. A low–cost housing module in Guadalupe Peralta. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
The IVEA offered technical support to its clients for further room extensions. This 
consisted of a set of drawings with layouts and construction specifications. Officials 
reported few residents take up this support, as they seemed to prefer following their own 
ways. As local regulations did not make a building permit mandatory if extensions were 
less than 50 square meters, adding small rooms remained unregulated and unsupervised. In 
this process, the formal and informal mechanisms mixed. Although the initial module was 
obtained through a formal body, the extensions were built by a self–help process in the 
same way as in informal settlements. Hence, formal and informal coexisted in the same 
arena, at the same time.  
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Figure No. 67. Guadalupe Peralta development under construction –note the size of 
the units and the limited area for expansion. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
Recently, the IVEA modified the housing approach in Valle de los Cactus housing 
development. From the previous housing model of building one–storey houses in an open 
development, now they changed into a two–storey home in a condominium administrative 
model. Now, the module comprised of two floors (see Figure No. 68) with a bedroom on 
the first floor and a bathroom, a cooking area, and a living room on the ground floor. The 
plot was 75 square meters and the housing module was 42 square meters. In comparison to 
previous public housing projects, this did not offer a parking space within the plot. Parking 
were located in communal areas within the settlement but residents complaint that cars 
have been stolen or vandalised, as they cannot keep an eye on them.  
 178 
 
Figure No.  68. Housing module in Valle de los Cactus 
Source: Instituto de Vivienda del Estado de Aguascalientes (2010). 
 
The location of the house on the front boundary prevents dwellers parking a vehicle. 
Besides, to enter the house, one must walk through what is called precintos –or precincts– 
with a landscape design that prevents people from driving an automobile between homes. 
Although the argument of local authorities is that these projects must be considered as 
start–ups homes that residents will eventually modify according to their own needs, 
interviewees did not consider extensions in the near future simply because they could 
afford them. This contrasts to older formal settlements, such as Ojocaliente and Morelos, 
where the majority of people have modified and/or extended their houses. In Valle de los 
Cactus in particular, extensions are highly regulated in terms of its location, material to 
use, and size that limit people to follow traditional paths towards home modifications, 
including self–help.  
 
“Well, if he builds something, we need to save the pennies to buy materials 
little by little basis.” VC–01xi 
 
Ground Floor First Floor 
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Any resident in Valle de los Cactus or Guadalupe Peralta, the most recent public housing 
projects promoted by the state government, mentioned the existence of an additional 
programme intended to help them improve their houses. This left the residents alone with 
the task of improving their housing conditions and this feeling could be perceived during 
the schedules.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure No.  69. Valle de los Cactus, a low–cost public housing condominium. 
Source: Google Earth (2014). 
 
Another external driver analysed was the assumed advantages that knowing someone 
previously living in the area selected would represent for newcomers. With the exemption 
of those already belonging or having connections to ejidatarios’ families, e.g., in Los 
Caños, Jaltomate, and Soyatal, only a few informal residents knew someone living in the 
ejidos before moving. For instance, residents in Pocitos and El Rocío did not know 
anybody before arrival. It seemed that ejidos already absorbed by the urban fabric resulted 
more attractive for newcomers than those far from the city, as in the case of Pocitos and El 
Rocío.  
 
The assumed social networking that helps people make their decisions was limited to 
ejidatarios–related residents. The rest, needed to build their connections and networks in 
order to attain their goal of gaining access to a piece of land. Agency, again, played a 
major role in this task. To know someone before arrival was less probable among formal 
dwellers. The designation of housing units depended on availability and, at local level, on 
the draw implemented by the state housing agency to assign the dwellings to applicants.   
Parking 
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Precincts or 
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When people selected and moved to the place, safety issues were less important. At 
present, residents of both formal and informal areas reported vandalism, violence, and 
other related problems. Some informal settlers said that in the beginning, they knew each 
other and the early friendlier ambience deteriorated as children grew up and more settlers 
arrived. Many complaints about young children neither going to the school nor having a 
job were common: youngsters remained in the colonias vandalising and causing trouble.  
 
“They [the youngsters causing problems] must be sleeping now. You should 
see this on Saturdays and Sundays. Everybody is shouting here. No, no, no. 
They hit my walls a lot before. There were many problems and I put some 
branches on the walls. I went out to tell them if they did not want to be 
bothered they should go to the river, it is wider there, go to the river. “Don’t 
take the risk” [they replied]. I told them you are making too much noise, my 
children are sleeping. Do not scare them. Later, they ran and [threw] a stone 
up there. The police came and they [the mothers] said “Oh no, they were not 
my children as I called them in very early”. At one in the morning, you can 
hear the row. God knows what they are doing.” LP–10xii 
 
Some dwellings reflected the current insecurity levels, as some dwellers have implemented 
measures to protect their homes from thieves, i.e., steel bars fixed to windows and doors, 
the front of the houses completely enclosed with metal doors. LP–06 put a wire netting in 
the front to safeguard some building materials piles –some bricks and stone blocks 
collected that were going to be used for foundations in the future. It becomes necessary to 
safeguard the materials that have been acquired through much family effort (see Figure No. 
70). The same occurred in formal settlements where insecurity is also a major issue now. 
The same level of protection can be seen, especially in the façade of many dwellings 
throughout the city.   
 
 
 
 
 
 181 
 
Figure No.  70. LP–06 protected as much as possible from intruders. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
Figure No. 71 shows the way MO–01’s residents (formal) protect their home. These bars 
are very common in the whole city.   
 
 
Figure No.  71. The MO–01 façade protected by steel bars/spikes on top. 
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Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
5.5.  The arrival at the new place. 
 
On arrival, interviewees showed a positive attitude towards the selected place but 
recognised how challenging this step was, especially in informal settlements. Moving 
represented a major step that materialised the initial decisions to leave the parental/original 
home. An owned house is a dream came true for millions of Mexicans. 
 
“To me, this is my house, my children’s, my family’s… they will have a 
place to live when I am gone. They will make their own house to be 
independent”. ER–06.xiii   
 
Yet, young couples faced their reality and conditions. Some spent the first nights in an 
improvised shack made of metal sheets or cardboard. For some, this has remained as their 
shelter up to today. Moving did not mean an immediate solution. LP–01 reported that the 
initial shelter was not weather proof and the roof leaked water as this was made of 
cardboard sheets. Some referred to the “suffering” that moving represented for being 
exposed to weather conditions, poor hygiene, and mugging.  
 
“That room is made of adobe brick… with the puddles he [the father] said, 
let’s make some adobitos …”. LP–01.xiv  
 
Remember such an anecdote was not always easy for the interviewees. When people 
referred to the effort of having their dwellings either paid or built, some showed some 
sense of nostalgia and, at the same time, proud for being able to accomplish partly or the 
whole task. The arrival was especially difficult for families with young children as no toilet 
facilities, drainage, or running water were available. The struggle for these services started 
from the arrival. Thus, moving to a formal settlement seems to be less difficult, as the 
house includes at least one fully serviced room from the very first night. It is very different 
the way a formal dweller faces the inclusion of a toilet, a shower, and a kitchen in their 
house to the conditions that their informal counterpart does on arrival. Many people have 
to face this reality from the very first day.  
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Figure No. 72. The toilet in the Cumbres III dwelling visited. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010) 
 
Both formal and informal settlers faced contrasting commuting difficulties. For instance, 
when plots were sold in Palomino Dena, there was no public transport to connect people to 
the city. In Morelos and Ojocaliente, the service was available from the beginning. Newer 
areas like Guadalupe Peralta and Valle de los Cactus lacked bus routes until recently. 
Some informal areas still lacked public transport. Many people complained of the constant 
escalating cost of bus tickets. Currently, it cost 6 pesos –or 30 pence– per trip. One trip in 
the morning and one in the afternoon represents 24 per cent of one minimum wage per day. 
People preferred to use bicycles and, whenever possible, to get a chocolate car as 
explained before.  
 
In Soyatal and Jaltomate, for instance, there are combis –or small vans for up to 10 
passengers– providing transportation for residents. This service is relatively recent and its 
frequency is a common complaint among residents. Another challenge was the lack of 
water. Residents in Los Pocitos reported that the army and local water provider brought 
them water on request for many years but this cost more than the service paid by formal 
residents to the local water company. However, some people did not have the money to 
buy it regularly, only a few had a telephone line to call for the service, and often were 
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absent of home due to their activities. When the army or the provider arrived, people stood 
outside their houses, put buckets, and plastic recipients to store as much water as they 
could at home. This water was not recommended for drinking. Sometimes people boiled 
the water to attempt to make it drinkable but this represented additional fuel costs, 
compromising the health of residents. Besides, water was used for other purposes, such as 
preparing the mortar and concrete used for home improvements, and for feeding the hens, 
some people had at home for their consumption. The investment in water was important 
and had to be managed carefully by the poor.  
 
 
Figure No. 73. Buckets of water in front of a house in Cumbres III. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
In Cumbres III, for instance, the informal settlement was created besides the pond where 
brick is still produced. There, health issues are of major concern, as the water seemed to be 
polluted. People need to collect water from elsewhere and pay a water truck to come to fill 
their buckets and tanks (see Figure No. 73). The brick continues to be produced in the area 
and pollution will continue to be a problem for residents. The brick is heated by using 
disposable materials, garbage, and any inflammable material available. This place requires 
a major intervention by local authorities to regulate such an activity. The same happens in 
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other areas of the city where brick is produced in the ladrilleras –or rudimentary brick 
works.  
 
 
Figure No.  74. Brick production in Cumbres III. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
Another factor was the number of people arriving at the plot/house. Often, informal settlers 
arrived as a couple with no children. However, most of the time, children arrived soon after 
and couples had to adapt the shelter as quickly as possible. Many acknowledged the role of 
the spouse, generally young women, in the construction process. She represents some 
savings in labour costs. The wife in ER–05 claimed during the interview that she prepared 
the mortar and carried the bricks closer to the bricklayer for him to build the walls. As soon 
as children grow, they also help in the construction process or, as in some cases, with 
money to pay for materials. ER–06 and LP–11 reported that children helped during the 
construction process in the same way. Surprisingly, none of the interviewees moved with 
extended family members from the very beginning, so help was not immediately available 
on arrival.  
 
Another key driver for moving to informal settlements is the flexibility of arrangements 
between the landowner and the land seekers. Ejidatarios were not wealthy people in the 
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real estate business. They were people who have inherited land and used it to raise some 
money in exchange. They tried to capitalise the land in periods of financial difficulties and 
sold plots according to their own financial needs and the buyer’s capacity. None of the 
residents were threatened with or evicted due to payment delays. In difficult times, a deal 
was reached. ER–02, ER–06, and ER–07 provided poultry and labour in exchange for a 
few instalments. This flexibility did not exist in formal settlements where arrangements 
were fixed and there were no options to modify them. Although interviewing an ejidatario 
would have been a major benefit to understand their reasons to sell, those who were 
approached for an interview refused, e.g., in Los Pocitos, Jaltomate, and Soyatal.  
 
Informal settlers needed to build “something” either before or immediately in the arrival. 
LP–04 illustrated informal settlers’ beliefs about that building “something” in the plot 
would make it difficult for the authorities to evict them. Thus, informal residents 
proceeded to do what they had learnt in their search period: 
“I followed what people told me you: “the people already living or with a 
small room in the plot are hardly evicted”. I believed that. I said: I am going 
to do it and I started doing it”. LP–04xv 
 
As local authorities had not evicted anyone from an informal settlement, residents felt 
confident about their permanency in the plot. LP–05 relied on the fact that “nobody has 
been evicted in this area ever” and “God has helped us and takes care of us”. Others relied 
on the time of permanency in the plot as a reason enough as for not being evicted. As ER–
03 mentioned, “one has lived here for a long time and many people grew up here”. They 
remained in the plot and were neither evicted nor expected to be in the future. Yet, it 
seemed that the final resource for feeling safe in the place was the paper signed with the 
ejidatario. It takes such a relevant role that it was very interesting to perceive a high sense 
of confidence in such a transaction.  
 
5.6.  Drivers for home improvements. 
 
This key stage refers to the efforts made by people to consolidate their dwellings 
physically. As residents’ conditions evolved, home improvements depended on family 
cycles, their economic capacity, the gain/access to public programmes, and the sense of 
and the aspirations for home ownership. As for family changes, these related to both the 
increase in the number of children or the inclusion of extended members. These changes 
put pressure on the need for more space as to address privacy issues. Yet, during this 
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process, the increase in the number of members may represent also additional support to 
try improving the dwelling’ conditions. For instance, as children grew, their chances to 
help the parent with labour or money increased, as LC–03 explained as follows: 
 
“[Some home extensions were built] because the family grew. I have two 
sons who do not stop making bricks. Their father told them: “I leave you 
nothing”. However, he thought them how to work. Wherever they work, they 
know how to do everything… not at a very good standard, but they do it.” 
LC–03xvi 
 
Many informal dwellings accommodated one or several additional members as older 
children got married. Depending on the availability of money, time, and skills, home 
extensions varied on the quality of building materials. Some new rooms were built with 
disposable materials, whilst others, used bricks and concrete. In El Rocío, for instance, 
almost half the dwellings visited were occupied by more than one family. This puts 
additional pressure on privacy issues. Some dwellers commented that the increase in the 
number of family members pushed some of the older children to migrate to the US in 
search for jobs. The money sent was directed mostly towards home improvements.  
 
At least in one case, migrating to the US had effective results in consolidating the house. 
ER–03 is a well–consolidated, two–storey house made of brick and concrete with metal 
windows (Figure No. 75). In this case, the older two siblings spent at least six years 
working –though, illegally according to the interviewee– in the US, sent the money for the 
house, and the brother plans to return to save enough to continue the home improvements 
in the near future. This young man showed me a tattoo in his arm with the coat of arms of 
Aguascalientes, proudly claiming that it reminded him of the city. The sense of belonging 
to his place of origin made this young man keep focused on his goal of helping his parents 
finish the house.  
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Figure No. 75. A house built with siblings’ help in El Rocío. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010).    
 
A consolidated dwelling often is the result of many family members’ efforts for many 
years. Yet, this process was perceived differently by some officials interviewed. Some of 
them commented on the “way” people used to live. They referred to a sort of “culture” by 
which people expressed their way of living, including their decisions and preferences 
regarding informal land and housing. They constantly repeated the word “culture” to refer 
to the way residents lived and behaved. An expert interviewed mentioned that part of this 
“culture” was that people were used to buying pirate products, such as the chocolate cars. 
This, he said, has become a sort of culture among the urban poor, and that this culture 
includes buying informal land.  
 
One official mentioned that living in “that way” had to change. He argued that the design 
of new housing projects attempted to “reshape” this culture by “teaching” them how they 
were supposed to live. This “change” referred to the implementation of a condominium 
system with communal areas and shared responsibilities. They called for a change in this 
“culture” as a path to have a real change in the conditions of urban poor. This sort of 
approach is discussed in the following sections as this represents part of structure to which 
the housing and land acquisition and, further, consolidation.   
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Another important aspect to consider is the period people intend to stay in the house, which 
entails the effort to improve its conditions. Most people considered the place they lived in 
as definitive and planned to stay there for many years. Hence, the consolidation process 
would last for decades in many cases. In the informal areas visited, for instance, it seemed 
to be an endless process as many houses have been “under constructions” for years. Figure 
No. 76 shows how rooms are built one by one within the plot to accommodate adult 
children who started their own families. One room made of brick was added next to the 
original shack built with cardboard that needed to wait for its replacement some more time. 
From such a process, it is evident that the original conditions under arrival change over 
time and children experience better conditions than their parents did in the first years. 
Although the original room is still in use, the better–built room often accommodated 
younger members.  
 
 
Figure No. 76. A permanent room next to the original informal shack. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
To illustrate a typical arrival stage at an informal settlement, LP–01 described how the life 
during the first weeks after moving was as follows: 
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“We walked among the puddles of rainwater because that year [of arrival] it 
rained so much and we had no roof. The water ran over where we slept. We 
had a shack made of steel sheets only. In the beginning, it was like that 
because when we were asked to leave where we lived before, we had no place 
to go, only the hills. When we arrived, there were hills only. We struggled a 
lot. That is why whatever we do is with a big effort. The room over there is 
made of adobe. With the puddles of rainwater, he [head of household] said: 
“Let’s make some adobes”. LP–01xvii 
 
LP–01 describes the arrival of a younger couple with small children with limited resources 
to invest in the house immediately after arrival. The father worked in construction and that 
helped them, as many other families, to make constant efforts according to their 
possibilities. Most informal residents’ circumstances were similar. Only a few were able to 
build structures that are more permanent soon after arrival and most of them started under 
precarious conditions.  
 
Many informal residents have not had the opportunity to improve their homes so far. In 
these cases, the home production cycle illustrate the non–linear character of the process, as 
it often stopped or delayed for many years. The house or parts of it, as that pictured in 
Figure No. 76, remains with walls and roofs made of disposable materials found in the 
dumps or brought from nearby construction sites. Pieces of wood were also used but they 
required to be replaced more often due to climate conditions, dry weather, with short, but 
heavy rainy seasons, made the shack vulnerable to extreme conditions.  
 
Often, the interior had a poorly poured concrete floor but the majority were made of 
compressed sand –i.e., a mix of sand, water, and cement compressed by a heavy 
metal/wood plank. The hygienic conditions were also poor. Food was often cooked on an 
open fire of wood or any other flammable material found (see Figure No. 77); with time, 
people were able to buy a small gas container to connect to a small stove or an improvised 
grill. Besides, dogs, cats, and even rats were common in these areas increasing the risk of 
diseases. The vulnerability of these dwellings to fire and flooding is high.   
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Figure No. 77. Cooking using any combustible material. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
Another aspect that helps residents to improve their homes is their ability to obtain 
municipal services. This is a key in showing their agency capacity, individual/community 
organisation, and the “efficiencies” of their contacts working, mostly, in government 
agencies. Usually, the first service obtained was the electricity by connecting cables to 
nearby posts. These cables were lying along the unpaved roads with the risk of electric 
discharges during the rainy season. Most informal residents were able to connect their 
shelters to electricity sources and plugged in their television and radio sets and more 
recently, other electronic devices and appliances. Many people washed clothes and dishes 
on the streets or patios and had no drainage in the house leaving the resulting water 
running freely along the roads. These increased the risks of accidents and deteriorated the 
hygienic conditions.  
 
The capacity of people to save or finance home improvements is a key driver. People 
implemented some strategies to cope with family expenses and home improvements at the 
same time. Although tandas did not necessarily change a family’s condition, they 
influenced their economic capacity on a temporary basis. They obtained a certain amount 
of money that was used in different ways: some used the money to make small home 
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improvements, whilst others bought as much building materials as possible, which became 
a sort of savings in kind. Nevertheless, participating in tandas was difficult due to the 
intermittency of income. They were seen as a way to finance immediate needs rather than 
as a way to save money. For instance, in LC–01, not only the mother but also the two 
daughters participated in tandas to finance home improvements. When possible, family 
housing finance is a shared task. Another way to cope with home expenses, a common 
practice found among interviewees, was that children accompanied their parents to work as 
apprentices at construction sites as chalanes –or bricklayer apprentices. In this way, young 
children helped the family by learning some skills that they applied in making home 
improvements and, at the same time, contributing with some money to buy building 
materials.  
 
The fieldwork showed several cases where various family members contributed to attain 
this goal. Women, for instance, generated some income through informal activities at 
home, which were not permanent and depended on the money available to supply the stock 
to sell (Figure No. 78).   
 
 
Figure No. 78. Some candies on a table ready to be sold through the window. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
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Surprisingly, the possibilities for making home improvements differ from formal and 
informal residents; it seemed that formal residents had limited possibilities to make home 
improvements. One of the reasons was that most formal residents were still paying for their 
mortgages and the additional money required for home improvements was limited. For 
instance, for the IVEA beneficiaries, the main requirement was to prove that they were 
able to make some savings to be eligible for a mortgage in the first place. The six–month 
savings period was required as a down payment fee, which served as a sort of a “training” 
period for applicants to get used to saving the monthly payment.  
 
However, formal settlers did not report any additional programmes or assistance once they 
were granted the mortgage. Once people paid the down payment, the housing authority did 
not implement any monitoring of the progress of peoples’ conditions or economic 
evolution. Their incomes were insufficient to attempt investing in home improvements in 
the same way as informal residents. Often, the small sums of money are used to install 
elements for protection such as fences in the front house or steel bars on the windows.  
 
 
Figure No. 79. OJ–02 invested in protecting the house as much as possible. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
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Access to additional financial support is another driver for making home improvements. 
Residents interviewed did not report the existence of formal financial bodies providing 
housing loans for home improvements. For instance, no microfinance agencies or NGOs 
focused on housing–related loans for the poor had been installed in the city at the time of 
the fieldwork. Only LI –a housing microcredit private agency– had recently opened their 
operations in the city, but targeted blue–collar employees only. The lack of financial 
assistance was not exclusive to informal residents but was generalised to all the urban 
poor. They had limited options to finance housing needs but also, this support was nil even 
when they had already accessed land or housing by their own means.  
 
However, the lack of financial assistance matched the disenchantment of residents to apply 
for credit. The majority of interviewees would not consider applying for a credit –for 
housing or other goods– because they thought interest was high. LP–03 felt that having 
credit exerted too much “pressure” on him. LP–06, despite living in an informal area, 
explained that the husband was offered an INFONAVIT credit once but he rejected it 
simply because “he did not like to own money to anybody”. LC–02 claimed that requesting 
a housing loan would represent a “huge debt”. Lastly, LC–03 surprisingly claimed that: 
 
“I would like to ask for support, help, I see that many people help me but I 
am ashamed.” LC–03xviii 
 
As a result, prioritising home investment becomes particularly relevant based on individual 
or family income flows only. Depending on the starting point at the time of arrival, 
investment priorities may differ between formal and informal settlers. As in formal 
housing, a basic unit existed from the beginning, the priority focused on the construction of 
additional rooms. However, among informal residents, some residents express different 
priorities. As SO2–03 explained:  
 
“Well, do not laugh at me as many others did… the very first thing that I 
built, was a toilet. At the beginning, they laughed at me. They said that how 
was it possible that I built the toilet before a room… [To me] it was a 
thousand times better to have privacy than going to the hills or the creek like 
them.” SO2–03xix 
 
Another driver for home improvements was the access to public programmes promoted by 
local agencies, which was found to be contradictory and contradicts  the formal and 
informal dichotomy. For instance, some informal residents sporadically obtained support, 
whilst formal residents complained about the lack of post–occupation assistance. On one 
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hand, illegal land tenure seemed not have prevented people from receiving some support 
from the government. Fringe public programmes provided them with bags of cement, 
bricks, and metal sheets used to improve the homes. They also received help during 
wintertime or flooding events. The support perceived by formal residents was different. 
Dwellers reported a no intervention by local authorities after housing occupation. No 
programmes were reported intended to help them improve their housing conditions. This 
seemed to be a common residents’ demand as dwellings were small and additional space 
was needed.  
 
The fact that residents were paying for the mortgage kept them ineligible for further 
housing credit to avoid compromising their solvency. Thus, legal tenure was useless until 
residents completely paid the mortgage. The house seemed to be “frozen” rather than 
easing access to credit in the way claimed by De Soto. The burden of coping with the 
mortgage was the one that actually prevented residents to access further credit. Besides, 
these houses did not gain enough value for the banks to find them attractive enough to back 
up credit. So people depended upon their personal/family effort alone, their personal 
savings, and even their own labour to improve their homes.  
 
Public agencies released building materials for reconstruction or blankets for the cold. This 
way, informal areas become “visible” to the authorities and, at the same time, potential 
areas for candidates to proselytise. Once residents received such help or a visit from the 
Mayor, a deputy, or a political candidate, they interpreted it as a sign that reinforced their 
chances to remain. In El Rocío, sewage and pavement were introduced after the local 
elections in 2007. People considered that the elected deputy was the one in charge of 
making this happened two years later. In fact, ER–01 considered that these works were a 
“gift” from the deputy. From the visits, it seemed that politicians take advantage of 
people’s needs for electoral purposes; yet, residents did not care about the political parties 
visiting them, but how able the politician was to fulfil his/her promises. In these 
relationships, women were more willing to deal with candidates and politicians. 
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Figure No. 80. Introduction of sewage in El Rocío. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2009). 
 
Some commented that participating in political campaigns was recurrent in trying to obtain 
the missing services or the regularisation. For some people, this is often the only way to 
talk to someone “influential” to present complains and demands. People remarked that 
candidates hardly visited their colonias once they took power. Nevertheless, achieving 
basic services were people’s main goals and the reason for making these ephemeral and 
“convenient” connections with politicians. They took advantage of their visits as much as 
they could since these visits may be the last opportunity to see them for a long time. In 
2009, in contrast, Los Pocitos had the water introduced after swine flu became a national 
emergency to prevent an outbreak of this disease. None of the residents acknowledged this 
disease as the reason for the introduction of it.  
 
Additionally, a sense of discontent was perceived among informal residents. There was a 
practice of having a neighbourhood representative before the local authorities. Residents 
said that the colonia representatives benefited from construction materials and food 
originally intended for the whole community. In fact, officials interviewed commented on 
this regard too, recognising a prevailing corruption among these representatives.   
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“They [the government] donated paint for the houses, water deposits, more help for 
floors, material for plaster, for all that, but they are always the same people who 
receive the help. I never get it. Most people getting help are relatives. As I have my 
small shop [within the house] they believe that I do not need money and they did 
not want to help me”. SO–01xx 
 
5.7.  Conclusions.  
 
The five –stage model followed in this study to assess the process of accessing land for 
housing and consolidate it, helped organise the data obtained in the fieldwork. Although, 
the process is not linear for all the participants, this helped clarify the different moments 
throughout the efforts to achieve such goals in both formal and informal areas along with 
the barriers faced by those finding more difficulties. Attempting to draw a profile or a 
route–to–housing that applies to every case was neither possible nor the goal of this study. 
Every household is different and faces the challenge of housing in different ways. Yet, 
some challenges seemed to be similar for formal and informal dwellers. For instance, 
formal housing markets are restrictive in the sense that the options offered focused to a 
small group of earners who work formally and with a certain income level. This leaves 
millions without any possibility to be eligible in a market that anyway offers a housing 
stock that seemed to be insufficient in terms of the demand that, for instance, public 
housing bodies have been unable to cope with for years. Moreover, formal housing is 
small, far from the central city, with minimal amenities for its residents –i.e., public parks–
, and often too expensive to be attractive for many formal workers who are entitled to a 
mortgage.  
 
From the fieldwork, a mismatch between the housing offered by formal bodies and their 
potential clients was evident, especially for the limited options found to enter it. Yet, the 
process of home acquisition showed how creative the urban poor are in terms of their 
agency capacity to achieve either a plot in an informal area that fits their own financial 
capacity, or a housing unit from a public body no matter how difficult this may be. The 
fieldwork drew on two main aspects, which resulted representative of what was studied in 
the literature. On one hand, capturing overwhelming benefits of living in a formal area was 
not evident in the areas visited. On the contrary, accessing formal housing schemes 
deprived people’s capacity to direct some investment towards home consolidations steps. 
When this was present, this represented a tremendous effort from all the family members 
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and, thus, it depended on the life cycles of the family. The time elapsed for people to finish 
paying the mortgage was most of the time the period spent with minimal possibilities of 
making home improvements.  
 
On the other hand, informal residents, though with a tremendous effort too, were more able 
to consolidate their homes progressively within more flexible and less restrictive periods, 
as their investments were channelled according to their own possibilities and without 
previously acquired financial commitments. Although, informal housing seemed to be 
potentially more feasible to be a place to capture the investments made through sales, 
many people have remained in their homes for many years despite the problems that the 
lack of some municipal services present in their everyday life.  
 
Both formal and informal residents showed limited possibilities or intentions to move 
elsewhere despite their precarious conditions. Once an individual accessed a piece of land 
or a house, he or she will make whatever it takes to remain there for the rest of their lives. 
People did not plan to find a job in a different city or town; their efforts were concentrated 
on one place only. Their mobility is nil. Finally, people’s attitudes towards their 
possibilities to obtain a piece of land in an informal area were always positive. They 
believed that ejidos were a place where land is always obtainable and that a deal will be 
reached at some point with the ejidatario. In contrast, people’ attitudes towards formal 
housing was negative most of the time. People felt that formal housing is expensive, 
inaccessible, unaffordable, and exclusive for a few. For many of them, this has been true 
for many years.  
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CHAPTER 6. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SECURITY TO INFORMAL HOUSE 
CONSTRUCTION. 
 
6.1.Introduction. 
 
This chapter assesses the role played by security of tenure throughout the process of house 
construction in the sampled informal settlements, the fourth objective of this research. 
Although each settlement presents its own features, five aspects were identified. These 
were not exclusive but showed how people’s perceptions of security evolved. First, 
security perceptions vary chronologically according to both the age of the settlement and 
family cycles. Second, they are influenced by the process through which the transactions 
take place, especially when they involved ejidatarios. Third, security of tenure is tightly 
related to the “structure and agency” approach in Giddens’ terms that this dissertation 
follows. Fourth, security of tenure influences whether a home is perceived as an 
investment that can eventually be capitalised. Finally, the fifth aspect is the role of security 
of tenure in deciding whether to participate in or promote land regularisation. These five 
aspects revealed how people faced informal house construction from the security of tenure 
perspective and helped clarify the different notions about informality, poverty, and 
structure and agency in the areas visited. Through all these factors, a transverse factor was 
risk, as this was present at all time and had to be measured in either explicit or implicit 
ways. The perception of risk was recurrent and varied according to these five aspects. 
 
6.2. The evolution of security of tenure. 
 
The fieldwork revealed that security of tenure was perceived by informal residents 
according to at least three factors: the chronology of the settlement, the stage of house 
consolidation, and the family cycle. People considered that the older the settlement, the 
less the chances of eviction, i.e., the more established. In a younger informal settlement, 
there were fewer residents at initial stages, people were more likely to be spotted by the 
authority, and therefore, they were more vulnerable to eviction. Some residents in Pocitos 
mentioned that they were the first to arrive with no neighbours or nearby inhabited areas. 
The colonia eventually received more settlers, which helped them build an incipient sense 
of community.  
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As the majority of informal areas were occupied without following an organised process of   
buying plots, each buyer faced the fact of being potentially threatened with eviction by the 
authority. This is an important difference from areas sold informally to organised groups, 
who occupy the land under the guidance of social organisations or political parties. Most 
individuals went through the acquisition, occupation, construction, and consolidation 
processes without support. Over time, some communal efforts to organise to pursue the 
municipality for still missing services, or for the regularisation of their plots, were also 
found. However, solid organisation was not evident among interviewees. A high level of 
discontent with pragmatic leaders of colonias was evident. These were reported to take 
advantage of their positions, leaving the rest of residents with no real benefits from the 
organisation and the intended process, such as keeping information about public 
programmes, or building materials kits, for their own benefit.  
 
The age of the settlement was also related to its location with respect to the city. Informal 
areas located relatively far from the urban area were less supervised by the authorities than 
those closer to or inside the city. When the growth of the city reached certain areas 
containing informal settlements, they then became attractive to land speculators or 
developers. These areas also were of more interest to the authorities, as they were 
embedded within newer formal areas developed around them. El Rocío and Los Pocitos 
were examples of this type of urban sprawl. Over time, these settlements were surrounded 
by formal areas, becoming a spot of informality embedded in them. The newer surrounding 
areas built around El Rocío were low–cost housing projects so security of tenure was not 
perceived at risk. Residents mentioned that the struggle related more to neighbourhood 
improvement rather than to the legal status of their plots.  
 
Los Pocitos faced a different situation. This settlement saw many high–class residential 
projects built around it, including a country club project with a golf course, a small high–
tech park, and the most expensive higher education facility in the country. Los Pocitos is 
now a poor area surrounded by some of the most expensive land of the city. This is a 
striking example of the segmentation that arises from land tenure formalisation. Residents 
mentioned that they had been visited by people wanting to buy their plots but they refused 
to sell. Los Pocitos was originally an ejido on the North of the city that has been 
dismantled over time. First, the local state University bought a large part of the ejido on 
which to build its facilities. Then, the country club also bought many hectares to build the 
most expensive upper–class residential areas. Other large areas have been sold to 
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developers of upper–class–residential projects. One section, though, was informally 
divided into small plots that eventually became the informal settlement. Some dwellers 
believed that they have spent many years with no public services as a way to pressurise 
them to sell their plots. Streets remained unpaved and trash collection was still 
problematic. Residents mentioned the presence of gangs and burglary as major concerns in 
their colonia, whilst the surrounding areas did not have such problems. Of all the informal 
areas visited, this was the one with most pressure on residents to sell. However, some 
people have started selling the plots alongside the main road where, for instance, a private 
school, a car wash business, and small restaurants have been built in the last decade. It 
seemed that this pressure from prospective entrepreneurs will continue.  
 
The rest of the informal areas did not experience pressure from external agents to acquire 
their lands. Soyatal, Jaltomate, Los Caños, Paso Hondo, and Cumbres remained at 
sufficient distance for no threat to their security of tenure from speculators. At the same 
time, they have followed a more “traditional” consolidation process at neighbourhood level 
as public services have been progressively introduced. This progression has not signified a 
radical improvement in their physical conditions and has not made them attractive to 
outsiders. They, in contrast, have meant more a social pressure on local authorities as 
residents have pushed them to provide public services for many years. Nevertheless, the 
security of tenure of these informally occupied lands has not been threatened. A 
settlement’s location has played an important role as a driver for making home 
improvements. It was found that the older and farther away the settlement, the less chances 
that security of tenure was threatened.  
 
Residents progressively reinforced their perception about the security of tenure as time 
passed by, especially as the house was transformed from a shack into a solid structure built 
of brick and concrete. This transformation makes people feel that eviction is less likely. In 
fact, an official interviewed mentioned that demolishing a house or even an eviction has 
never been an option in recent years. Nowadays, this option is considered as counter–
productive in social and political terms. This was common knowledge. Residents knew that 
being evicted or having their homes demolished will hardly ever happen. The focus of their 
struggle was on the construction of the initial room before the authority detected it. Some 
residents even wrote on the walls the owner’s name and the “address” of the house in big 
letters for everyone to see. Building even one small room with brick is considered as a 
triumph towards permanency and, thus, security of tenure. The absence of the authority 
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played an important role in the process of informal house construction. LP–04 exemplified 
the way of thinking of many informal residents as follows: 
 
“…it is very difficult to be evicted once you build a small room on the plot. I 
believed that. I said I am going to do that and started doing it.” LP–04xxi 
 
It was even more difficult for the authority to eradicate homes built when there was more 
than one in the area. Dealing with more informal residents became more problematic over 
time. Additionally, it became difficult to evict residents who had lived in the same informal 
area for many years. Some people felt that a sort of “right” to remain is built up over time. 
Some mentioned having long talks when local supervisors visited them at initial stages of 
house construction. They mentioned that supervisors were unable to convince them to stop 
building but, at the same time, were unable to present a real threat of eviction. It seemed 
that a tacit acceptance of their permanence is granted even from the start. This also seemed 
to be a sign of recognition reinforcing the security of tenure among informal residents. 
Besides, some residents acknowledged that they were informed by the ejidatarios that 
eviction was not a problem. Ejidatarios were well regarded by interviewees as trustworthy 
individuals in general terms as none reported having being defrauded by them. LP–04 
exemplified the way residents regarded a transaction with ejidatarios as safe: 
 
“There was paper proof of the transaction. I could defend myself with it. This 
[the plot] is mine. I bought it and there were witnesses that I bought it from 
Mr X. With that, others told me, a signed paper no matter if on a white sheet 
in a notebook, already signed, he [the ejidatario] is aware of the sale and I 
was aware too that we agreed on it. We both were mentally sound. We are 
citizens with responsibilities, then, you cannot rescind the transaction.” LP–
04xxii 
 
Finally, families approached security of tenure and house construction in a different way 
according to their own “family cycle”. Some residents perceived legal tenure more relevant 
as children grew. They considered that obtaining a land title would serve as family 
patrimony in the future. Legal tenure was important not necessarily for the present, but for 
the future. Yet, it did not mean that they did not feel tenure insecurity. It meant that 
obtaining legal tenure would avoid future problems for their children. Some perceived that 
acquiring the legal title helped them improve their living conditions. Yet, they realised that 
only some years later. They claimed that they did not know about the potential benefits of 
the title and this was attributed to the inexperience of young couples, as ER–04 reported: 
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“As I said, it [the legal title] helped us make the contracts for water, 
electricity, and everything… We were very young parents– I was 16 when 
my first child was born. My husband was 17. We had not any experience and 
did not know what we were “throwing” ourselves into when we came here. 
Instead of paying for a [formal] house in INFONAVIT and pay for…” ER–
04xxiii 
 
Families needed to adapt the plot as fast as possible for their shelter needs. These were 
different when children were young. At the beginning, potential eviction would be faced in 
a different way than if it happened at later stages with older children. Security of tenure 
also evolved accordingly. The majority moved to the areas when they were young and, 
mostly, recently married. 
 
 Women played an important role in the process of home construction, especially in 
negotiating the introduction of services and during the regularisation process before the 
authorities. As men were supposedly at work, women were in charge of meeting officials 
when they visited the areas for supervisory tasks, or when they needed to arrange things 
related to the introduction of public services. Apparently, men had not much time for it. 
Women had more contact with these procedures and with politicians who visited the areas 
periodically. Women were more participative in public affairs related to home 
improvement as men were absent most of the time. Thus, the way a family approached 
security of tenure is highly tied to the role played by women in the process of informal 
construction. In summary, the evidence was that the age of the settlement, the level of 
house consolidation, and the family cycles were key elements that influenced the 
perceptions and de facto security of tenure in informal housing areas.  
 
6.3. Transactions and security of tenure. 
 
Although the process towards acquiring a consolidated house started when people decided 
to leave the parental home, its materialisation started when the transaction took place. This 
was when an agreement was reached between the buyer and the seller on how a piece of 
land would be acquired and for how long payments would be made. This was the point 
when the first perception about security of tenure became relevant to the buyer. It was a 
major step in the life of a person in pursuing a consolidated home. The transaction, 
therefore, had to be regarded as safe and the plot worth such an investment.  
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Both parties took the risk of conducting an informal transaction. First, ejidatarios sold land 
piece by piece because they often needed the money. Agriculture was not as profitable as 
some years back and many of them found informal sales a way to obtain some cash. As 
transactions were unregulated, ejidatarios took the risks to sell plots to someone that they 
may or may not have known before. However, trust was the main component in the 
transaction between the ejidatario and the buyer. The former needed to have sufficient 
confidence in the buyer about the transaction in a place where the latter will be able to 
build his home. On the other hand, the buyer needed to interpret the context in which he 
was making the transaction as safe in order to feel confident to invest in that piece of land. 
It was convenient both ways. In this process, security of tenure highly depended on the 
trust built during the transaction. PH–01 believed that its transaction was “legal” simply 
because the seller was an ejidatario:  
 
“…as this place was an ejido that belonged to the same ejidatarios. I knew 
that it [the transaction] was legal.” PH–01xxiv 
 
In Soyatal and Jaltomate, the transactions were different as most residents came from an 
ejidatario family and obtained their plots more easily. EJ–03, SO–02, and SO–03 were 
some of the families where the head of household was a son of ejidatarios. The plot where 
they lived either was a gift from their parents or sold at a very low price. This way of 
acquiring plots made people feel secure about tenure regardless of the legal status. Making 
transactions with ejidatarios is seen as safe here. Ejidatarios were a sort of “authority” to 
sell land and their deals were secure. It seems that ejidatarios were a parallel real estate 
force able to sell land according to their will and needs. They have become an alternative 
for the urban poor to buy land but some ejidos have gained more value due to their 
proximity to the city. Even those further from the urban area remain attractive to land 
seekers. Informal areas like Los Pocitos are now expensive and so offered to different 
types of “clients”. Along the road in Los Pocitos, plots were advertised for sale on fences 
or lampposts indicating mobile phone numbers for those interested. Now informal land is 
advertised differently than a few years ago. It is clear that the plots advertised that 
belonged to the original ejidatarios or to the first buyers. Yet, when informal transactions 
took place, both ejidatarios and buyers took a risk as the former might regret the sale and 
the latter might default on payments.  
 
Enforcing transactions is difficult for both parties as they are originally outside the law. 
Recently, the law changed and the promotion of informal land subdivisions became a 
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felony that nobody wants to disclose officially, although it is silently tolerated. A new 
addition to the judicial code states that subdividing and selling land without the 
corresponding authorisation may result in a 10–year sentence in prison depending on the 
value of the transaction (Congreso del Estado de Aguascalientes: 2012). Probably for that 
reason, payments are often in kind as a way to help buyers cope with their obligations 
instead of defaulting. However, ER–06 claimed, “in those years, it was easier to trust in a 
person’s word than today”.xxv  
 
None informal resident reported a problem with demands for defaulted payments. Hitherto, 
two of the interviewees reported being threatened with eviction by the ejidatario. Yet, such 
eviction would have to be by the ejidatarios’ own means. In no settlement visited was a 
real attempt of eviction reported, even among those who had more difficulties in coping 
with their payments. An agreement was always reached with the seller to avoid defaulting 
and most of them had finished paying for their plots by the time of the interviews. 
 
Informal dwellers found ejidos a place with no or almost no associated costs besides the 
direct cost of the land purchased. This allowed residents to channel their resources towards 
house construction according to their own needs and possibilities. This flexibility was 
found in every informal area visited. Where the plot was a gift, flexibility was even greater. 
The level of home improvements depended on the ability of residents to react to the 
incentives perceived in their context. One of these incentives was the flexibility found in 
land transactions. Lastly, informal dwellers found vacant land more attractive to buy than a 
second–hand dwelling even in an informal area. Land was cheaper than a built house at 
any construction stage and thus transactions could be more flexible.  
 
6.4. Structure and agency. 
 
This part of the analysis refers to the relationship that informal residents built with external 
agents, or exercising agency, and their own actions consequently. It deals also with their 
relationship with the authority, especially with those who can help with, or deter them 
from, the process of land or house acquisition or home improvements. This agency can be 
analysed in at least three phases: first, up to the point when the land is acquired; second, 
during the process of house construction; and, third, in the process of regularisation or land 
titling. Informal residents gain experience on how to deal with local authorities, ejidatarios, 
and even speculators at different stages of their lives in the settlement.  
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First, informal settlers dealt with ejidatarios in a way that they eventually gained their 
confidence to the point that they were able to reach a land transaction arrangement. This 
was the result of the construction of a relationship based on, ideally, trust and, probably 
most importantly, mutual needs. This deal was the first test for future dwellers in regards to 
their agency capacity. Most informal residents –except for Jaltomate and Los Caños– were 
not related to  ejidatarios but were still able to build the degrees of trust and an incipient 
network that helped them  access a piece of land. This relationship is often troubled at 
some point, especially when residents have problems coping with agreed payments. In 
such cases, residents reported a certain degree of flexibility from the landowner allowing 
them to pay later or in kind. Some informal dwellers were able to extend their negotiations 
towards the acquisition of the land. For instance, ER–07 reported that some building 
materials for the house were obtained in exchange for labour, in particular, with the 
landowner. This created a strong relationship between the seller and the buyer of mutual 
benefit, as the former obtained labour at cheaper costs and the latter continued the process 
of house construction.   
 
Another situation faced by informal residents was a recurring encounter with municipal 
workers or supervisors from several urban and housing regulatory bodies, in particular 
from the urban development, agrarian affairs, housing issues, and social development 
offices. Here, the formulation of an agency relationship with the authority was a major 
challenge. This had to be built so that residents were able to secure their permanency in the 
place. In this sense, the perception of such security was important. This depended on the 
frequency of these visits, the officers’ approach to residents, the electoral periods in which 
these visits took place, and others aspects related to the perception of a real threat of 
eviction. Time here played also an important role as the longer the time, the lower the 
chances of evictions some people said. For instance, LP–04 claimed that:  
 
“People say things and one believes them. Then, one needs to fight. One buys 
a piece of land, builds a small room and then nobody will kick you out. It is a 
matter of time and they will not kick you out. Is it true or false…? Only the 
law knows.” LP–04xxvi 
 
The relationship with public officers was a key in the individual agency process of 
residents. This transcended the individual level to a collective process depending on the 
way this was built. In theory, the same rules applied to everyone. Yet, it was the capacity 
of individuals to deal with their informal status, which allowed them to gain security of 
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tenure over time. It seemed that time and this agency affected the perception of a right to 
remain. People felt that they have the right to live there despite the fact of the informal land 
acquisition process. Besides, residents progressively built a sense of belonging, a right to 
their piece of land, and a voice to claim for the missing municipal services. Sometimes, 
agency allowed them to avoid legal consequences, especially when residents continued 
breaking the law openly, in addition to their illegal land occupation.  
 
For instance, it was often evident that they stole electricity from a nearby public lamppost 
or other electricity sources. Many cables were illegally connected despite the risks that this 
represented. One can follow the cables and identify the houses to which they were 
connected. Supervisors did not report these connections no matter how evident they were 
(Figure No. 81). Most informal areas visited have some municipal services introduced long 
before regularisation. This was illegal, as public investments cannot be channelled to 
informal areas. Yet, due to social and political issues, local authorities recognised that 
these investments were necessary.  
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Figure No. 81. Illegal electricity connections to a lamppost in Paso Hondo. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2009). 
 
Every household was different in terms of their interaction with local authorities. Yet, 
some presented common aspects at collective or neighbourhood levels. For instance, 
residents often managed to have one municipal service introduced due to their capacity to 
negotiate with the authority. This was usually either water or electricity. Regularisation 
was always the last step in every settlement and it seemed that it was not related to a 
priority defined by residents but that the authority was more interested to “municipalise” 
the areas once they had obtained all the services and infrastructure anyway. Residents 
knew that the introduction of any municipal service was a silent step towards public 
recognition and, most importantly, security of tenure. This was why residents considered 
these services a first goal in their process towards their security of land tenure.  
 
 209 
6.5.  Investment and security of tenure. 
 
The level of house investment is another aspect that incentivises the perception of security 
of tenure. People seemed to believe that the more they invest, the fewer the chances to be 
evicted. They received the recommendation from the ejidatario to build as soon as possible 
as a way to demonstrate possession or ownership. In Paso Hondo, it was found that as soon 
as people built a room, they write their names and an “address” on the outside wall for 
identification (Figure No. 82).  
 
 
Figure No. 82. The owner’s name and “address” on a wall in Paso Hondo. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2009). 
Note: Translation: “Plot: 225, Block: J, Name: XXX” [intentionally erased by me to 
preserve anonymity].  
 
Certainly, this does not give any legal tenure to residents. Yet, it allows them to “show” 
that the house has an owner that people can recognise. It showed also a sort of 
organisation, to the extent of providing an address, though, informal. It is not only a matter 
of building a room on the plot for shelter but it is also important for securing tenure issues. 
The room does not necessarily need to be built with permanent materials. In some places, 
rooms were built with scrap materials and they remained the same for many years. Yet, the 
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more consolidated the room, the better for the resident in terms of security perceptions. At 
collective level, arrival at a place where some rooms are already built provides newcomers 
with a sense of tenure security for their own. That settlers have not been evicted 
encourages newcomers to start their own house consolidation process with fewer worries.  
 
 
Figure No. 83. Electricity posts along unpaved streets in Paso Hondo. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003) 
 
Despite the security of tenure that progressive house investment implies in informal areas, 
this did not transform the informal dwelling into a more “marketable” asset. Some 
residents mentioned that their houses would be difficult to sell to potential buyers. One 
reason is the potential value of the house. LP–07 mentioned that the price would not be 
sufficient to buy another house in a new place if they decide to sell. ER–02 recognised that 
selling the house would be very difficult. Another reason is that some plots are still 
informal and owners have no titles. LP–02 said that nobody would ever buy his house 
without the land title. LP–03 explains his approach on the potential sale of the house as 
follows: 
   
“If you have the title, it [the house] is yours. If you want to sell, you fix the 
price… if they want [potential buyers] to buy it, that is OK”. LP–03.xxvii  
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Nevertheless, some residents believed that they would be able to sell their houses easier 
once they obtain the legal titles. However, they did not believe that their homes would 
reach a price to make the sale attractive. That means that they believed that the land title in 
itself would not necessarily increase the value of their dwellings. This makes titling 
unattractive in terms of the potential benefits to encourage a potential sale of their homes 
in the future. This is contradictory, since the informal area was an attractive option for 
them a few years ago in terms of its cost. In fact, the residents interviewed have lived there 
since they arrived and did not plan to sell or move elsewhere in the future. There is 
practically no mobility among residents of informal areas. No matter how far they can live 
from the places they work, they do not move easily.  
 
“Well… we are OK here. My mom says that probably later in the future [to 
sell the house]. Yet, she says that it is not of much value [the house]”. ER–
02.xxviii 
 
In summary, people invested in their homes to improve their living conditions. No 
economic drivers were found leading such investments, as people do not plan to sell their 
homes in the future, e.g., obtaining profits for a potential transaction. They regarded their 
houses as highly appreciated assets accomplished after many years of effort. Their houses 
are the goals rather than the means in terms of their investments. In many cases, anyway, 
residents did not believe that their houses have attained a value high enough to allow them 
to sell them and restart a better life in another place. The value of their homes is not 
necessarily related to an economic value but to a user value, a personal or family one. Most 
of them did not think they can “capitalise” the value of their homes.  
 
The house is a lengthy–dreamt goal attained through a process of an agency able to deal 
with an established structure that has been sufficiently tolerant, as to allow them to reach a 
certain level of house consolidation and, in most cases, land titles. If the house is supposed 
to be an asset able to help people overcome poverty, the informal residents interviewed did 
not consider this as an option in such enterprise. Figure No. 84 shows a small shop along 
the road in Los Pocitos; piles of brick lay aside waiting to be used to build additional 
rooms as a result of income generated in the shop.     
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Figure No. 84. A small shop on the road in Los Pocitos. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
6.6. Regularisation and security of tenure. 
 
Regularisation is an important step in the life of an informal settler. The process means 
different things at different stages for both the family and the settlement as a whole. 
Interviewees referred to the importance of regularisation at different times. For instance, 
regularisation is perceived differently in terms of security of tenure on arrival than to when 
people have spent many years in the settlement. Regularisation also relates to security of 
tenure’s various aspects. First, achieving a land title provides the head of household with a 
sense of having materialised a patrimony that will become an asset to leave to her/his 
children in the future. In this sense, security of tenure is inherited or transferred to children 
at some point. In this way, interviewees mentioned that they would be able to guarantee 
them a place with no further legal problems.  
 
“This is my house, my children’s, and my family’s. They will have a place to 
live when we die…” ER–06xxix 
 
In the second place, regularisation provided security to people to avoid eviction. This has 
been explained in previous chapters but it is also true in the visited informal settlements 
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that have gone through the process. Although, a real threat of eviction was not felt by 
residents, obtaining the land title finally represents the tangible security of tenure to 
residents. This security translated into different benefits. It allowed proceeding with home 
improvements with no further latent worries regarding eviction threats. Although, the 
majority of people built the house little by little despite the informal status of their land, 
regularisation freed them from any doubts.  
 
A third benefit of regularisation was to prevent potential claims from “previous” owners. 
Some interviewees, particularly in Los Pocitos, mentioned that some people claimed to be 
the original owner of the land. However, ejidatarios claimed that they had sold the land 
only once. In any case, this situation actually disappeared after the residents obtained the 
land title. With the title in hand, home improvements would rely on people’s capacity and 
no further legal issues would be involved besides those related to the regular construction 
permits that the authority issues to formal housing areas.  
 
A fourth effect of regularisation on security of tenure relates to the fact that people 
perceived that they finally obtained official recognition from the local authorities and the 
governments at all levels. They became “visible” to the authorities. In consequence, they 
obtained a legal address that identifies them more precisely. Now, they count on an official 
address that will help them participate in affairs the same as the rest of the citizens, i.e., 
casting their vote in elections. They are now entitled to receive official support from public 
programmes including those related to home improvements, which will help them speed up 
the consolidation process. This “visibility” also allows them to pursue the municipality for 
services still missing more quickly, as they are now officially part of the city.  
 
They become eligible for such services and public investment but achieving these would 
depend on their ability to negotiate for them through a new agency process under different 
conditions, of being a regularised settlement instead of an informal one. Yet, poverty is 
rampant among various residents visited. Figure No. 85 shows some boys and a girl 
searching for “something” they could use or sell in the street’s trash container. This is a 
common image in many places in the city; yet, seeing children naked and barefoot is often 
shocking.  
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Figure No.  85. Children picking up in the trash container in El Rocío. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
However, as the fieldwork indicates, most informal settlements had already obtained at 
least partial municipal services and regularisation was not necessarily a condition for 
obtaining them. Therefore, obtaining services was not an incentive for regularisation. 
Nevertheless, those missing services will be more achievable in the future due to the 
erasure of the informal status of the settlements. It was evident that the partial introduction 
of services contributed towards the security of tenure of residents over time. They were 
interpreted as a tacit recognition of the areas despite of their status.  
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Figure No. 86. Partial introduction of electricity in El Rocío. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
   
A fourth effect of regularisation on security of tenure was a sense of a more equalitarian 
status of previously informal settlers with respect to the rest of city residents. Some 
interviewees mentioned that they felt discriminated against because they lived in an 
informal settlement. In a city where zoning clearly locates the poor on the east and the rich 
on the north, living in an informal settlement leaves thousands in an even lower category 
from the previous two. This was the case in Soyatal, where residents believed that they 
were supposed to obtain the benefits of a sewage programme but it just benefited the 
neighbouring colonia up to the bordering street. The benefit did not reach them because, 
some claimed, the government discriminated against them.   
 
“I do not know… that street belongs to a different colonia. There, people 
“agitate” and we have been forgotten. Look, they [the government] came and 
introduced the sewage and the service that was supposedly to be for the 
whole of Norias [the ejido]. However, they believed we belonged to it, they 
introduced sewage works, but they did not reach here because they believed 
that this is informal land. This is Norias… they discriminated against us and 
did not install the sewage.” SO2–03xxx 
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Yet, it seemed that a new stage starts after regularisation, as this step could delay further 
support from public programmes. For instance, in comparing the housing conditions of 
dwellings visited during the two periods for this fieldwork, e.g., 2003 and 2010, the 
difference is hardly perceived. Figure No. 87 and No. 88 show a dwelling visited in 2003 
(left) and 2010 (right). The house has deteriorated on the outside, losing the former 
growing tree. Inside, now there is an electricity connection, and some walls have been 
replaced with brick instead of materials collected from the dumps and a concrete floor was 
installed.   
 
    
 Figure No. 87. Comparison of a dwelling in Los Pocitos 2003–2010. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003 and 2010). 
 
  
Figure No. 88. Comparison of a dwelling in Los Pocitos 2003–2010. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003 and 2010). 
 
In contrast, a dwelling visited in the same period in El Rocío, showed a depressing image. 
There were practically no improvements inside the house; in fact, this was highly 
deteriorated despite the fact that the interviewee mentioned had a good relationship with 
the local authorities. Certainly, sewage pipes had been inserted along the streets and 
sidewalks were found on the second visit, yet, those seemed the only visible 
improvements; they were none inside the house (see Figure No. 89).  
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Figure No. 89. Comparison of a dwelling visited in El Rocío 2003–2010. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003 and 2010). 
 
The same was observed in the dwelling visited in Cumbres III. Home improvements were 
at a minimum. Services had not been introduced by the second visit and only a bathroom 
had been built and some interior walls plastered (Figure No. 90). The change in the legal 
status of the three dwellings compared meant nothing to residents in terms of the intended 
benefits resulting from this process. The three residents interviewed mentioned no support 
from local authorities to continue improving their homes.  
 
  
Figure No. 90. Comparison of a dwelling visited in Cumbres III 2003–2010.  
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003 and 2010). 
 
The fifth effect of regularisation on security of tenure detected was that people felt that the 
government would no longer trouble them. Although no explicit mention was made of 
direct corruption of local authorities, this is implied in terms of the fringe benefits that 
some interviewees mentioned to have been obtained only because they were “close” to 
some politicians or authorities. Some people did complain about the differentiation made 
between those “closer” to these actors than those who were not. Some even mentioned that 
they did not have access to any sort of information about the possibilities of regularisation, 
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construction, and other procedures they requested in local public offices simply because 
they were informal residents. With the titles in hand, people felt that they would have 
access to the information from public officers about further affairs. Figure No. 91 shows 
people waiting inside the city hall to talk with local authorities to apply for building 
materials. This scheme has been implemented by the municipal government and takes 
place every Wednesday morning. Top ranked officials must receive a number of people to 
try solving their problems directly (called the Citizen’ Wednesday).  
 
   
Figure No.  91. Residents waiting for an interview with local authorities. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003 and 2014). 
 
Consequently, informal residents believed that the relationship with the government 
actually changed after regularisation. People feel that they would have more “rights” 
simply because they now paid land taxes –though very low. Among these rights is that of 
protection, as many complained about the vandalism and gangs that keep making trouble in 
these settlements. People thought that a formal settlement would have more access to the 
police safeguarding the areas. This was not necessarily the case as these problems 
continued in areas regularised before. Security problems related more to aspects other than 
the legal status of land.  
 
Paying land taxes encouraged people to demand policing from the local authorities but this 
was not actually a direct effect of regularisation, as it did not imply the eradication of 
violence, vulnerability, or even less problems with local gangs in the colonias. Actually, 
some residents mentioned that it is very rare to see a police car patrolling their colonias. It 
seemed that regularisation is not directly related to the security of residents in those terms. 
It is in fact related to security of tenure but high levels of individual and property insecurity 
and violence deserve to be more accurately analysed in the future as to assess their effects 
on the security of tenure and, eventually, the value of the houses.  
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 Figure No.  92. A highly protected dwelling from intruders in Los Pocitos. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003) 
 
A sixth effect of regularisation and its process is the role played by women all throughout. 
Although the men played an important role as providers of many of the needs detected in 
the households, women played a highly relevant role as well. Most women not only helped 
build the house and contributed to the family expenses, but they were also in charge of the 
regularisation process by dealing with the authorities in charge. The women participated in 
the meetings, filled the application forms, lobbied, and went through a number of activities 
that finally led to the regularisation of the plots. Most men interviewed mentioned that the 
wife was more actively involved in the process than they were. The women were more able 
to name the officials and offices involved in the process than men were. This active role 
was more obvious among female–headed households as some cases in Los Pocitos and El 
Rocío. Women built a constructive relationship with city council members, politicians 
running for elections, and with those already in power. They have demonstrated their 
ability in lobbying and accomplishing the goal of regularisation. Regularisation is a major 
issue in terms of gender. In addition, this is a theme requiring a more in–depth research in 
the future.  
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“If there was a meeting, the women... If we needed to go to request 
something, the women…” ER–04xxxi 
 
A seventh effect of regularisation on security of tenure is one that seemed to be more 
obvious. This is that people felt actually more secure living there and that eviction in the 
future is unlikely because they had obtained their land titles. However, this differs from 
those living in a formal area still paying for their mortgage. Although a formal resident has 
legal status for a piece of land or a house, the volatile economic situation of low–income 
earners makes it difficult to cope with payments and, therefore, defaulting on the mortgage 
is always a possibility. While flexibility is not a feature of formal mortgages according to 
interviewees, most informal settlers transited through a flexible payment scheme where 
defaulting would be very difficult to a regularisation process at a point when most of them 
had already paid for their plot.  
 
Therefore, obtaining the land title actually provided them with a sort of closure to a long 
process that meant mostly a final recognition of their existence and of their rights to remain 
in the place that was so hard to accomplish over many years. Although a real threat of 
eviction never occurred, most residents felt a sense of relief after the land title was issued. 
However, it did not mean that they perceived a higher value of their plots and houses but 
that they would be able to use their asset in case of an emergency.  
 
“… his son is dying… he [the owner] pawned the land title. He still owes one 
thousand [pesos]. It is not very much, but the title is still in the pawn. He says 
that he is about to recover it but without a job…” ER–01xxxii 
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Figure No. 93. The gas cylinders for cooking in a dwelling in Jaltomate. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
The way the land title was regarded differed. For some residents, the land title would 
secure the existence of a property for the children in the future. For others, an immediate 
benefit can be obtained as in the case explained above. It is particularly interesting to 
observe that some residents did not perceive any benefits from regularisation. In fact, LP–
02 was a resident that had lived in the settlement for many years. He was probably one of 
the first settlers in the area. Yet, after so many years living informally and eventually 
having obtained the title, he did not perceive benefits. This might be because most of the 
potential benefits of regularisation were obtained before it. Once land titles were obtained, 
they did not need most of the services that more recent settlers requested but for a shorter 
period.  
 
“This is a security. No more… one is always worried about not being regular. 
What will happen if they had taken this from us? They had told us that if we 
built they would demolish it. We were going to lose anyway. They told us 
“you build at your own risk”. In the meantime, however, I would live here 
two or three years! I see no benefits because I do not even have what I need. 
What is the point?” LP–02xxxiii 
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Finally, an important effect of regularisation on security of tenure is that residents are now 
more confident about a further transaction of their assets. They are now able to sell their 
homes at any time with no further formal issues involved. Yet, the large majority of 
interviewees did not plan to sell the house in the future. However, it is necessary to 
recognise that the informal status of land was not an obstacle to selling the house before, 
but what is relevant at this point is the freedom to sell “within” the law. Because of 
regularisation, some settlements are under pressure from interested parties to buy the land. 
This was quite evident in Los Pocitos as this is located on the borders of fancy residential 
areas (below).  
 
 
Figure No. 94. A sign publicising “exclusive plots” 60 meters in Los Pocitos. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
However, due to the subdivision of the land into plots, this became more difficult than 
simply buying hectares from an ejido. Developers have shown interest in buying in this 
informal settlement and regularisation has provided residents with the possibility to pursue 
this if they want. Yet, LP–05 shows what many residents believed about this possibility as 
follows: 
 
“No, but I know that some people have been asked to sell. Do you think so? 
We are all very poor. We made all this with sacrifice and effort to build a 
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roof. Do you actually think that they will sell? They will buy nothing with the 
money they would get.” LP–05.xxxiv 
 
The accomplishment of a consolidated house with a land title is highly appreciated by 
residents who are unlikely to sell their houses in the future. The argued benefits of 
inserting the regularised land into a formal market, as a way to help the poor overcome 
poverty is still untested, as many people did not even think of this as a possibility. It is 
necessary to accompany this process with other aspects if this theory is to be regarded as 
widely assertive in cases such as those included in this fieldwork. Despite of any effect of 
regularisation in these areas, poverty prevails in many cases (see Figure No. 95).  
 
 
Figure No. 95. A boy walks naked on unpaved streets in El Rocío. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
6.7. Risk and security of tenure. 
 
Throughout the process of achieving housing, including the regularisation stage, risk 
stands as a factor driving people’s decisions. The risk materialises in a different way at the 
beginning of the process than at the final stage of home consolidation or even during the 
regularisation process. It seemed that many residents learnt how to live with risk on an 
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everyday basis. However, the result was very similar among informal residents of different 
settlements. No evictions were reported in the areas visited and in others informal areas in 
the city. This may be a starting point of regarding a potential risk in comparison to what 
happens in reality. The risk of eviction was more related to an eventual defaulting of 
payments to ejidatarios than to a demolition ordered by the local authorities or an eviction 
from them. The risk perceived from the local authorities intervening in the settlement was 
very low. This means that residents never referred to a real threat of eviction promoted by 
the government. The risks associated with the transactions with ejidatarios were low as 
well. With these two risks in mind, it seemed that buying a piece of land in an ejido will be 
regarded as “safe” to many for years as these areas have been progressively occupied 
informally without any consequences for either the ejidatarios who sold land or the buyers 
who  obtained them. In fact, ejidos remained as the factor that addressed the lack of land 
within the grasp of the very poor by providing a feasible option for them to obtain a piece 
of land.  
 
“Sometimes they came to close the constructions down… but, it never 
happened to us. It happens elsewhere many times. It did not happen here 
either because they did not find us or they could not get inside the house.” 
LP–02.xxxv 
 
In summary, ejido land will remain as an attractive place for many. These will eventually 
be transformed into large regularised areas surrounding the city of Aguascalientes. The 
closer the ejido to the city, the more attractive they are to newcomers and to the urban 
poor. In such cases, buying land in ejidos did not represent a risk for the buyers at all in 
general terms. From the beginning, buying a plot in an ejido was perceived as a very low 
risk transaction. This in fact benefited many of the urban poor who found ejidos as the 
place to start a lengthy process of home consolidation. 
 
6.8. Conclusions. 
 
This section revealed the importance of the role played by agency and structure in the life 
of informal residents regarding their efforts to achieve consolidated housing. They 
implemented creative strategies to deal with public bodies, exercising agency, which, at the 
same time, were unable to enforce land legislation to prevent the formation and 
consolidation of the areas they occupied. The result seemed to be a “tolerated” informal 
land market, or structure, benefiting both, the urban poor who accessed land at cheaper 
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costs, and the local authorities who have been unable to promote housing options for the 
very poor. Their participation has been limited to promote regularisation programmes, 
especially to the areas already absorbed by the urban sprawl. The urban poor have been 
able to interpret such a convenient environment in ways that have allowed them to reach 
consolidated housing in most cases. The role played by ejidos in this equation has been a 
key in the chances of incorporating land within an unclear legal setting where nobody is 
unable to enforce the law.  
 
Local public bodies have seen their capacity to deal with the problem of housing thousands 
of the urban poor in search of shelter eroded. The city has reacted to land speculators and 
urban planners have shaped city plans accordingly. In a city–state such as Aguascalientes, 
which concentrates most of the public spending and contains the majority of the region’s 
population, the problem of urban sprawl will be evident in the coming years. The arrival of 
new factories, such as the second Nissan plant, will represent new challenges not only to 
accommodate potential jobseekers in the city, but also to provide the opportunities to many 
of the unemployed already living there. The current city plans were under review at the end 
of 2012 and the location of the new Nissan plant seemed to have a key influence in the new 
city layout. Unfortunately, this plan was not ready for publication before this dissertation’s 
submission date.   
 
Structural factors are much more to do with the underlying conditions of economic 
relationships, i.e. they produce the income inequality and poverty that creates this 
segmented and segregated society. It is into this situation that the agency relationships 
emerge and these are sustained. Moreover, structure and agency may play a mutually 
constitutive relationship. The challenge of housing the poor needed to be assessed also 
under the perspective of those who, being poor, worked in the formal sector. Although, 
they faced similar conditions in terms of income levels and restrictions, their options for 
achieving a consolidated housing were different and these will be revealed in the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7. LAND TENURE AND FORMAL HOUSING. 
 
7.1. Introduction. 
 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. First, it scrutinises the views of the poor who 
chose the formal path towards housing, their agency capacity and the structure within they 
struggle to house their families. The idea of formal housing markets serving as drivers for 
capital accumulation and, consequently, an exit to poverty has been most vociferously 
expounded by De Soto (1989: 47–62; 2001: 47). Here, formal residents in the sampled 
areas in Aguascalientes and interviewees assessed the soundness of the formal housing 
sector as an enabler for the improvement of the housing conditions of the urban poor. The 
experiences of formal residents exemplified whether the value of their assets, i.e., the land 
of the house, was “revealed” in the way De Soto claimed (1989: 47). Those assumptions 
may have influenced the opinions and shaped the way local authorities and/or the experts 
approach the problem of housing the urban poor. That, as a second objective of this 
chapter, aims to analyse the set of rules, policies, and the market–oriented environment, the 
structure in which the poor attempted to achieve consolidated formal housing. The 
interviewees selected were: 
 
 Group No. 1. Officials from relevant government offices: 
The federal representative of the National Land Tenure Regularisation Office –
COR. 
The federal representative of INFONAVIT –INF. 
The director of the State Housing Institute–IVE. 
The director of the State’s Urban Development Office –SDU.  
The state secretary of the Social Development Agency –SED. 
The director of the Municipal Housing Institute–IMU. 
 Group No. 2. Political actors: 
The leader of the right–wing party at local level–RWP. 
The leader of the left–wing party at local level–LWP. 
 Group No. 3. Experts: 
The senior manager of the first private micro–credit housing agency locally funded 
in Aguascalientes –MFH; and  
An urban development expert –UDE.  
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I selected these interviewees for holding the top rank in their corresponding organisations. 
The interviews provided the insights of the key agents that were at the foremost of the 
policies’ design and implementation processes. They provided valuable data regarding the 
reasons behind the policies implemented and of their impact on the urban poor. In addition, 
they helped build the frame in which policies matched the reality expressed by the formal 
residents interviewed.  
 
This study is aware of the potential bias of interviewees. For instance, most of those in 
Group No. 1 and No. 2 had a political background. Often, to attain a position of this sort, 
individuals must belong to the political party in power, i.e., the federal government 
appoints the state representatives and the municipal/state top ranked officials are appointed 
by the Major based on his/her political party of origin. For instance, the federal 
government and its delegates were of the same party, the right–wing party, at the time of 
the fieldwork. Nevertheless, most of them had professional qualifications in law, business 
administration, or architecture.  
 
7.2. Agency and structure. 
 
The first analysis refers to the role of agency and structure in accessing formal housing 
among the urban poor. It refers to both the relationship built between the urban poor and 
local authorities and the whole set of tangible and intangible rules functioning around 
them. The structure is composed of the set of governing rules of the formal housing 
market, including the institutional framework, the social, economic, and regulatory forces, 
and how all these interacted (Giddens 1984: 17; Perkins et al 2008: 35; and Walmsley and 
Lewis 1993: 181). Formal residents’ agency faced different challenges in contrast to that of 
the informal. Firstly, formal residents’ agency concerned having the choice to pursue this 
path, which implicated their ability to cope with the requirements defined by the ruling 
structure to be eligible to formal support. This depended on their ability, for instance, to 
push themselves to comply with these requirements. The formal procedures hardly 
changed or evolved according to people’s experiences. They will change only when those 
in charge of implementing such procedures decided. It is not the urban poor who decide 
when or what.  
 
For instance, applicants to INFONAVIT depended only on a points system implemented 
by the organisation to decide their eligibility. Also, applicants to the local housing institute 
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depended not only on their ability to save the money sufficient to cope with the down 
payment but also to be lucky enough in the draw for housing units amongst those who have 
successfully met the requirements too. Agency was limited in this sense. They had to 
follow the rules. There was no space for negotiations in order to “adjust” the mortgage to 
the applicants’ capacity. Applicants to housing programmes/funds built temporary agency 
processes with the official in charge the day when the individual attended the office. These 
were not personal relationships as the housing agencies might rotate the employees 
attending applicants. The process is impersonal and so very difficult to build up a 
relationship.  
  
The ability to cope with requirements and procedures depended on individual agency, only 
Palomino Dena residents submitted a group application with the help of a political party 
who arranged everything with the housing institute on behalf of the beneficiaries, assuming 
agency. In this case, the residents’ agency depended on the political party rather than on 
the housing body. The result was the allocation of plots to the group of the party’s 
followers. They occupied their plots by a formal process. Yet, the consolidation process 
followed an informal one. None of the extensions built followed a formal procedure, as 
residents did not apply for a permit of any sort. Yet, the authority did not issue any fines 
despite the breach of rules in the construction. Their behaviour was the same as informal 
settlers, as the improvements’ stage tested their agency capacity. The difference was only 
in the way they accessed a piece of land. The rest was the same.  
 
As formal housing settlements had all the municipal services introduced from the 
beginning, there was no need for residents to organise to achieve them. In this sense, 
formal areas were less cohesive in terms of community agency and relied more on 
individual efforts to obtain what each family considered to be worth enough to deal with 
local authorities, i.e., access to building materials programmes for home extensions. In 
fact, politicians in search of electoral support seemed to approach formal areas differently. 
As residents were not “desperate” to obtain the basic services, their offers were more 
related to complement missing facilities in neighbourhoods, such as parks, green areas, or 
the improvement of services already in place.  
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Figure No. 96. A view of a formal housing area under construction. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
In summary, relationships between agents remained important to be able to cope with the 
requirements imposed by formal housing within the institutional framework. Yet, it was 
constrained in aspects that left no room for widening people’s options. This framework 
restricted the process, which often left the urban poor with fewer options than those in the 
informal sector. Giddens’ arguments may be contested regarding the way agency and 
structure interact to an extent that it can be undistinguishable whether the environment 
shapes people’s actions or these shape the environment (Giddens 1984: 19), at least, in the 
way the structure would move towards constructing a more enabling pro–poor 
environment.  
 
Figure No. 97 shows how few houses had been expanded vertically in an informal 
settlement after some years of arrival. For many, direct some investment towards housing 
improvements is difficult, prioritising the mortgage payments before home extensions.  
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Figure No. 97. A view of formal settlements in the East side of the city.  
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
7.3. Transactions and security of tenure. 
 
In the formal housing sector, the agency process directed to achieve a consolidated home 
played a key role when individuals applied for a mortgage from either a public or a private 
housing fund. Formal workers must apply to the fund they contribute to, i.e., INFONAVIT 
or FOVISSSSTE. Those without formal jobs or earning too low to contribute to these 
funds must apply for a mortgage from the local housing institute. Usually, the process took 
many months or even years depending on their eligibility. Thus, people will try to find the 
place where the transaction would be safer and that provides for more security of tenure.  
 
Yet, due to economic circumstances, a greater challenge may be to keep paying the 
mortgage over its duration. By doing so, security of tenure can be built progressively over 
time. This often depended on people’s ability to keep a job that paid sufficient to cope with 
their payments. Building an extension, or improving the house did not necessarily provide 
a greater sense of security of tenure. No matter how consolidated a house might be, i.e., 
through building home extensions, the house was not secure until the mortgage was paid. 
However, this was not easy. Some found it even difficult to complete the six–month 
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savings period required to be eligible for a mortgage from the local housing body. Others 
often found it difficult to pay their monthly instalments and frequently needed to have a 
second job to cope with their financial commitments.  
 
“Well, we tried to get the money that the IVEA required, the down payment 
on the house… well, working and trying to find another business, as you can 
see, in order to pay the monthly instalments.” VC–02xxxvi 
 
The six–month savings period required by the local housing institute provided an insight 
into the role of a restrictive element within an institutional structure. The IVE official said 
that the idea was to force people “to learn” that they have a responsibility to pay every 
month. Once they proved able to save for a six–month period, they became eligible for a 
mortgage. This “training” period was far from the traditional ways through which the 
urban poor dealt with their housing needs, which did not necessarily involve money. If 
applicants failed to make payments in the savings period, the institute penalised them and 
they were not refunded.  
 
 
Figure No.  98. A dwelling visited in Palomino Dena. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
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In terms of the perceived security of tenure, formal residents faced potential difficulties 
differently from their informal counterparts. For instance, formal housing bodies were 
more willing to enforce payments through legal means. The penalties were explicitly 
included in the contracts and residents knew the consequences of defaulting. The security 
of tenure was more a fluctuating issue associated with the process and only achieved at the 
end of the mortgage whilst, in informal areas, it seemed to be part of people’s lives from 
the beginning. As enforcement is different in either place, formal dwellers learnt how to 
live with the fact that defaulting is always a possibility and, thus, a risk. Nevertheless, 
many dwellers faced some difficult times when national economic crises hit the country in 
1995 and 2007. Some were at risk of losing their jobs and eventually defaulting on their 
mortgages. However, none of the interviewees specifically referred to these crises as an 
event that disrupted their mortgage payments.  
 
Most formal dwellers considered their houses as expensive. This was particularly 
interesting as one might expect that people would buy a place to live where costs were 
more accessible. However, residents repeatedly mentioned that their houses were costly. 
MO–01, MO–02, and PD–02 claimed that: 
 
“If I could, yes [apply for a credit], if they were not such thieves. The houses 
are so expensive and you never end paying for them”. MO–01xxxvii 
 
“…the most expensive… [It] is the house, which now drives me crazy. The 
one that my husband bought in INFONAVIT…” MO–02xxxviii 
 
“In fact, I think that the government must define a mediator between the 
workers and the [housing] developers because, in reality, I think the houses 
are very, very expensive, the INFONAVIT ones, compared to what they are 
really worth.” PD–02xxxix 
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Figure No. 99. A dwelling visited in Guadalupe Peralta. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
This perception was that formal housing was unattainable. This coincided with what 
informal residents also mentioned regarding how expensive a mortgage can be. This 
became a key barrier for many applying. Some people regretted having chosen a house 
through the formal way. It seemed that they did not visualise clearly the mortgage scheme. 
Others have seen their conditions change over time and found it difficult to keep on track. 
The analysis carried out by the housing bodies to evaluate their eligibility is valid only at 
the time of their applications. Yet, individuals’ conditions changed, the mortgage remained 
the same.  
 
Another key aspect was the alleged potential of legal tenure to “unlock” the value of 
properties. The fact that most people were still paying for their mortgages prevented them 
from selling the house. On one hand, they felt they needed to end paying for it before they 
could think about selling it. People did not feel wealthier. The transfer of mortgages to 
others was not found in the fieldwork. People could sell the house only if they cleared the 
debt before the financial body. The owner could transfer the debt to a new owner in theory 
but it meant losses to the original owner who needed to consider the outstanding balance of 
their mortgage and the associated costs of r the transfer, such as with the property registry.  
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Figure No. 100. A view of Guadalupe Peralta housing modules development. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
Before considering a formal house marketable, people preferred to complete their 
mortgage. On the other hand, people feared the red tape that a transfer might represent. 
Consequently, this limited the possibilities to use the asset as a means to capitalise 
residents. Recently, INFONAVIT, for instance, implemented a second–mortgage scheme 
in which people could access a second mortgage but INFONAVIT had not implemented it 
at the time of the fieldwork. There was a contradiction between the formal and the informal 
areas. Whilst informal residents kept thinking that once they obtained the title they would 
sell the house more easily, formal residents did not consider selling their houses despite the 
fact that they already had legal possession of their asset.  
 
Both formal and informal residents were “locked” in terms of their assets’ marketability. 
The title did not necessarily play in favour of either resident. The land title was not a driver 
for formal residents to obtain the benefits of living in a formal area. Nobody mentioned the 
intention to sell his or her house after the mortgage period ended. In summary, residents 
did not see formal housing as an opportunity to “unlock” the property value that this sort of 
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tenure represented. It was still “locked” in De Soto’s terms and other factors would be 
required to “unlock” properties values.  
 
7.4. Living in a formal housing development. 
 
Formal residents perceived security of tenure different at the various house consolidation 
stages. As formal housing projects included –at least– one room from the beginning, the 
challenge was not to attain an immediate shelter to stay overnight at this initial stage, as 
was the case for informal settlers. Local regulations forced formal housing developers to 
include, at least, a one–room unit supplied with infrastructure and public services from the 
beginning. Yet, the characteristics of the housing units have changed over time. For 
instance, the Guadalupe Peralta housing project offered a housing module to buyers. 
Morelos and Ojocaliente offered a two–bedroom house with a living/dining room, a 
kitchen, and a bathroom. Valle de los Cactus offered a one–room unit with living/dining 
room, an I–shape kitchen, and a bathroom, and followed a condominium administration 
where residents share common spaces and pay a maintenance fee. The rest of the sampled 
areas did not follow this type of administration.  
 
The Palomino Dena project exclusively sold plots with no housing modules and no public 
services, the only case of a sites–and–no services housing public project in the city. It was 
a special case in terms of its creation, as the party in the power promoted the settlement 
and arranged everything with the housing institute. Evidently, these residents mentioned 
that accessing land was easier than expected. However, conditions were difficult in the first 
stage. The settlement was located far from the existing urban area and public services only 
arrived some years later. Although the initial stage was difficult, it took residents less time 
to achieve public services than the sampled informal areas. The only requirement to access 
a piece of land in Palomino Dena was a commitment to the party promoting it and their 
electoral support in further campaigns. This provided a sense of tenure security to residents 
because that party had been in power for decades and people expected it to continue ruling. 
This apparatus contributed to the sense of security of tenure among residents and, in fact, 
none of the interviewees reported any threat of eviction.  
 
In Ojocaliente and Morelos, the initial stage of occupation was different. Ojocaliente was 
one of the largest low–income housing projects built so far for local formal workers. Most 
of its residents were INEGI’s employees relocated from Mexico City after the earthquake 
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in 1985. According to some neighbours, some of these original residents decided to return 
to the capital a few years later or after retirement. Its occupants are now from diverse 
origins. Ojocaliente followed a more “traditional” occupation path according to 
INFONAVIT’s rules for mortgages.  
 
Another key aspect was that formal dwellers occupied their house on an individual basis 
with no previous knowledge of neighbours. This was different from some informal 
dwellers that sometimes knew or belonged to an ejidatario family. The process of home 
occupation and mortgage application was an individual effort to cover the requirements of 
the corresponding housing bodies. No sense of neighbour support was present at this initial 
stage. In addition, the process of home acquisition was “institutional” which means that an 
“intangible” individual was in charge of processing the application and this could not be 
personalised in the same way as in ejidos with landowners. Furthermore, none of the 
formal residents mentioned that they have been under pressure to sell their homes to 
potential buyers who had any special interest in their homes, as happened in Los Pocitos 
for instance.  
 
The original owner in most cases inhabited the sampled formal areas. In this sense, 
mobility was nil despite the fact that residents in Morelos, Ojocaliente, and Palomino Dena 
had completed their mortgages. This meant that people did not sell their homes once they 
had finished payments. Legal tenure did not “reveal” the value of homes to improve the 
living conditions of their residents. Residents in Guadalupe Peralta and Valle de los Cactus 
were still paying for their mortgages but they did not mention having expectations of 
selling their houses afterwards. In this sense, residents perceived their houses as a goal. 
They did not expect to use it as a platform to pursue a new/second mortgage either to 
improve their current housing conditions, or to move to another location. Their houses 
seemed to be an “ultimate” goal in terms of achieving shelter for their families, which 
barred search for opportunities elsewhere because they seemed to  cling to the same place 
for their whole lives. Accessing the mortgage seemed to be a lengthy expected goal that 
people are not willing to put at risk.   
 
“…we are not willing to do it again [apply for a credit] because one never 
finishes paying for it”. GP–02.xl 
 
Another stage in the security of tenure process was when residents make home extensions 
or improvements. These modifications depended on their needs, wants, and their capacity 
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to accomplish them. For instance, people faced difficulties to invest in home improvements 
when they have to pay for the mortgage at the same time. Residents need to plan this 
double spending very carefully. Thus, formal housing improvements often went through 
processes similar to their informal counterparts. Some formal residents made home 
improvements or home extensions through self–help. This resulted in a mix of formal and 
informal processes in the same place and at the same time. On one hand, people timely 
paid their mortgage whilst, on the other hand, they implemented informal strategies to cope 
with their needs for more space and better housing conditions. Thus, none of the residents 
had requested a loan for home improvements. They seemed to have enough with their 
mortgages. Some mentioned that they needed and would want to have access to a second 
housing credit to make home improvements but they will not apply for it. People cannot 
wait until they finish paying their mortgage to start investing in home improvements; they 
needed to do them in parallel.  
 
A formal resident can be, at the same time, an informal builder. For instance, GP–02 was 
building some home improvements. The materials and the construction followed the same 
process of home improvements as in informal areas. The family saved as much money as 
they could to buy building materials and followed a “traditional” self–help process within a 
formal house. Formal dwellers could hardly receive building materials from public 
programmes simply because they were poor, as reported in the sample informal areas. The 
“formal” urban poor received a different treatment than those, also poor, living in informal 
areas.  
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Figure No.  101. A formal housing/ informal builder in Guadalupe Peralta. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
The role played by women in the process of formal home acquisition was also a little bit 
different from its informal counterpart. Most heads of households were men and the 
mortgages were under their names. Women headed only two households, VC–01 and VC–
02. Yet, their role became more prominent during home improvements as they participated 
in the same way women did in informal settlements. All the dwellings visited had 
modifications, except for Valle de los Cactus, maybe, due to its condominium–like rules. 
Residents had extended their homes with some rooms, exterior fences or walls, or small 
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front shops for groceries in Guadalupe Peralta, Morelos, Ojocaliente, and Palomino Dena, 
i.e., MO–02 and PD–03. In these two last cases, women ran these small shops as a way to 
generate additional income. As for VC–01, the female spouse contributed to home 
improvements by participating in a tanda to save some money to buy building materials as 
follows: 
 
“I use to participate in tandas. I participate in a 50 pesos tanda every week 
and I get 500 pesos. I buy concrete blocks, save them and then, I participate 
in a new tanda again. After, the cement. I then, participate in another one. 
That way, little by little.” VC–01xli 
 
 
Figure No.  102. Decoration of a dwelling visited in Guadalupe Peralta. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2010). 
 
The role played by women was useful in terms of their contribution to the household’ 
resources’ management, or in incrementing the household´s income to cope with the 
mortgage, or to make investments in home improvements. Their participation is crucial in 
attaining better living conditions since the majority of men were busy working elsewhere.  
 
7.5. The perceived security of tenure in formal settlements. 
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An important difference between formal and informal land tenure was that the formal 
residents regarded it as the objective whilst informal tenure was a means to attain a 
consolidated dwelling. For formal settlers, security of tenure depended on them only, as 
long as they did not default with their mortgage. There was no evidence of frauds with the 
sale of houses and people knew who sold their houses and to whom they owed their 
mortgage. Formal residents were “visible” to local authorities. They “existed” from the 
beginning and their sense of citizenship was no different with respect to other city 
inhabitants. However, this put them in a disadvantageous position since they were not a 
priority for the local government who, in theory, attempted to serve areas that were more 
deprived. Since formal settlements counted on municipal services, local authorities would 
not do more than their regular provision. It did not necessarily mean that the formal areas 
visited did not have anything to improve. On the contrary, these are areas built with the 
minimum construction standards to keep prices low, and so required constant maintenance 
of streets and sidewalks, public lighting, and public spaces  
 
“Everything was built when I arrived: water service, some rooms with 
electricity, public lighting, and the trash containers arrived around those 
days… we had all those services”. VC–01.xlii 
 
Some interviewees felt that areas inhabited by higher–income earners received more 
attention from local authorities. Some claimed that they did not receive the same level of 
services simply because they were poor, building a sense of a non–egalitarian community. 
For instance, some of the fraccionamientos visited presented the highest rates of violence 
and crime in the city. Thus, the majority of people mentioned that the most important 
service they required was to reinforce police surveillance. Most people would like to see 
this problem solved. These areas presented also the highest levels of illiteracy, 
unemployment, and crime. In this sense, the residents and the authority needed to build a 
strong relationship to deal with the social issues.  
  
“Well, [feeling] isolated… too much violence and insecurity [in the 
neighbourhood].” OJ–01.xliii 
 
Often, residents focused more on social aspects rather than in the improvement of housing 
conditions. This was also a difference between formal and informal areas. The former 
focuses on issues others than housing conditions whilst the latter deals with both. This 
makes improvement of living conditions more difficult among informal residents.   
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The role played by women in formal areas is as important as that in informal ones. 
Although there are less women heads of households in formal areas, they played a relevant 
role in making home improvements. They not only helped saving some money through 
tandas but also participated in self–help construction tasks. For instance, in both formal 
and informal areas visited some women sell candies in their homes as a way to make some 
income for their families (Figure No. 103 and Figure No.78). Their role is similar in formal 
and informal areas and they have proved to be decisive agents in attaining better living 
conditions. Yet, education levels are similar in both formal and informal female residents 
participating in the interviews; their role within the household is also similar and it seemed 
that changes would be difficult to expect in the near future with this regard.  
 
 
Figure No.  103. A woman selling candies in Valle de los Cactus. 
Source: Carlos Hernandez–Velasco (2003). 
 
7.6. The role of local authorities in housing the poor.  
 
The roles played by the authorities and their perceptions about housing the poor were 
central to the problems observed. The key discussion focused on the way these 
organisations defined an informal settlement. Most of them focused on the legal aspect of 
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informality, defining an informal settlement as the failure to comply with the legal 
framework. RWP, the right–wing party leader, stated a more radical position: 
 
“I believed that the informal settlements should not exist.” RWPxliv 
 
RWP considered informality as a synonymous to illegality and implies that it should be 
eradicated. Meanwhile, SDU, the state’s urban development director, claimed that a 
definition of an informal settlement did not exist in local regulations. These included only 
procedures about how the authority must deal with them but did not contain a definition. 
SDU also followed a judicial approach to the problem. He had been in charge of the 
application and modifications of the State’s Urban Code as part of his duties. However, a 
definition was actually spotted in the Code. Yet, here was a worrying situation, as a local 
authority must know the regulations they apply. The State Urban Code (2007: 225) defined 
an informal settlement as:  
 
“ARTICLE 581. For the purposes of this Code, the informal human 
settlements term refers to the communities located within areas fractioned or 
subdivided without the corresponding authorisation, regardless of their land 
tenure system.”xlv 
 
In addition, COR, the federal regularisation office representative also follows a legal–
oriented approach to informal settlements when claiming that:  
 
“Informality is illegality.” CORxlvi 
 
COR claims that informality and informal buyers and sellers must be prosecuted. Such 
attitudes made it difficult for informal residents to approach the authority to improve or 
legalise their informal condition. Moreover, if this was true, the authorities were also 
breaking the rules by channelling public funds to informal –thus illegal– areas in the form 
of social programmes, including upgrading schemes, introduction of basic services, and 
infrastructure. SED, the social development secretary, recognised that the authorities break 
the rules that they attempt to enforce: 
 
“… The government puts money in those informal human settlements often 
breaking the criminal legislation that prohibits governments to put money in 
informal human settlements.” SEDxlvii 
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This contradictory behaviour was also evident when the federal government installed a 
national agency to regularise informal human settlements, which, to an extent, would also 
be a way of channelling public funds to “illegal” causes. This would remain controversial 
as it may be interpreted as an “exit” for informal residents and, often, as a driver for the 
creation of new ones. In the end, informal residents would always be able to apply to a 
regularisation programme under such approaches. Local authorities had a similar 
viewpoint, claiming that informality could be defined as a way of living. As COR claimed 
“a sort of culture or subculture”. SED claimed also that informality was a: 
 
“…Mexican idiosyncrasy… it seems that we love to buy what is prohibited.” 
SEDxlviii 
 
This approach to informality seemed to remain during the entire process of home 
consolidation. UDE, the urban development expert, claimed that people actually preferred 
to remain informal, as this was a way to escape the burden of land taxes. As most informal 
residents believed that, the authority would introduce the municipal services anyway at 
some point. It seemed that “forcing” a regularisation process simply did not make any 
sense. On the contrary, it would put them in a position that would require the compliance 
with, for instance, taxes that they have not been paying for years.  
 
UDE said that informal residents avoid “getting married with land taxes” as much as 
possible and that informal residents are a force that can be used on occasion, such as in 
public protests. He claimed that people under similar circumstances would help each other 
in case of problems, especially with the authorities. However, this did not necessarily 
reflect what was found in the fieldwork. Informal residents showed a more individual 
approach towards their personal circumstances and their relationship with the authority, in 
particular with respect to their willingness for their possessions to be regularised.  
 
In terms of this “culture of informality”, interviewees agreed on the way the urban poor 
“prefer” to save. Some claimed that, as part of this culture, the urban poor prefer to invest 
in land and housing as much as they can. As their money is limited, they prefer to put it in 
the house as they feel this is the safest way to see their efforts materialise, without paying 
too much attention to the legal protection of such an investment. UDE claimed that: 
 
“The Mexican mentality regarding savings is through real estate… the house 
is the patrimony for the whole life and even for the coming generations.” 
UDExlix 
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Most interviewees agreed on two important drivers for the creation of informal areas. The 
first was the incapacity of formal institutions –the structure– to cope with the demand of 
the poor for housing. The second was the “attractiveness” of informal land supplies more 
accordingly to the needs, wants, and perceptions of the poor –where they can exercise their 
agency. As for the institutional capacity, most interviewees recognised a lack of a political 
framework effective enough to cope with an increasing demand for housing for the urban 
poor. This incapacity dealt not only with that related to provide for the demand itself but 
also to the weak legal framework for enforcement. In terms of the unsatisfied housing 
demand, COR and IVE agreed on the fact that informal settlements are an “escape valve” 
for millions, which have not seen their demands met. IVE claimed that such a process is 
“not always 100 per cent fair”, which implied, again, the “illegal” approach of the 
authority towards informality. Also, IVE claimed that:  
 
“Informal human settlements probably are created because there is not  
adequate land tenure regulation  to grant residential land use, where the 
authority has total control over adequate housing developments and, thus, in 
order to offer housing under affordable conditions for poorer families”. IVEl 
 
IVE recognised two additional elements. First, the impact of land speculation that affects 
the limited capacity of governments to acquire affordable land for public housing 
programmes due to high costs of potential land reserves for future developments. 
Peripheral city areas have lain vacant for years waiting to be considered attractive for 
developers. Now, national and local governments attempt to play more a regulatory role 
rather than a land developer one. The government seemed to put him in a position where 
others dictate the rules. The authorities must implement innovative approaches to 
maximise its regulatory roles.  
 
The second aspect was the role of political interests willing to take advantage of the 
phenomena of housing the poor for electoral purposes. All the agents interviewed, 
including the political parties leaders, recognised how negative the role of politicians in the 
process of creation of informal settlements has been. Moreover, their participation seemed 
to favour the informal status of poorer areas as a way to keep the support of residents. The 
idea is to keep a dependency circle with informal residents. Once areas are regularised, the 
politicians stop being “attractive” figures for residents who will not need them anymore. 
The point is relevant because many of these politicians become part of the governmental 
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structures once in power and the pressure to regularise or obtain municipal services derives 
from the fact that many informal areas start receiving fringe benefits of such a support.  
 
This is the case, for instance, of El Rocío whose inhabitants identified that the introduction 
of the sewage, running water, and street pavements were the fulfilment of a promise made 
by the deputy during his electoral campaign. Thus, residents would participate in the 
electoral game with as many politicians as possible. This makes people feel attracted to 
electoral processes more instead of participating in a formal procedure with the authority, 
making the pressure for either regularisation or the claim for municipal services cyclical.  
 
In terms of what people find attractive in informal areas to select them as their home, the 
key actors interviewed agreed on two main reasons behind their selection: the size of plots 
and the flexibility in their acquisition based on people’s capacity. SED identified plot sizes 
in informal areas ranging from 200 to 500 square meters whilst, formal plots ranged from 
50 to 60 square meters. This made formal housing unattractive due to the long period of 
commitment that a mortgage represents and, more importantly, to the cost of the plot as 
they could obtain larger plots at lower costs and with flexible payments schemes 
elsewhere. This, evidently, reflects the location of informal areas: the cheaper and bigger 
plots, the more distant from the city.  
 
In theory, poor residents would need bigger plots where they could raise poultry or cattle. 
Yet, only a couple of cases in informal areas actually raised some poultry to feed their 
families. None of these cases existed in the sampled formal areas. Informal plots were 
bigger apparently because land was cheaper, not because people needed it that size for 
some activities. People preferred them because of their flexibility at the time of acquisition, 
though, RWP claimed that living in formality despite of such small plots, is much better 
than living in informality.    
 
Regarding the life of the urban poor in informality, interviewees offered interesting 
viewpoints. IVE claimed that people preferred an informal area because they believed that 
their chances to access formal land were nil. Therefore, this was advantageous for some 
leaders or promoters ready to sell them informal land. SED also claimed that the urban 
poor believed that they were not eligible for a mortgage. The poor disregarded even the 
possibility to investigate whether some other option existed for them. There was a sort of 
resignation about either their lack of coping with requirements or their willingness to deal 
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with the whole set of commitments that a mortgage represented. Nevertheless, the same 
authorities recognised that they were unable to cope with the demand anyway. Some 
residents said that they knew about formal programmes but they could not fulfil the 
requirements. There was a mismatch between what authorities believed and what people 
did. SED added that people also buy an informal plot because they believed that they 
would never have a problem with the authority. They did not recognise that many informal 
settlers decided to enter the informal path because they knew that the same authority 
constantly sent them messages about its security that their inability to act represented. COR 
claimed that: 
 
“[The government] does not regularise quickly to avoid bad examples, to 
avoid its promotion [of informality].” CORli 
 
The idea behind this statement, he continued, was to avoid large investments in the 
provision of the missing municipal services, as he argued that this was more expensive in 
comparison to a formally created settlement. The authorities interviewed did not consider 
the ready–finished housing approach as limited and costly for those who are very poor. But 
SED recognised that housing agencies should promote more self–help housing instead of 
traditional housing developments. Nevertheless, IVE claimed that the approach was correct 
and that self–help could become an “important problem at urban scale” in the future:  
 
“I think that guideless self–help can become an important problem at urban 
scales. It is also an important social problem  due to the conditions of 
spontaneous housing areas that disregard many aspects of basic needs and 
thus can provoke acute social problems.” IVElii 
 
This was inserted into the discussion about what the authority regarded as a “decent house” 
which was related to construction standards. Some interviewees repeatedly asserted that a 
housing supply for the poor must be “decent”. SED claimed that people living in informal 
areas did not live in a “decent way”. RWP also agreed with the decent way of living. This 
related to an approach that claims that people must live under standards that are more 
“acceptable” than others are. For the authorities, living in informal areas’ conditions was 
unacceptable. To live under decent conditions meant, for them, in a finished house with all 
the municipal services introduced. Those failing to fulfil these standards are considered as 
a “no decent way of living”. Yet, many informal residents said that their living conditions 
were acceptable as these were part of the process towards consolidation and, eventually, 
regularisation. It was interesting to know that, in addition, SED claimed that informal 
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residents must be the most interested in pursuing regularisation, not the authorities. This 
tested the capacity of people’s agency, as the authorities, according to SED, were not 
interested in improving the living conditions of informal residents. They needed to push 
the process if they wanted to attain land titling.  
 
The way local authorities approached informality varied. For instance, RWP evaluated 
current housing policies as positive since the government implemented adequate 
programmes to serve the urban poor. Nevertheless, IVE claimed that there were many 
things to do, as the problem should be tackled from a long–term perspective by 
incorporating land reserves at low cost so the authority could develop them accordingly. 
This would reduce the cost of potential housing developments for low–income earners. 
SED, in contrast, argued that a housing development would be cheaper if it were born 
formal from the beginning. For SED, regularising informal settlements was more costly 
that formal settlement creation. This was negative, as local governments need to channel 
money towards informal areas, leaving formal sections of the city with a reduced budget 
for investment. SED claimed that:  
 
“For the urban poor, it is more expensive to buy [a piece of land] in an 
informal settlement than in a formal one.” SEDliii 
 
There seemed to be a perception about how bad the urban poor administered their money. 
Some interviewees believed that, for instance, the ejidatarios who often sell pieces of land 
to informal dwellers spend their money on superfluous things, i.e., the traditional fifteenth 
anniversary party for their daughters. There was a perception that selling ejido lands 
informally was a millionaire business for ejidatarios. They were unable to explain why 
ejidatarios also remained poor despite of having had the opportunity to sell large 
extensions of land. Probably, selling ejido lands was a survival mechanism for ejidatarios 
who had been unable to make their land productive in agricultural activities, its reason to 
exist.  
 
Besides, there was a perception that the correct approach to house the urban poor was by 
providing traditional residential areas for low–income earners, which include a ready–
finished house supplied with all the municipal services. The argument behind that was that 
housing areas lacking all these housing and neighbourhood standards had a tendency to be 
areas of social conflict. LWP, the left–wing party leader, argued the need for larger plots 
with less built–up housing area for the possibility to build housing extensions in the future. 
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He claimed the need for more flexible credit schemes to provide more options for low–
income earners.  
 
Local authorities perceived four key benefits from regularisation programmes for informal 
settlements. First, the security of tenure that legalisation represents for people. Second, 
former informal settlements become eligible for municipal services or are entitled, at least, 
to demand their introduction. Third, people also become eligible for credit and, fourth, 
people invest more in housing improvements after regularisation. These four aspects 
matched with most of the benefits of regularisation claimed for instance, by De Soto. Yet, 
in the practice, the result from the schedules did not show such results. It seemed that local 
authorities did not take enough account of the history and culture of those experiencing 
regularisation.  
 
In terms of security of tenure, SED and COR claimed that a person who finally obtained 
the legal title of their piece of land, changes “automatically” his/her perception simply 
because the land belongs to him legally. SEP argued, “after the rights to live and freedom, 
there is [formal] land/housing tenure”. These are rights, for SED, of a similar hierarchy. 
SED indicated that people have the rights to a family, a shelter, and a decent house 
according to the Mexican Constitution. This exemplified how important the legal approach 
to housing the poor was. In contrast, UDE did not believe that people actually realise how 
important having a land title is for their lives. According to him, if people were aware of it, 
they would promote the regularisation more acutely. The COR official believed that the 
local authorities will not introduce municipal services to informal settlements as long as 
these remain informal. Without legal titles, IVE affirmed that the authorities were not 
authorised to invest in informal areas due to legal restrictions, leaving thousands of people 
without basic services and no possibilities to improve their living conditions.  
 
This only applied in theory. Most sampled informal areas received public support from at 
least one public agency in the form of a social or a housing programme. Both the authority 
and informal residents break the regulations at some point intermittently. Some authorities 
believed that an informal settlement could become a place for social conflicts. The more 
population settled in an informal area, the worse the social and environmental conditions. 
According to COR, regularisation is a way to deal with social and environmental 
degradation. Yet, some areas visited remained practically the same as they were before 
regularisation: the streets were still unpaved and many shacks remained the same for many 
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years. Regularisation did not bring the argued benefits to most dwellers as claimed by 
some interviewees.  
  
IVE recognised that recently regularised areas became entitled to request municipal 
services. Yet, during the fieldwork, there were no recently regularised areas under the 
process of service introduction. Many would need to wait for some more years. Indeed, the 
same residents did not expect to have the services immediately before regularisation, as 
these depended on their agency capacity to negotiate with local authorities before thinking 
of regularisation. Residents were aware of the fact that regularisation was a long process 
and that some services could be actually obtained even before it. Thus, they focused more 
on making home improvements, relying on their agency capacity to attain the services.  
 
Then, regularisation was more a segmented process, which was not part of a more 
comprehensive public policy intended to improve the living conditions of informal 
residents. It tried to solve the legal aspect only. Actually, public agencies were not able to 
survey the impact of the regularisation processes implemented. COR accepted that once 
this agency granted legal titles, there was no following–up process to survey the impact of 
its regularisation programmes.  
 
The interviewees also considered an increase in  access to credit and of home improvement 
investments as two more benefits from regularisation. Yet, formal credit bodies have 
systematically rejected the poor not only for housing purposes but also for other financial 
needs. Only a few interviewees mentioned that they had access to individual credit but it 
did not depend on the legal status of their land. It exclusively depended on the payment 
capacity required by the loaner. Thus, potential credit sources’ eligibility seemed to be 
unrelated to the legal housing status. None of the interviewees mentioned that they planned 
to sell the house after regularisation simply because they did not consider it as an option. 
Their house, either formal or informal, represented a lengthy struggle to improve their 
living conditions and it was a valuable accomplishment at both individual and family 
levels. Houses were not an attractive asset to loaners to guarantee larger loans no matter 
their legality 
 
7.7.  Reflecting on the efficacy/obstacles of the existing structures.   
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The experts and officials interviewed understood and recognised the extent to which the 
same authorities comply with their functions and responsibilities. Although most of them 
kept to an institutional position in their answers, some were able to recognise some of the 
inefficiencies and problems that their organisations faced in housing the urban poor. This 
introspection was possible to reach, in most cases, because I already knew some of the key 
actors due to my previous jobs in the field. A major output from this was that some key 
actors seemed to recognise that an incoherent policy to tackle the process of housing the 
very poor was inefficient and uncoordinated.  
 
This results in an unarticulated approach among the different levels of government, which 
followed the individual agendas of the national, state, and local governments. There was no 
consensus about the way to approach housing the urban poor. On one hand, IVE 
recognised that there was not an adequate planning process to reveal basic urban aspects. 
The government has been unable to implement a consistent policy to deal with a growing 
urban informality. The interviewees mentioned that the resources channelled to this 
problem have been traditionally insufficient. MFH, the microfinance senior official, 
recognised that: 
 
“Mexicans are very bad planners and we want to solve everything by 
implementing projects. That is too bad.” MFHliv  
 
SED claimed that there was no regularisation or an informal settlements’ policy and that 
only one person in his office dealt with this problem and with thousands of cases of 
informality. The problem, SED claimed, was not only at the local level. The federal 
government was not well organised and this was reflected in the poor coordination among 
the different public agencies at all levels: 
 
“The same federal government is not well organised. On one hand, 
FONHAPO, FOVISSSTE, CONAVI, INFONAVIT, the Urban Development 
Under–Secretary… then, the Mexican is like this, each one works separately. 
At state level, it happens the same and among the more than two thousand 
municipalities too. There is no state policy in terms of urban development, 
housing, and particularly with respect to the informal human settlements.” 
SEDlv 
 
MFH agreed that there was not a strong policy focused on informal settlements to help the 
urban poor. This microfinance manager claimed that: 
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“The greatest problem in housing the poor and the low–cost housing is 
strongly related to the value of land which, at the same time, relates to 
planning policies, the growth of cities, and a long–term perspective. 
Suddenly, some governments decide to develop large–scale developments 
thinking of the highest standards of streets, public services, water treatment, 
state–of–the–art technology… but, when you know the value of land, there is 
no way that could be a business. If you want to promote affordable housing, it 
should be a business, or it will not be attractive to investors. The developer 
will not build low–cost housing. It is that simple.” MFHlvi 
 
Controversially, UDE claimed that there was no law that prohibited servicing informal 
settlements. No law expressly defined what an informal settlement was and, therefore, 
UDE said, that they do not exist legally. He said that a “double game” existed. On one 
hand, informal settlements did not exist in the law and, on the other, public agencies kept 
channelling some funds to help improve their conditions. SED criticised the fact that the 
federal Social Development Secretariat was in charge of the federal housing policies for 
the urban poor. This, he continued, has proved to be eminently political, and therefore, for 
political goals. Interviewees disagreed with the current housing policies that they were in 
charge of implementing. SED also criticised the fact that current formal housing policies 
promoted vertical projects as an attempt to stop urban sprawl. Yet, for SED, Mexicans do 
not like living in a flat and this policy will fail in the future. SED claimed that this was a 
cultural issue.  
 
Another aspect was the position of some authorities in recognising corruption. SED 
accepted that the public agencies in charge of acquiring territorial reserves for further 
housing development were corrupt. They bought large extensions of land at a very low cost 
to incorporate them into the land reserve stock at a higher cost. In the process, the 
authorities obtained a personal profit from the transaction.
40
 Thus, the housing offered 
became more expensive for potential buyers due to the increase of land costs included in 
the final housing costs. It seemed that the current offer could be neither cheaper, better, nor 
bigger. On the other hand, IVE recognised a contradictory position. The law prohibited 
local authorities to invest in informal areas but they introduced municipal services at the 
same time. There was an ambivalent culture in the application of the laws because public 
agencies attempted to make “corrective” approaches that, contradictorily, break the law. 
                                                 
 
40 By 2014, the former state’s governor is being prosecuted for corruption after he led the corruption network 
in land sales to the government he was in charge, according to allegations. The case is under investigation.   
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For instance, UDE claimed that the state informal settlements commission, in charge of the 
local policies intended to deal the proliferation of these areas, was simply useless: 
 
“The state commission is only for the photograph… I have not seen any real 
effect from its activities during the time I belonged to it.” UDElvii 
 
The interviewees also pointed out other inefficiencies. For instance, SED claimed that the 
same urban development plan designed by his office, incentivised land speculation. When 
a land use is established, he claimed, you make the land worth more. The authority does 
not update the land taxes values in the city after it granted land use changes over time. 
Large extensions of land remained paying the same land taxes despite of having 
infrastructure and basic services introduced by the local authorities a few years ago. There 
was a problem of capitalising public investment in private land through land taxes, which 
prevented the municipality from recovering its investment to continue improving other city 
areas. This made services expensive and, thus, residents needed to pay more for them. 
Besides, as the city grows and empty urban land remained undeveloped, the municipal 
services provision to newer areas becomes more expensive. There are no incentives to 
occupy vacant land within the consolidated urban area. The effect is evident; new 
residential areas, whether for  the poor or the rich, locate far from the central city.  
 
The interviews with both the right–wing’ and the left–wing parties’ leaders allowed me to 
understand how different their positions were with respect to housing the poor. Whilst the 
RWP agreed with the existing housing policies for the urban poor –although, the 
government in power belonged to his party– the LWP claimed that there was still lots of 
things to do; he also believed that housing policies were inadequate. The RWP claimed 
that the costs of housing programmes for the very poor should be absorbed by the 
government. This meant that RWP proposed that housing for the very poor should be free: 
 
“… I think they [the urban poor] must be included in welfare programmes. 
The government approach should consider it [credit for housing] as non–
refundable. If people can repay, that’s fine, but the objective should not be 
making profits from social housing programmes.” RWPlviii  
 
In contrast, LWP claimed that a major problem with housing the poor was the lack of 
affordable credit. He recognised that politicians have been unable to establish efficient 
policies once they take power; even RWP agreed that a big difference existed between 
what a politician running for elections believed to what the reality was for him/her after 
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becoming a mayor, a governor, or a deputy. In 2010, the RWP party lost the elections at 
national, state, and local levels. Its deputies became a minority in the local congress. 
Voters elected the PRI’s (Institutional Revolutionary Party) candidate as President, sacking 
the PAN. LWP believed that current housing policies for the poor would lead to important 
social problems in ten years’ time. He said that the city had not been planned adequately 
and there will be social “decomposition”; access to housing will be even more limited for 
the very poor, and informal settlements will become “visible” only after a tragedy occurs 
in them, e.g. flooding in prohibited areas occupied by informal residents.  
 
UDE claimed that informal settlers became “political spoils”. Many were eligible to voting 
because they registered in other relatives’ addresses. The promise of a better place to live, 
regularisation, the introduction of municipal services, and other aspects were elements for 
political purposes. If a politician, once in power, helps informal residents with 
regularisation, they would become less helpful in the future.    
 
INF, the national workers’ fund federal delegate, claimed that INFONAVIT was already 
“open” to informal workers. After questioning him about why the largest housing body in 
the country prevented the urban poor without formal jobs to access a loan, he claimed that 
informal earners were now eligible for housing loans if: 
 
“An informal worker could have an INFONAVIT loan as long as he is 
registered [in the revenue agency] and pays the corresponding fees [to the 
housing fund]. He can register under the smaller taxpayer scheme… they 
register and then pay the fees, fulfil the INFONAVIT regulations in terms of 
credit. After a certain time, they qualify for a credit in the same way as a 
formal worker does.” INFlix 
 
Herein, there is a problem with the concept of informality and “eligibility”, as INF actually 
discarded informal workers simply because these never get registration in the revenue 
office. If they do this, they would immediately stop being informal and would become 
formal. It was actually why MFH confirmed that his company dealt with the fact that 
informal workers were unable to show proof of income and they implemented a savings 
scheme to make them eligible. Actually, INF started the interview claiming that 
INFONAVIT was exclusive for formal workers because they were entitled to the fund due 
to the fees paid to it and, consequently, they become potential beneficiaries. The INF 
representative became a federal senator for Aguascalientes in the 2010 elections. SED 
claimed that INFONAVIT was too inefficient and unattractive even for formal workers due 
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to bureaucratic procedures, small houses offered, and expensive credit schemes of at least 
15 to 20 years long. Again, there was an inconsistency among the authorities in charge of 
applying key policies intended to improve the living conditions of the urban poor. 
However, MFH claimed that the very poor were an attractive part of the housing market:   
 
“The banks and the large developers prefer to stay out of this market segment 
[the urban poor] because it means a lot of work, such as requiring the people 
to save. To us, they [the poor] are a very worthy of consideration and we are 
working with them.” MFHlx 
 
Indeed, the urban poor were a profitable segment for MFH. INF recognised that, although 
this was the segment with the lowest income level, they showed low levels of mortgage 
default. Women, he continued, have proved to be more reliable for credit. The role of 
women in the housing equation was recognised by the officials interviewed as a key. As 
for the informal workers served by the local housing body, applicants face different 
challenges. They need to save for at least six months as the proof of reliability and his/her 
payments’ capacity. Yet, income was not constant and applicants would be in trouble 
sometimes. This body did not include an unemployment insurance option for its clients.  
 
“Yes [the poor were financially reliable]. Yet, we must consider some 
features. Of course they are. They are good people in most cases. They are 
working people focused on their own. The problem may come from the side 
of public policies for the poor.” MFHlxi 
 
7.8. Conclusions. 
 
This chapter revealed, on one hand, the challenges that formal housing represent for the 
urban poor and, on the other, the assessment of some key actor intervening in the process 
from public agencies and relevant organisations. It helps understand how the formal 
structure either ease or deprive the poor from gaining access to satisfy such a need or goal. 
Actually, the fulfilment of formal rules did not guarantee the argued benefits to residents 
flagged by those in favour of a legal framework to cope with this issue. For instance, the 
depersonalisation of formal procedures made the formal structure slow and unable to 
attend individual requirements and needs. The formal apparatus disregarded individuals 
and focused on population’ segments, dealing with their needs within standardised criteria. 
This resulted in a series of challenges for the poor.  
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First, the potential “unlocking” of the properties values was not clear from the schedules. 
None of the formal residents seemed to appreciate it simply because their homes, they 
believed, had the same value whether they already paid for the mortgage or not. 
Additionally, informal residents eventually achieving legal tenure did not see this as an 
opportunity to “capitalise” the value of their homes simply because the formal market and 
financial bodies were not interested in them. This left the urban poor with limited 
possibilities to overcome poverty as De Soto claimed, restraining their agency capacity 
towards capturing the benefits of their formal stance.  
  
Second, a mix of formal and informal procedures was found in the same place and at the 
same time. Even formal dwellers were unable to make home improvements following 
formal procedures. The fact of living in a formal housing did not guarantee them access to 
formal mechanisms to finance home extensions at all. They remained unattractive to banks 
or housing funds as to provide financial assistance because, first, their income was 
captured for many years to pay for the mortgage, and second, their income was too low 
anyway as to become eligible for housing credit for home improvements. In these cases, 
the formal structure seemed to be stronger than any agency exercised by residents who 
were unable to continue their housing consolidation path within formal rules. They needed 
to exit the formal structure and proceed with informal mechanisms to improve their 
housing conditions.  
 
Third, political interests and public agendas shaped the role played by the public bodies 
intervening in the process of housing the poor. Public bodies’ participation was biased by a 
political agenda of the interests of the party in the power in order to retain it. The urban 
poor seemed to be an attractive sector that needed to remain dependent on the 
governments’ intervention to, at the same time, retain the possibilities to “sell them the 
benefits” from an electoral viewpoint.   
 
Fourth, there existed a pathological cycle created during electoral processes that prevented 
the poor from improving their living conditions faster. It was a key to support the candidate 
who would win the election, otherwise, people’ needs will remain unattended until the 
promise of help returned at the next electoral period. Besides, the partial fulfilment of 
promises kept the colonias permanently dependent on the political will and as electoral loot 
for the next candidate. The poor have learnt to live within the political culture prevailing in 
the city, which has become a sort of structure during electoral campaigns and a different 
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one when politicians take power. This has become a sort of “electoral game” where 
residents and politicians obtain fringe benefits according to their own interests.   
 
Finally, the approach to housing the poor followed a pragmatic stance with unclear and 
uneven concepts among the interviewees. They often regarded poverty and informality as 
elements subjected to be criminalised because of a sort of “sub–culture” among a large 
sector of the population. This negative way the authorities approached the issue of the legal 
aspect has left the informal residents in a compromised position in their attempts towards 
consolidated housing. The idea of “teaching the poor how to live and behave” has created a 
vicious circle of failure in attempting to implement something that would not happen 
anyway in the end. Besides, the permanent idea of implementing the “proper housing 
standards” that make housing “decent” has restricted the role of housing and urban 
development agencies to provide fully–serviced and ready–finished homes, disregarding 
people’s capacity of self–construction and increasing the cost of housing developments. 
Thus, the housing supply was expensive, small, and limited to what the authorities believed 
the way things must be done.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS. 
 
8.1. Introduction.  
 
The completion of this research is a rewarding experience; it revealed some lessons that 
contribute to the understanding of housing the urban poor. On one hand, the scrutiny of the 
role played by land tenure in home production among the urban poor has implications for 
both theory and practice. On one hand, in theory, it assessed the different approaches to 
tackle this problem within the restrictive environments that developing countries represent. 
On the other hand, in the practice, this dissertation engaged with a case study that 
demonstrates the challenges that translating orthodox and/or external solutions in a 
particular context represents. It explored the implications of some dichotomies –e.g., 
formal and informal- for the life of the urban poor and how these impact the way people 
attempt to achieve a house for their families.  
 
8.2. The aim, objectives, and methods of the research. 
 
Briefly, the aim of this dissertation was to assess the motivations and barriers for the urban 
poor to invest and achieve fully consolidated and serviced housing. This aim assessed the 
role that residents’ agency capacity plays within a restrictive environment –or structure. 
This helped scrutinise different strategies implemented by the poor in dealing with other 
actors related to housing, i.e., local authorities, ejidatarios, neighbours, and financial 
bodies. This allowed me to understand those barriers implicitly and/or explicitly imposed 
by the structure in which they attempt to achieve their goals. This is a major experience in 
the case city selected as urban growth and industrial development did not necessarily 
contribute to the overcoming of poverty and the provision of housing for this segment of 
the population in a straight–forward way. The three objectives defined to pursue these aims 
contributed to the assessment of the dynamics of housing the urban poor; thus, these also 
shaped the structure of the dissertation.  
 
Thus, the first objective expanded the discussion by including the assessment of the 
dichotomies of informal and formal to thereby explain and understand the living conditions 
of the urban poor. As housing is a distinctive tangible representation of poverty, studying 
the process of home production among the urban poor from a wide perspective and at a 
global level illustrated the necessary context for this dissertation. This provided a 
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comprehensive framework that eventually contributed to the selection of the stance of this 
research before the challenge that designing and conducting a case study would represent. 
By scrutinising the circumstances under which the urban poor make choices regarding their 
efforts to acquire permanent housing –the second objective of this dissertation-, this 
dissertation contributed to the analysis of the existing mechanisms by which the urban poor 
attempt to access owned and consolidated housing in developing countries. The third 
objective –to scrutinise the contribution of security to informal house construction– 
brought into the discussions the implications of the meanings of security of tenure, both 
formal and de facto– in the life of millions of poor settlers. This helped assessed both the 
key drivers in housing choices, i.e., the agency–structure relationship- and the role that 
land titling played as a driver for home improvements. The discussion engaged with the 
dichotomy that diverse scholars and practitioners claim regarding the role that land tenure 
plays in the housing equation and helped address the implications of diverse theoretical 
definitions at the time of attempting to make them operational. In addition, the role that 
key actors play throughout the housing process, i.e., local authorities– was also scrutinised 
throughout the research. This was very useful for this dissertation by contrasting the efforts 
made by the urban poor –agency– and the environment in which these took place. The 
results showed key insights into this relationship that are analysed in the reflections and 
conclusions sections of this chapter.  
 
In terms of the methodology defined, this dissertation gained valuable insights into key 
aspects of the housing process. First, it focused on places where the study of housing the 
poor is uncommon as most of them concentrate in the three largest cities in Mexico, i.e., 
Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey. The selection of a rapidly urbanising middle–
sized city provides a fresh look into areas of these sorts in Mexico, which are being 
transformed at a pace that scholars must take into consideration. Second, the application of 
a behavioural approach that helped scrutinise the agency–structure relationship in the 
housing process, contributed to widen the knowledge of this field. This approach framed 
the analysis of the different theories relevant to this study, i.e., the formal/informal 
dichotomy, the call for a legal system as a path to overcome poverty, and so on. The 
methodological stance was innovative in terms of the selection of the place to study and of 
the variables and approaches considered. I believe that this dissertation contributes to a 
fresh way to look into the housing equation. 
 
8.3. Key findings. 
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This research helps fill the gap in the literature regarding the experiences of the urban poor 
attempting to achieve consolidated housing in medium–sized cities, in particular, in an area 
that is experiencing tremendous pressure due to industrial development and an increasing 
impoverished population. It also contributed to understand the differences between those 
cities frequently analysed by experts and those emerging urban areas that account for the 
new wave of urban growth, i.e., the medium–sized cities. In particular, this research 
concentrated in the city of Aguascalientes, Mexico as this is a place plenty of challenges to 
address urban development issues and, consequently, its associated problems. Thus, based 
on the aim and objectives of this research, the implications of the findings are summarised 
as follows: 
  
 The urban poor are more part of the solution than of the problem, as Turner 
advocated many years ago. Many have been able to achieve consolidated 
housing over time owing to the incapability of the institutional structure to 
promote an affordable land market for the very poor. Local governments have 
remained one–step behind in the provision of potential solutions for thousands 
of urban residents in search of a place to live.  
 Formal institutions have tried to eradicate/outlaw informal housing and land 
markets rather than to participate in its dynamics, adopting a role focused on 
learning from a housing process. Yet, although the housing process is lengthy 
and not all the poor settlers succeed, their experiences must be taken into 
account by further scholars and practitioners.  
 The imposition of unrealistic housing standards has to be reviewed, as the 
provision of formal housing under this criterion has limited and deterred the 
possibilities of promoting areas that could be progressively improved with the 
participation of residents and the authorities together. The values appraised by 
dwellers were different from those of the institutions and these must consider 
alternative ways of dealing with informal settlers.  
 Approaching the role played by land tenure in home choices by following a 
behavioural approach, enriched this research by assessing it from the 
perspectives of the main actors involved in the process. It helped understand the 
problem from a perspective that is rich in experience as settlers provided an 
insight to their problems within the sampled areas. People were avid to discuss 
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their problems with this researcher but at the same time, illustrate their 
creativity to overcome their challenging conditions.  
 The qualitative stance of this research resulted in a rich introspective into the 
viewpoints of residents, officials, and experts that helped make a 
comprehensive assessment of the problem of housing the urban poor. It was 
evident that land tenure and security of tenure meant something different from 
residents to officials. The agency exercised by residents proved what their 
priorities were, whilst the institutional agenda determined the stance from 
which the structure dealt with it. There is the opportunity to expand this 
research more in–depth into the structure as a way to understand the barriers, 
tangible or intangible, to learn from the people. There was a mismatch between 
formal institutions and their intended beneficiaries.  
 In addition, there was a discrepancy between the living standards imposed by 
the authority and the way people lived in reality. There was a mismatch 
between the growing city of Aguascalientes and the reality of thousands of its 
residents. These struggled simply to survive in a city that has been eagerly 
providing formal land for industrial estates and housing for formal workers, 
though a minority. This has left thousands of people attempting to access a 
piece of land in ejidos, peripheral areas, and in those that are not attractive to 
developers. This has segmented the city and this phenomenon has reached 
residential spots where the poor lived. Wealthier areas now surround poor areas 
and gentrification seemed to be an area for analysis in the following years. 
 The overlapping of formal and informal mechanisms in the housing process 
was evident in the sampled area. The dichotomies of legal/illegal and 
formal/informal will prevail institutionally for many years. Yet, access to 
formal housing does not guarantee the eradication of informal mechanisms to 
improve the conditions of a shelter that is insufficient for the needs and wants 
of the beneficiaries of such programmes.  
 Thus, the formal housing process becomes segmented and limited. It also 
seemed to play against the cities themselves as formal settlements are being 
located far from the consolidated areas, as land is cheaper in peripheral zones. 
To some extent, urban sprawl is being promoted by the same local authorities 
that blame informal settlements for engendering it, through policies intended to 
promote formal land tenure to all, but at a cost that in the end seems to be 
unsustainable.  
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 Local authorities must reconsider their focus on legal tenure as the ultimate goal 
in dealing with informal settlers in general, and in providing housing for the 
poor in particular. Other elements that consolidate land security than 
exclusively that fact of having the legal possession of the assets were found. 
The progressive introduction of municipal services must be recognised as the 
silent acknowledgement of the informal areas by institutions. There was a 
paradox found between the local officials advocating eviction and/or relocation, 
whilst services are promised by politicians and introduced, eventually, by 
municipal agencies. This jeopardised the consolidation process for many years 
needlessly, especially as the eviction policy has faded away under political, 
electoral, and even humanitarian pressures.  
 The urban poor are willing to wait for the legal aspects of their land or house as 
long as necessary. They always knew that legalisation is a step in the process 
towards consolidation and recognition but it did not need necessarily to be the 
first. The reduced mobility that settlers presented in the sampled areas showed 
high levels of place attachment. People did not expect to capitalise their 
properties to improve their living conditions or even overcome poverty. Their 
houses are their most valued possession. They will trade them only as a last 
resort.   
 De Soto’s ideas of the need of a formal system as a condition for trading goods 
safely, did not seem to apply in the sampled areas. Besides, his optimistic 
concept of the capitalisation of assets as a step to overcome poverty seemed to 
be far from the reality. The poor remain poor even after some of them obtained 
the legal titles of their houses simply because these areas neither increase in 
value nor become sufficiently attractive for formal institutions to consider them 
as collateral.  
 A complete alternative housing and land market of safe transactions is 
operating among the urban poor despite their informal condition. No problems 
between landowners and buyers were found in the informal sampled areas that 
jeopardise such informal transactions. In the contrary, the urban poor have dealt 
with informal transactions for many years and learnt about the value of a 
“contract” signed on a single piece of paper by the two parties involved.  
 Formal housing mechanisms must be reviewed in further research. It seemed 
that the selection of formal beneficiaries remained dependent on the political 
will of the official in charge. Some formal dwellers struggle to cover both the 
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mortgage and to raise resources to adapt a house that is simply inadequate for 
their needs. Their limited incomes and the limitations imposed by the new 
regulations for formal housing, represent a tremendous challenge to survive in 
the more recent developments. The new approach of communal housing –i.e., 
condominiums– has proved unpopular and difficult to implement and it should 
be reviewed. Paradoxically it seemed that, for many, accessing formal housing 
has made it more difficult for them to solve their housing problems.  
 The assessment of the role that land tenure played in the sampled area helped 
illustrate how creative informal residents can be to achieve consolidated 
housing over time. For instance, it was the lack of formal tenure, which made 
informal settlers attractive to politicians, particularly during electoral periods. It 
became an element for negotiations and trade between the settlers and the 
candidates for office.  
 Besides, many people have been able to take advantage of their “informal” 
condition and obtained fringed benefits from the authority. It was in El Rocío 
where one of the interviewees mentioned that she had not made any housing 
improvements because that would endanger her “eligibility” for public 
subsidies and help. For some, being informal has become a sort of culture and, 
at the extreme, a way of life.   
 In defining poverty, it was found that one could not make general statements or 
apply a one–dimensional concept everywhere. Poverty must be defined at the 
most local level possible to make its translation into alleviation programmes 
more effective. The definition of poverty must respond to local circumstances, 
cultures, and history of the location in which practitioners attempt to translate it 
into, for instance, public policies and programmes. It needs to consider also the 
needs and wants of those regarded as poor.  
 The different poverty definitions and measurement systems have created 
confusion and have proven not to be effective everywhere. Poverty alleviation 
programmes must respond to local agendas and be conducted from local 
perspectives as poverty is not a static concept and represents different 
challenges for people over time.  
 When approaching housing for the urban poor, the interpretation of poverty 
becomes a significant element of discussion affecting the design of appropriate 
policies. There was a disassociation between the current poverty theories and 
those held by those in charge of the design and implementation of the policies 
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intended to reduce it. In the case city, officials in charge of poverty and housing 
for the poor programmes seemed to react, adopting immediate resolutions to a 
problem demanding long–term solutions.  
 The ability of people to interpret their environment and act consequently was 
evident. In general, their agency capacity is palpable in the fact that most of 
them have been able to achieve consolidated housing to some extent. Their 
capacity to make the improvements by themselves has being disregarded by 
current policies as self–help programmes have been practically eliminated.   
 Housing policies should be reviewed and include alternative ways to 
incorporate the voice of the poor into the equation. However, there was no way 
to hear that voice in the current institutional framework. The urban poor 
remained as an attractive segment only under certain circumstances, i.e., 
elections or public protests. To tackle housing the poor, there is more to do with 
the structure than the agency.      
  
8.4. Reflections. 
 
The experience of conducting this research implies necessarily the need to reflect on this 
experience for both the study itself and the researcher. First, although the assessment of the 
process of housing for the poor is not new, the utilisation of new approaches towards its 
scrutiny becomes necessary. More research is needed from perspectives that represent 
creative stances to attempt to contribute to poverty reduction and housing provision. This 
research followed a behavioural perspective, which actually provided insights from the 
incumbent actors into their agency capacity to deal often with an overwhelming structure. 
Additionally, the assessment of voices calling for the implementation of a legal system as a 
condition to solve the problem of poverty and, hence, expediting the improvement of 
housing conditions of the poor, provided an insight into practices that can enrich the 
research process in the future. This is the case of the various dichotomies herein assessed, 
i.e., relative versus monetary approaches to poverty and/or formal versus informal housing.  
 
As the emerging economies are experiencing important industrialisation processes in less–
saturated cities, medium –sized cities call for the attention of scholars to analyse its 
implications. This is a key contribution of this research as the case city represents an area 
full of contrast that may be alike, on one hand, to those cities with similar urban and 
industrial conditions. Yet, it illustrates, on the other, unique features of a city that is able to 
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participate in globalised industrial policies but at the same time, been unable to tackle its 
problems at the local level. Generalisations are not recommended of the process involved 
and this research shows the importance of dealing with local conditions.  
 
Evidently, the research scope represents an opportunity to explore aspects more in–depth 
elsewhere due to its own limitations in length, time, and resources. For instance, there is an 
opportunity to explore the implications of the role that land tenure plays in home choices 
comparing its impact on households at different periods. This would assess the evolution of 
the concept of security of tenure over time that would enrich the discussion in this regard. 
Another opportunity is the construction of different concepts related to poverty and 
housing for the poor at a local level. This would represent more effort locally but, at the 
same time, it would imply probably more effective approaches to solve the problems of 
residents provided their voices be taken into account. Besides, there is an opportunity that 
calls for conducting research on the agency –structure relationship at local levels. This 
dissertation is aware of the uniqueness that this relationship may represent in different 
places but there is an opportunity to systematise its incorporation into the housing 
equation. Again, this would enrich the focus of those involved in the decision–making 
process and would promote their association in the process of working with the urban poor. 
There is also the opportunity to implement more systematic quantitative data analysis 
about the perceptions of the incumbent actors in order make comprehensive assessments in 
the future.   
 
As for the implications of this dissertation for this researcher, this has been an exercise full 
of experiences. On one hand, in practical terms, a more rigorous discipline in the process 
of working in this study would have helped its completion much earlier. The difficulties of 
dealing with different personal situations made this process challenging and concentrating 
exclusively on research are highly desirable. On the other hand, I learnt that reaching a 
precise research focus is very helpful at earlier stages of the study. This helps concentrate 
on the relevant topics from the beginning rather than scrutinising wider aspects of issues 
that need to be more specific. This happened when exploring, for instance, micro finance 
or poverty, which, although these were relevant aspects, their study required more strategic 
approaches to have a more effective use of my time. Another aspect is to take the 
opportunities to share research progress in seminars and conferences as much as possible. I 
only had the opportunity to participate in a few of them, which allowed me to hear 
valuable opinions from experts who enriched my own work.  
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I see the opportunity to both expand this research into more systematic ways to approach 
housing the poor from the behavioural perspective and identify better ways to capture the 
voices of the different actors intervening in the process. The former would comprise a 
focus that explores innovative drivers in housing choices whilst the second would 
incorporate effective methods to make the voice of both the decision–makers and the urban 
poor heard. Thus, the challenge is to translate their experiences into successful approaches 
that eventually contribute to alleviate poverty and to improve their living conditions.  
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APPENDIX NO.1. COMPARISON OF POVERTY APPROACHES. 
Element of analysis Monetary approach Relative approach Social exclusion Participatory approach 
Unit of analysis 
Ideally, the individual, de 
facto the household 
The individual 
Individual or groups relative to 
others in their 
community/society 
Groups or individually  
Required or 
minimum standard 
identified by 
Reference to ‘external’ 
information (defined outside 
the unit); central element food 
requirements 
Reference to ‘lists’ of 
dimensions normally assumed 
to be objectively definable 
Reference to those prevailing 
in society and state obligations 
Local people’s own 
perceptions of well–being and 
ill–being 
Sensitivity to social 
institutions 
None, but assessments can be 
broken down by group 
Emphasis on adequacy rather 
than sufficiency leaves space 
for (non–modelled) variations 
Central element 
Reflected in the way poor 
people analyse their own 
situation 
Important of 
processes 
Not essential, but has 
increasing emphasis 
Not clear 
One of the main thrusts of the 
approach 
Critical for achievement of 
satisfactory methods 
Major weaknesses 
conceptually 
Utility is not an adequate 
measure of well–being; and 
poverty is not an economic 
category 
Elements of arbitrariness in 
choice of basic capabilities; 
problems of adding up 
Definition unclear, framework 
susceptible to many 
interpretations and therefore 
difficult to compare across 
countries 
Whose perceptions are being 
elicited, and how 
representative or consistent are 
they? How does one deal with 
disagreements? 
Major weaknesses 
for measurement  
Needs to be anchored to 
external elements. Arbitrary 
Impossibility of set evaluation. 
Problems of dealing with 
multidimensionality even if 
only of basic functionings 
Problems with 
multidimensionality. 
Challenge of capturing process 
Howe comparable? How 
representative? 
Problems for cross–
country comparisons 
Comparability of surveys; of 
price indices; of drawing 
poverty lines 
Fewer problems if basic 
capabilities are defined 
externally; but adding up 
Lines of social exclusion 
essentially society – specific; 
also an adding up problem 
Cultural differences can make 
appropriate process differ 
across societies; results may 
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Element of analysis Monetary approach Relative approach Social exclusion Participatory approach 
difficulties make comparisons 
difficult with inconsistencies 
according to adding up 
methodology 
not be comparable 
Data availability 
Household surveys regularly 
conducted; omitted 
observations can be important. 
Use of national income data – 
but requires assumptions about 
distribution 
Data less regularly collected, 
but could easily be improved 
Currently have to rely on data 
collected for other basic 
dimensions, data could be 
regularly collected 
Generally only small 
purposive samples. Never 
available nationally; would be 
difficult to extend method for 
regular data collection 
Most obvious policy 
implications 
Emphasis on economic growth 
and distribution of monetary 
income 
Investment in extending basic 
capabilities/basic needs via 
public services as well as 
monetary incomes 
Foster processes of inclusion, 
inclusion in markets and social 
process, with particular 
emphasis on formal labour 
market 
Empowerment of the poor. 
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APPENDIX NO. 2. MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS REVIEW. 
 
Microfinance institutions have evolved by transforming the way they do business. This 
section shows some examples of how some important institutions have evolved from small 
NGOs or financial organisations into consolidated microfinance institutions. For instance, 
in Nigeria, during the last decades, many banks have been created or converted into MFIs. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria provides a list of 899 microfinance banks working in the 
country. Many of them were traditional banks. The oldest bank was registered in 2006 to 
start operations but about 176 banks do not offer registration date (Central Bank of Nigeria 
2009). In Peru, Acción Comunitaria del Perú (ACP) in operation since 1969, as many 
others NGOs, was transformed into MiBanco, a microfinance institution that started 
operations in 1998 (Fernando 2003: 7). This MFI was created through the investment of 
two social investors, two commercial banks and the ACP as the majority owner. The 
Bank’s mission is to promote financial options for low–income earners, i.e., working–
capital loans, fixed assets loans, housing loans, rural loans, savings, checking accounts, and 
money transfers (Ibid: 1, 9). By 2002, MiBanco accounted for 34 branches and more than 
99,000 active borrowers, the second largest number of borrowers in Latin America, only 
behind Banco Compartamos in Mexico. Yet, by 2008, MiBanco had 380,807 clients in 
total, or 3.7 times those 7 years before, while Banco Compartamos 1,155,850 clients 
(MixMarket 2009). 
 
In Mexico, the biggest MFI is Banco Compartamos originated as an NGO in 1990. After a 
transformation process, Compartamos became the first MFI to issue debt into capital 
markets in the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores or Mexican Stock Exchange (Compartamos 
2009). Since 1996, the number of clients has growth by 46 times (MixMarket 2009). This 
bank offers loans to women and men for productive activities based on solidarity guarantee 
and housing improvement loans only offered to women already with a loan. Compartamos 
offers both credit and insurances. The four most important types of credit are the “Women 
Credit” (based on group collateral); “Merchant Credit” (based on social collateral); “Grow 
your Business Credit” (personal guarantee); and “Home Improvement Credit” that focused 
on women who are clients already. In 2009, in terms of financial viability, Compartamos 
reported $27.6 million USD (£16.9 million GBP) net profits, i.e., 31 per cent higher than 
the previous year and a repayment default of 2.6 per cent for the same period; by 
September 2009, Compartamos reached 1,423,239 clients in the 327 branches in the 
country (Compartamos 2009: [1]). 
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In South America, BancoSol is the most important MFI in Bolivia. It was a former NGOs 
as many other MFIs worldwide that has changed into microcredit markets. In 1986, the 
Microenterprise Promotion and Development Fund –or Fundación para la Promoción y el 
Desarrollo de la Microempresa– was first created as a NGO and eventually converted into 
the Banco Solidario or BancoSol in 1996. By 2009, BancoSol accounted for 240,000 
clients and a $310 million USD (£190.3 million GBP) portfolio (BancoSol 2009). There 
are more than 100 branches distributed along the eight most important cities in the country. 
Bank’s products comprise loans, savings, remittances services, micro–insurances, and 
migrants–oriented services. As for loans, these include individual loans (guarantee 
required), solidarity loans (solidarity guarantee), housing loans (mortgage), cash loans 
(formal workers), car loans, gold loans (jewellery–based loan), and fixed assets loans. In 
2008, 68per cent of the total loans where individual loans and 17 per cent housing loans in 
BancoSol.  
 
Most of loans requested were for productive activities and housing improvements. 
Individual loans average amounts were $1,955 USD (£1,200 GBP) and housing average 
loans were of $2,321 USD (£1,420 GBP). About 78 per cent of BancoSol’ loans were of 
less than $5,000 USD (£3,070 GBP) and only 3 per cent of more than $10,000 USD 
(£6,140 GBP). By 2008 alone, bank's portfolio increased by 41 per cent from the previous 
year in comparison to the 13 per cent increase in Bolivian commercial banks. Savings 
accounts increased by 26 per cent, deposits balance by 69 per cent and the default rate 
were less than 1 per cent in that year. BancoSol has been ranked for the 12 years as one of 
the three best banks in Bolivia (BancoSol 2009b). These numbers show solid MFIs in 
operation for more than 20 years now. In South Africa, Small Enterprise Foundation, SEF, 
is a non–profit organisation working towards the eradication of poverty in one of the 
poorest provinces of the country. Founded in 1992, SEF provides credit and savings 
products and promotes jobs creation, income generation projects, and social empowerment. 
The Foundation designed special products for the very poor population: the MCP or 
MicroCredit Programme and the TCP or Tshomisano –or “working together”- Credit 
Programme (SEF 2009). By 2006, MCP had 15,677 active members whilst TCP accounted 
for 30,063 clients. These programmes follow the Grameen Bank philosophical approach 
and methodologies. By 2009, SEF had 57,425 clients in the country from which 99 per 
cent were women and the average loan size was R 2,023 (or $267 USD/ £164.5 GBP). 
Since 2004, the Foundation presents positive performance by increasing by 159 per cent 
the number of active clients, 56 per cent the size of the average loan, and 300 per cent the 
amount of savings held by clients. 
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APPENDIX NO 3. INTERVIEWS. 
 
SCHEDULE 
Group 1. Settler in an informal settlement   
Interview No.:  
Date:        
General information about the interviewee: 
Name of settlement:    
Gender:    
Type of Employment:  
Family composition:  
Income level: (i.e. in minimum wages) 
Section 1. General perception on access to a place to live 
About their perception on the existing alternatives to access land/shelter in the city 
Section 2. Decisions to move and select the place to live 
About the previous place of residence 
About the reasons for moving 
About the drivers for moving from the parental/previous 
About the driver for selecting this place 
About knowing about the legal status of land/house 
About knowing about other sources of land/housing (i.e., INFONAVIT) 
About the year of arrival 
About the moving (alone, with family, etc.) 
About the type of employment at the time of moving 
About the income level at the time of moving 
Section 3.  Access to land/house  
About the characteristics of land/house bought (i.e., area, size, services, etc.) 
About knowing anyone in the place before arrival 
About the features of the place under arrival (i.e., number of people in place) 
About the price, interests, and methods of payment for the land/house acquired 
About whether the person counted on own savings  
About access to loans/credit/tandas, raising a sum in a pawn broker, savings 
About the time to pay for the land/house 
About the difficulties to meet with costs of land/house 
About the landlord (i.e., ejidatarios) 
About the proof of transaction 
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About the perception of a safe/unsafe transaction 
About the first steps on arrival 
About the process of construction of the initial room 
Section 4. Home improvements 
About the current housing conditions (i.e., materials, services, rooms, etc.) 
About their relationships with and the perception of  local authorities 
About the difficulties faced in making home improvements  
About the drivers for making home improvements 
About the way improvements are/were paid/financed 
About the first rooms built in the plot or the first home improvements 
About access to public programmes for home improvements 
About the process of construction (i.e., self–help, help, etc.) 
About access to loans/credit/tandas, raising a sum in a pawn broker, savings 
About the way they dealt with lack of services 
About the process of accessing the basic services introduced 
Section 5. Land tenure  
About the role played by land tenure in buying land/making home improvements 
About the effects of having/lacking legal tenure 
About the plans once/after regularisation (i.e., selling, dividing, extending, etc.) 
About the efforts –if any– to attempt attaining legal titles 
Section 6. Financial  
About perceptions of credit/borrowing money 
About access to credit before/after legal tenure 
About access to credit/loans at local level (i.e., corner shop) 
About access to a credit in the future 
Section 7. Personal 
About how people feel living in the place (i.e., happy, disappointed, etc.) 
About doing things differently if starting again 
About the most difficult aspect of living in the place 
About the sense of “belonging” to the rest of the city  
About the services and infrastructure at neighbourhood level 
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SCHEDULE 
Group 2. Settler in a formal settlement   
Interview No.:  
Date:        
General information about the interviewee: 
Name of settlement:    
Gender:  
Type of Employment:  
Family composition:    
Income level: (i.e., in minimum wages) 
Section 1. General perception on access to a place to live 
About their perception on the existing alternatives to access land/shelter in the city 
Section 2.Decisions to move and select the place to live. 
About the previous place of residence 
About the reasons for moving 
About the drivers for moving from the parental/previous 
About the drivers for selecting this place 
About the year of arrival 
About the moving (alone, with family, etc.) 
About the type of employment at the time of moving 
About the income level at the time of moving 
Section 3. Access to house  
About the characteristics of house bought (i.e., area/size, services, etc.) 
About the price, interests, and methods of payment for the house acquired 
About access to loans/credit/tandas, raising a sum in a pawn broker, savings 
About the time to pay for the land/house 
About the difficulties to meet costs 
About proof of the transaction 
About the first steps on arrival 
Section 4. Home improvements 
About the current housing conditions (i.e., materials, services, rooms, etc.) 
About the difficulties faced in making home improvements (i.e., finance) 
About the drivers for making home improvements 
About the process of construction (i.e., self–help, help, etc.) 
About the way improvements are/were paid/financed 
About access to public programmes for home improvements 
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About access to loans/credit/tandas, raising a sum in a pawn broker, savings 
Section 5. Land tenure 
About the role played by land tenure in buying land/making home improvements 
About the effects of having/lacking legal tenure 
About the plans once/after regularisation (i.e., selling, dividing, extending, etc.) 
About the efforts –if any– to attempt to attain legal titles 
Section 6. Financial 
About perceptions of credit/borrowing money 
About access to credit before/after legal tenure 
About access to credit/loans at local level (i.e., corner shop) 
About access to a credit in the future 
Section 7. Personal 
About how people feel living in the place (i.e., happy, disappointed, etc.) 
About of doing things differently if starting again 
About the most difficult aspects of living in the place 
About the sense of “belonging” to the rest of the city  
 
 299 
APPENDIX NO.4. ACRONYMS. 
 
CONAVI.  Housing National Commission. Comisión Nacional de Vivienda.  
CONAFOVI. Housing Promotion National Commission. Comisión Nacional de 
Fomento a la Vivienda. 
CORETT. Regularisation of Land Tenure Commission. Comisión para la 
Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra. 
FONHAPO.  Popular Housing National Fund Trust. Fideicomiso para el Fondo 
Nacional de Habitaciones Populares.  
FOVISSSSTE. Social Services and Security for the State Workers Institute’ Housing 
Fund. Fondo de Vivienda del Instituto de Seguridad Social y Servicios de 
los Trabajadores del Estado.  
IMUVI. Housing Municipal Institute. Instituto Municipal de Vivienda.  
INDECO.  National Institute for Community Development and Popular Housing. 
Instituto Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y de la Vivienda 
Popular 
INFONAVIT. Workers National Housing Fund. Instituto del Fondo Nacional de 
Vivienda para los Trabajadores.  
IVEA. State Housing Institute. Instituto de Vivienda del Estado de 
Aguascalientes.  
LI. Lomelí Real Estate. Lomelí Inmobiliaria.  
PAN. Nacional ActionParty. Partido Acción Nacional.  
PRD. Democratic RevolutionParty. Partido de la Revolución Democrática. 
PROCEDE. Ejido Right Certification Programme. Programa de Certificación de 
Derechos Ejidales. 
SEDESO. Social Development Secretariat. Secretaría de Desarrollo Social. 
SEPLADE. Regional Development and Planning Secretariat. Secretaría de 
Planeación y Desarrollo Regional. 
SHF Mortgage Federal Society. Sociedad Hipotecaria Nacional.  
SOFOLES Limited Object Financial Societies. Sociedades Financieras de Objeto 
Limitado. 
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APPENDIX NO. 5. SPANISH TRANSLATION OF QUOTES. 
                                                 
 
i
 “Hace algunos años, la ciudad de Aguascalientes había sido considera como un centro 
urbano con amplias perspectivas de desarrollo debido a su ubicación geográfica, 
orografía, clima y por ser zona asísmica. A esto se sumaba, además, su capacidad para 
hacer frete a demandas adicionales de empleo, vivienda y equipamiento urbano. Por 
ello, la ciudad de Aguascalientes se evaluó como una opción en la que el cambio no 
impactaría drásticamente su equilibrio en el corto plazo. Asimismo, el estado de 
Aguascalientes disponía de vías de comunicación suficientes, planteles de educación en 
todos los niveles e instituciones de salud, además de un dinámico crecimiento 
económico derivado del fortalecimiento industrial. Por todo lo anterior, aunada a la 
buena disposición de las autoridades y pueblo del estado por sumarse al esfuerzo de 
descentralización, la ciudad de Aguascalientes fue elegida como la nueva sede para las 
oficinas centrales del INEGI.” (ibíd.: 51–2). 
ii
 “Ire (sic.) antes de vivir en esta colonia yo pensaba que nunca en la vida lo iba a lograr 
[tener una casa] y sin embargo hubo la oportunidad de hacerme de este pedacito de 
terreno y aquí estoy.” SO–03. 
iii No, de hecho mi esposo todo el tiempo trabaja fuera, pues era lo mismo estar allá que 
acá, pero para uno es más fácil, por ejemplo si él no trabaja, pues puedo buscar yo. 
iv “Porque me casé y me trajeron para acá.” SO-03. 
v “Por seguirlo a él, a mi marido.” SO-02. 
vi “Si no fuera irregular te piden más dinero y así no, como vayas pudiendo.” ER-02. 
vii “Mediante reuniones de una persona que estaba muy allegado al PRI”. PD-03. 
viii
 Si pagábamos, pero era de palabra nada más, siempre anotaban en un cuaderno para 
llevar cuánto quedaba.” EJ–01. 
ix “Con ese papelito entonces si me pude venir para acá. Ya con este ya no tan fácil me 
corren porque ahí firmaron que me daban la autorización de que yo entrara a este 
lote.” LP-10. 
x “A mi mamá siempre le han gustado las orillas.” ER–02. 
xi “No, pos (sic) para construir arriba… si él construye arriba pos ya iríamos ahorrando 
algún centavo poco a poquito y comprar material poco a poco.” VC-01. 
xii
 “Han de estar dormidos [los muchachos que causan problemas]. Lo que son sábados y 
domingos, nomás escuchara el relajo. Un griterío aquí… no, no, no. antes me 
golpeaban mucho la pared, había mucho relajo y tuve que ponerle ramas… salía a 
correrlos y les decía que si no quieren ser molestados váyanse al rio allá está bien 
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amplio, al rio por allá váyanse. Usted a que se expone señora, que sabe que… les digo, 
es que están haciendo mucho relajo, mis niños están dormidos, no me los asusten… de 
rato corrían y una pedradota (sic) allá arriba. Viene una patrulla y dicen, ah no, mis 
niños no son, desde muy temprano los meto para adentro. A la una de la mañana aquí 
se oye la parranda, sabe Dios qué andarán haciendo de averías.” LP–10. 
xiii Para mí, es mi casa, para mis hijos, para la familia y pues si un día llegamos a faltar ellos 
tienen donde vivir mientras que ellos se hacen de una casa para ellos ya que se 
independicen ellos mismo. 
xiv El cuarto de allá es de adobe, con los charcos del agua, él decía ‘hay que hacer unos 
adobitos’. LP-01. 
xv
 “Porque me dejé llevar por lo que decían, la persona que ya vive o hace un cuartito en un 
terrenito es mucho muy difícil que lo saquen. Yo creía eso. Dije, voy a hacer eso y 
empecé a hacerlo.” LP–04. 
xvi
 “Pues porque creció la familia. Ahí tengo dos hijos, no han dejado de hacer ladrillos. 
Les decía su padre “no les dejo nada”, pero su padre los ensenó a trabajar, donde los 
ocupen ellos saben hacer de todo… mal hechito pero lo hacen.” LC–03. 
xvii
 “…andábamos en los charquitos porque ese año llovió tanto y nosotros sin ningún 
techo. Nos corría el agua en donde estábamos dormidas. Nosotros teníamos un jacal de 
pura lámina. De primero era puro así, porque cuando nos pidieron la casa no había 
dónde, puro monte, cuando llegamos aquí fue puro monte, se batalló mucho. Por eso 
lo poquito que vamos a hacer es con esfuerzo, el cuarto de allá es de adobe, con los 
charcos del agua, él [el jefe de familia] decía “hay que hacer unos adobitos”.” LP–01. 
xviii  “Yo quisiera pedir apoyo, ayuda, yo veo que muchas gentes ayudan pero a mí me da 
vergüenza.” LC-03. 
xix
 ‘Pos (sic) no se vaya a reír como se han reído muchos, lo primeritito (sic) que yo 
construí en mi casa fue el baño, es que al principio se burlaban de mí, que cómo era 
posible que yo primero hiciera el baño que un cuarto… preferible mil veces tener una 
cosa privada que andar como ellos en el monte y en el arroyo’. SO2–03. 
xx
 “Pues han dado pintura para las casas, han dado tinacos, que más ayudas para pisos, 
enjarres, para todo eso, pero siempre son a las mismas personas a las que ayudan.  A 
mí no me toca, es que a la mayoría a los que les llegan los apoyos son familiares y 
como yo tengo mi changarrito, pero piensan que como tengo mi tienda que no necesito 
dinero y no me quisieron ayudar.” SO–01. 
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xxi
 “Porque me dejé llevar por lo que decían: la persona que ya vive o hace un cuartito en 
un terrenito es mucho muy difícil que lo saquen. Yo creía eso. Dije, voy a hacer eso y 
empecé a hacerlo.” LP–04. 
xxii
 “No, porque ya había un papel de compra venta, yo con eso me defendía, esto es mío, 
ya lo compré, hay testigos que compré a fulano detal. Yo con eso, decían, que una 
persona que firme un papel, no le hace que sea en blanco, con que sea un papel de 
cuaderno, ya firmando, él está consciente de que está vendiendo y uno está consciente 
de que está uno comprando porque se especifica que los dos estamos de común 
acuerdo, los dos estamos bien de facultades mentales, somos ciudadanos mayores con 
responsabilidades, entonces ya no puedes decir, ya te vendí, te lo voy a quitar.” LP-04. 
xxiii
 “Lo que le digo, nos sirvió para hacer los contratos del agua, de la luz, de todo. De los 
servicios y aparte cuando nosotros éramos jóvenes, fuimos papás muy chicos porque 
yo tenía 16 años cuando nació mi primer bebé. Mi esposo 17, o sea, que nos casamos 
muy chicos y a lo mejor estábamos inexpertos, no sabíamos a qué nos lanzábamos. 
Como dice, cuando nos lanzamos aquí. Pudiendo, él estaba en el CERESO de varones, 
pudiendo comprar una casa de INFONAVIT y pagarla…” ER-04. 
xxiv
 “No, porque aquí era ejido de acá, es ejido de los mismos ejidatarios, yo sabía que era 
legalmente.” PH–01 
xxv“En aquellos años era más fácil de creer en la palabra de las personas que ahora.” ER-
06. 
xxvi
 “Son cosas que le dicen a uno y uno también se lo graba. Entonces vamos a hacerle la 
lucha. Compra terreno, haz un cuartito y ahí ya no te sacan. Con el tiempo ya no te 
sacan. Cierto o falso, nomás la ley sabe.” LP-04. 
xxvii
 “No. es que si usted tiene su título, es suyo. Si usted quiere vender usted le pone 
precio, ya si ellos le quieren entrar, pues ya.” LP-03. 
xxviii “Pues incluso estamos a gusto, bueno, mi mamá si dice que ojala que más adelante; 
pero pues dice que supuestamente, no es mucho valor supuestamente verdad pero 
como que sin título estamos a gusto.” ER-02. 
xxix
 “Para mí, es mi casa, para mis hijos, para la familia y pues si un día llegamos a faltar 
ellos tienen donde vivir…” ER–06. 
xxx
 “Pues la verdad yo no sé, de esa calle para allá es otra colonia, y ahí es donde se 
mueven, nosotros aquí estamos olvidados, mire vinieron y pusieron el drenaje 
supuestamente el servicio era para todo Norias, pero como pensaron que nosotros 
éramos de allá, pusieron el drenaje ahí así, está la alcantarilla donde está el drenaje 
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mayor y toda esa cuadra pusieron drenaje, pero nosotros que somos de ahí dónde está 
esa camioneta todavía somos de Norias y no nos pusieron porque pensaron que era 
terreno irregular de allá, pero aquí es de Norias, nos discriminaron y no nos pusieron 
drenaje.” SO2–03 
xxxi
 “Haga de cuenta para nosotras, las mujeres. Ahorita, siempre que una junta, mujeres. 
Que vamos a hacer una petición de algo, mujeres…” ER–04. 
xxxii
 “…se le está muriendo su muchacho… un muchacho como éste. Empeñó el título de 
propiedad, ahorita todavía debe mil. Ya le falta poco, pero el título lo tiene empeñado. 
Dice que ya lo va a sacar. Pero sin trabajo ahorita.” ER–01. 
xxxiii
 “Nomás con una seguridad, que a uno si le da pendiente a uno que esta sin regularizar. 
De todos modos si nos quitaban, ¿qué? Ya nos habían dicho, si fincábamos y nos 
tumbaban… de todos modos llevábamos la de perder, porque así nos dijeron, finquen 
pero si les tumban… de aquí a que nos tumben, pues mientras vivo dos o tres años, 
pero no… como dice usted, pues luego no veo ningún beneficio porque incluso no 
tengo ni lo necesario aquí… ¿de qué sirve?” LP–02. 
xxxiv
 “No, pero sí he sabido, aquí a varias personas les han dicho que si venden, ¿pero usted 
cree? Si todos estamos bien pobres. Todos lo hicieron con sacrificios y batallas para 
hacer un techo, ¿usted cree que vendan? Ya con lo que les den ya no comprarán.” LP–
05. 
xxxv “Venían a veces a clausurar, pero aquí con nosotros nunca nos clausuraron, pero hay 
muchas partes que sí; aquí no porque no nos encontraban o no se veía para adentro.” 
LP-02. 
xxxvi
 “Bueno pues tratamos de conseguir los medios económicos que nos pedía vivienda, el 
enganche y pues trabajando, tratando de buscar cómo ve otro negocito aparte para 
poder pagar las mensualidades.” VC–03. 
xxxvii
 “Si se pudiera sí, pero que no fueran tan ratas, que no fueran tan caras las casas y 
nunca se acaban de pagar.” MO–01. 
xxxviii
 “…lo más caro la casa que ya me tiene harta hasta la fregada, la que compró mi 
marido en el INFONAVIT.” MO–02. 
xxxix
 “De hecho yo creo que podría ser algo de gobierno que pusiera un mediador entre 
trabajadores y la constructora, porque en realidad se me hacen las casas muy muy 
caras de INFONAVIT de lo que en realidad valen.” PD–02. 
xl
 “…no nos quedaron ganas por que nunca se acababan de pagar.” GP-02. 
 304 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
xli
 “Es que entro en tanditas, agarro una tanda de $50.00 pesos cada 8 días y me entregan 
$500.00 pesos y eso lo compro de block, los guardo y vuelvo a entrar a otra y el 
cemento y vuelvo a entrar a otra y así poco a poquito.” VC–01. 
xlii “Cuando yo llegué a vivir aquí ya estaba todo construido, ya por cierto había servicio de 
agua, algunas habitaciones ya tenían servicio de luz, ya había servicio de la luz 
pública, contenedores llegaron en esos días, ya teníamos servicios de esos.” VC-01. 
xliii “Pues también aislados tanta violencia e inseguridad.” OJ-01. 
xliv“Creo que los asentamientos irregulares no deberían existir.” RWP. 
xlv
 ARTÍCULO 581. – Para los efectos de este Código, se entiende por asentamientos 
humanos irregulares, a los núcleos de población ubicados en áreas o predios 
fraccionados o subdivididos sin la autorización correspondiente, cualquiera que sea su 
régimen de tenencia de la tierra. (State’s Urban Code 2007: 225). 
xlvi
 “La informalidad es ilegalidad.” COR. 
xlvii
 “Luego, el gobierno le mete dinero a esos asentamientos humanos irregulares, muchas 
de las veces violando la legislación penal que prohíbe que el gobierno le meta dinero a 
los asentamientos humanos irregulares.” SEP 
xlviii
 “…Idiosincrasia Mexicana… pareciera que amamos comprar lo prohibido.” SED 
xlix
 “La mentalidad Mexicana de ahorrar es con terreno… la casa es un patrimonio para 
toda la vida y para las nuevas generaciones.” UDE   
l
 “…los asentamientos irregulares probablemente se den principalmente porque no hay una 
regulación adecuada de la tenencia de la tierra desde el punto de vista donde se le 
pueda dar un uso habitacional, donde la autoridad tenga la rectoría de desarrollos 
habitacionales adecuados y por lo tanto pueda darse una oferta de vivienda de 
condiciones alcanzables para familias más pobres.” IVE 
li
 “No regulariza rápido para no dar el mal ejemplo, para no permear y no promoverlos.” 
COR 
lii
 “la autoconstrucción como tal sin una guía, creo que puede llegar a ser un problema 
urbano importante, un problema social también importante por las condiciones de la 
vivienda y los desarrollos o los conjuntos habitacionales que se dan de manera un 
tanto espontánea con la autoconstrucción pues también descuidan muchos aspectos de 
atención a algunas necesidades fundamentales y por lo tanto pueden provocar 
problemáticas sociales graves.” IVE 
liii
 “Es más caro para los pobres comprar [un lote] en un asentamiento informal que en uno 
formal.” SED 
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liv
 “Los Mexicanos somos muy malos planeadores y queremos resolver todo 
implementando programas. Esto es muy malo.” MFH 
lv
 “En el mismo gobierno federal no están organizados ellos. Por una lado la FONHAPO, el 
FOVISSSTE, la CONAVI, el INFONAVIT, la subsecretaria de desarrollo urbano, 
entonces, como somos los mexicanos, cada quien jala para su lado. Los estados igual y 
los dos mil y tantos municipios lo mismo. No hay una política de estado en el ámbito 
del desarrollo urbano, de la vivienda, y mucho menos de los asentamientos humanos 
irregulares.” SED 
lvi
 “El gran problema de la vivienda para pobres o la vivienda económica tiene mucho que 
ver con el valor de la tierra y el valor de la tierra está íntimamente relacionado con las 
políticas públicas de planeación, el crecimiento de las ciudades y la visión de largo 
plazo, de repente tenemos propuestas de que hay autoridades de gobiernos que quieren 
hacer desarrollos habitacionales pensando en economías de escala y pensando en 
grandes calidades en temas de vialidad, de servicios públicos, de tratamiento de agua, 
en fin tecnología de punta, pero a la hora que te pones a hacer los números con los 
valores de la tierra que tenemos no hay forma de que eso sea algo rentable, si tú 
quieres fomentar la vivienda económica tiene que ser negocio, si no es atractivo para 
un inversionista o para un empresario construir vivienda económica no la va a 
construir así de simple.” MFH 
lvii
 “La comisión estatal de prevención es solo para fotos yo no he visto una actividad real 
en el tiempo que estuve ahí.” UDE 
lviii “…yo creo que deben de ser considerados como parte de programas de asistencia social, 
que en la mentalidad del gobierno sean ubicados como no recuperables, lo que se 
pueda recuperar y lo que la gente pueda aportar qué bueno, pero que finalmente el 
objetivo no sea el estar haciendo negocio con la generación de fraccionamiento para 
estas personas…” RWP. 
lix
 “Sí podría una persona del sector informal lograr una vivienda con un crédito 
INFONAVIT siempre y cuando este se dé de alta y también genere una aportación. Se 
puede dar de alta, es lo que le llamamos REPECOS que son los pequeños 
contribuyentes, entonces pueden registrarse, hacen su aportación, cumplen la 
reglamentación que tiene el instituto en materia de créditos, y después de un tiempo 
determinado  logran su calificación como cualquier otro trabajador regular y entonces 
lo podrán solicitar.” INF 
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lx
 Por supuesto que sí [es atractivo atender a las personas más pobres], la banca y muchas 
empresas grandes prefieren no meterse con este segmento de mercado, porque implica 
mucho trabajo, es decir, poner a la gente a ahorrar. Para nosotros es un segmento del 
mercado perfectamente atendible y estamos trabajando con él.” MFH 
lxi
 Si [los pobres son financieramente confiables], sin embargo hay que tomar en cuanta 
ciertas características, por supuesto que lo son, son gente buena la mayoría de los 
casos, son gente que se dedica a lo suyo, el problema quizá venga con algún tipo de 
políticas públicas en relación con los pobres 
